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This great article from Steven Pinker is well worth it’s own thread.
Pinker explains the filmy concept of “group selection” and exposes it for what it is.
This great article from Steven Pinker is well worth it’s own thread.
Pinker explains the filmy concept of “group selection” and exposes it for what it is.
That’s one opinion. Presumably, you agree with him. But there are other evolutionary scientists, including ones with even more stellar reputations than Pinker, who take the opposite view. So it’s something that will be argued out over the next 20 years or so. You and I are just bystanders in that regard, although watching the parade from the opposite sides of the street.
I thought this was a fantastic essay and well worth the read. I started out disagreeing with him, but about halfway through I realized my disagreement was semantic, regarding the meaning of “group selection.” His definition of “group selection” seems precise and accurate to me, so I ended up not even disagreeing semantically.
The “money shot” for me was this:
To be sure, if we go back to group selection as an explanation of group traits, particularly cultural ones, then it’s easy to see how a group that successfully coerced or manipulated a renewable supply of its own members to launch suicide attacks might expand relative to other groups. But that would have nothing to do with its members’ inherited psychology, in this case, their willingness to sacrifice themselves without manipulation. The same is true for less extreme sacrifices.
I guess it sort of comes down to how much of our behavior is innate and how much is learned. Group selection seems to depend on the assumption that certain “altruistic” behavior is innate when that’s not necessarily the case. I’m beginning to think that our only truly innate trait vis-a-vis “groupishness” is empathy. Empathy gives rise to the conscience, which is basically just a vessel for a set of rules (morality) which reconcile self-interest with the interest of the group. The conscience itself may be empty at birth or it may come pre-figured with some basic rules, but either way it’s eventually filled with rules that are learned. “Stealing is wrong,” for example. If “stealing is wrong” is one of the rules contained in the vessel of my conscience, I’ll feel guilty and ashamed for stealing—even when stealing would benefit my own tangible self-interest. The intangible cost of stealing on my well-being (feeling guilty and ashamed) outweighs the tangible benefits of possessing whatever it is I’m thinking about stealing. But the key point is that “stealing is wrong” is probably a learned rule, not an innate one. I know it was for me!
So morality (the rules programmed into the conscience) is essentially just a mechanism for coercing or manipulating a renewable supply of society’s own members—not necessarily to launch suicide attacks, but to behave in ways that benefit the group at a tangible cost to the individual member: the “less extreme sacrifices” Pinker mentions.
Anyway, thanks for posting the link. It was a great read!
Good article. I’ve just recently read Pinker’s ‘The better Angels of Our Nature’ and this piece has confirmed to me that he’s a damned good thinker and writer. And, ASD, I think the quote you gave pretty much sums up his argument as to why certain apparently altruistic behaviour does not support the fuzzy notion of group selection either theoretically or empirically. An even better quote, I think, is the one by George Williams that Pinker uses: “a fleet herd of dear is really just a herd of fleet deer”.
Just one question, ASD. You say:
Empathy gives rise to the conscience, which is basically just a vessel for a set of rules (morality) which reconcile self-interest with the interest of the group. The conscience itself may be empty at birth or it may come pre-figured with some basic rules, but either way it’s eventually filled with rules that are learned.
I think conscience probably does come prefigured with at least some rules, just like the rules that account for the deep structure of language (See Pinker, The Language Instinct) I mean, empathy would probably be present even if you grew up without the moral teaching of a group. I think it probably comes from our innate ability to put ourselves in another’s shoes – innate like our ability to acquire complex language and understanding unstated categories such as subject and object, verb and noun. Could it not be the same to a certain extent with certain aspects of morality that seem universal in all but the psychopath? But, as I say, I think you’re pretty much on the money in your post above.
Talk this morning on robotics and AI, but the speaker also mentioned some tests they did comparing “genetic” selection vs group selection in robot models. What he found, given the parameters of the tests, was that the primary selective factor for the tasks they set the robots (these were learning able devices) was genetic, but that “altruistic” behavior arose via group selection. Rob, when you say that group selection is vague and poorly defined, you’re describing your understanding of the term. There are very well formulated mathematical theories of it.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 01 July 2012 05:09 AM
I think conscience probably does come prefigured with at least some rules, just like the rules that account for the deep structure of language (See Pinker, The Language Instinct) I mean, empathy would probably be present even if you grew up without the moral teaching of a group. I think it probably comes from our innate ability to put ourselves in another’s shoes – innate like our ability to acquire complex language and understanding unstated categories such as subject and object, verb and noun. Could it not be the same to a certain extent with certain aspects of morality that seem universal in all but the psychopath? But, as I say, I think you’re pretty much on the money in your post above.
I think you’re right about the conscience coming prefigured with at least some innate rules, but I also think learned rules are what eventually end up in there. Sometimes our learned moral rules reinforce our innate ones, sometimes they overwrite them. But I don’t think innate moral rules “survive” the learning process if the learned rules are different than the innate ones.
On the other hand, empathy, or maybe the capacity for empathy, I think is innate. There’s a difference between a normal person with the capacity to feel empathy but who has learned to not feel it or ignore it; and the psychopath, who probably lacks the capacity. And I think it’s the capacity to feel empathy that makes the conscience possible. A person lacking the capacity for empathy would therefore also lack a conscience. Psychopaths can learn moral rules, but I imagine that without a conscience moral rules “feel” like rules for addition or subtraction do to you and me. It’s one thing to “know” stealing is wrong; it’s another to “feel” it’s wrong. The conscience provides the feeling of wrongness or rightness, but the rules connected to those feelings can be anything.
If I’m right, then universal aspects of morality could be achieved simply by programming everyone’s conscience with the same moral rules. If that’s the case, then the “rightness” or “wrongness” of those rules doesn’t depend on some universally shared innate trait, but on the preferences of whoever decides what rules to program into everyone’s conscience.
Group selection has never been the mainstream view of the majority of evolutionary biologists.
The evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne noted;
Group selection isn’t widely accepted by evolutionists for several reasons. First, it’s not an efficient way to select for traits, like altruistic behavior, that are supposed to be detrimental to the individual but good for the group. Groups divide to form other groups much less often than organisms reproduce to form other organisms, so group selection for altruism would be unlikely to override the tendency of each group to quickly lose its altruists through natural selection favoring cheaters. Further, we simply have little evidence that selection on groups has promoted the evolution of any trait. Finally, other, more plausible evolutionary forces, like direct selection on individuals for reciprocal support, could have made us prosocial. These reasons explain why only a few biologists, like [David Sloan] Wilson and E. O. Wilson (no relation), advocate group selection as the evolutionary source of cooperation.
Richard Dawkins and fellow advocates of the gene-centered view of evolution remain unconvinced about group selection. In particular, Dawkins suggests that group selection fails to make an appropriate distinction between replicators and vehicles. Steven Pinker concluded that “Group Selection has no useful role to play in psychology or social science.”
Basically it seems to me that the argument is framed as sociobiology vs memetics.
I would also add that many people confuse ‘group selection’ with’ kin selection’, or ‘kin group selection’. This was beat to death on the old Richard Dawkins forum.
Kin selection was proposed by Darwin and is part of the modern synthesis, group selection is not. from Wiki-
“Kin group selection” should not be confused with the concept of “group selection”: a theory that a genetic trait can become prevalent within a group because it benefits the group as a whole, regardless of any benefit to individual organisms.
I would also add that many people confuse ‘group selection’ with’ kin selection’, or ‘kin group selection’. This was beat to death on the old Richard Dawkins forum.
Kin selection was proposed by Darwin and is part of the modern synthesis, group selection is not. from Wiki-
“Kin group selection” should not be confused with the concept of “group selection”: a theory that a genetic trait can become prevalent within a group because it benefits the group as a whole, regardless of any benefit to individual organisms.
Group selection was originally beaten almost to death around 40 years ago. The past few years, however, it’s been making a comeback in a more reasonable form. So you have the “new” group selectionists vs the “old” anti-group selectionists. One of the reasons it’s being reconsidered by some is that it appears that kin selection and mutual reciprocity are insufficient to explain the amount of cooperation that appears in human societies (most of the group selectionists today only want to apply it to humans).
And why should it only apply to humans? Is there something special about us that elevates us to a level at which natural did not or does not work? That’s really dumb.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 03 July 2012 06:37 AM
And why should it only apply to humans? Is there something special about us that elevates us to a level at which natural did not or does not work? That’s really dumb.
No, people who apply it only to humans point out that cultural factors can play a significant role in human group identity. E.g.,
“Culture is crucial for understanding human behavior. …Culture is part of biology. …Much evidence suggests that we have an evolved psychology that shapes what we learn and how we think, and that this in turn influences the kind of beliefs and attitudes that spread and persist. Theories that ignore these connections cannot adequately account for much of human behavior. At the same time, culture and cultural change cannot be understood solely in terms of innate psychology. Culture affects the success and survival of individuals and groups; as a result, some cultural variants spread and others diminish, leading to evolutionary processes that are every bit as real and important as those that shape genetic variation. These culturally evolved environments then affect which genes are favored by natural selection. Over the evolutionary long haul, culture has shaped our innate psychology as much as the other way around.” Richardson & Boyd (2005), Not By Genes Alone, pp. 3 - 4
Nice article. What I get from it is that when it comes to human behavior, not only are its influences by nature vs nurture usually both when considered as separate and distinct concepts, but that the concepts are inseparably interdependent and intertwined. He seems to be in line with Harris’ ideas expressed in TML.
Seen through the Trioonic Lens of Perception, Pinky’s problem become simple. He believes in mono-sentience.
For humans, genetics and Darwinian Evolution stop at the Chunk Limit, and then narrative sentience takes over.
(Rob):
And why should it only apply to humans? Is there something special about us that elevates us to a level at which natural did not or does not work? That’s really dumb.
Because… yes… dumb or not.
You were drawn to the word “elevation” the same way that I was drawn to the term ‘bridge”. Elevation to where? Plato’s Cave? The Shining City on a Hill? Belonging to something greater than our selves? How about, to a perceptual ability that we have and others don’t. And one that creates shared hyper-realities that look out for their own survival and growth without much regard for the blood and bone that made it possible.
It isn’t one or the other… biological evolution or cultural evolution… and there is no blending them together. Biology affects us directly but only below the chunk limit. Culture affects and creates our narrations that we then use them to train Hippo and Now to limit or proscribe what they would do for strictly biological reasons. That way, they will do things for cultural reasons that promote the survival and maintenance of the Big Story That Must Go On Forever including self-sacrifice. Narratives do not replicate. They grow and eat other narratives. How? By convincing humans via narrative resequencing that they can perceive it, too. Sometimes, the only way to kill one is to stop the blood flow to all the brains of people who believe it is “there”.
And, they believe it is there because our Post-Cinema Perception allows us to see it. Animals will never believe a narrative is “there” because they have no internal apparatus with which to perceive one.
Try 50 years burt. VC Wynne-Edwards wrote ‘Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior’ in 1962.
Resurgence it may be, but as Jerry Coyne pointed out in the paragraph I posted-‘Further, we simply have little evidence that selection on groups has promoted the evolution of any trait’
ANY trait. That’s the bottom line I think. Not sufficient evidence to support the proposition, however attractive it may sound to some Sociobiologists.
‘Presumably it would, in principle, be possible to imagine a group-level equivalent of individual inclusive fitness: that property of a group of organisms which will appear to be maximized when what is really being maximized is the survival of the genes controlling the phenotypic characters of the group. The difficulty with this is that, while we can conceive of ways in which genes can exert phenotypic power over the limbs and nervous systems of the bodies in which they sit, it is rather harder to conceive of their exerting phenotypic power over the “limbs” and “nervous systems” of whole groups of organisms. The group of organisms is too diffuse, not coherent enough to be seen as a unit of phenotypic power.’
The greater debate concerning group selection is the genotype vs phenotype as the unit that natural selection acts on producing adaptation.
Try 50 years burt. VC Wynne-Edwards wrote ‘Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior’ in 1962.
Resurgence it may be, but as Jerry Coyne pointed out in the paragraph I posted-‘Further, we simply have little evidence that selection on groups has promoted the evolution of any trait’
ANY trait. That’s the bottom line I think. Not sufficient evidence to support the proposition, however attractive it may sound to some Sociobiologists.
Check out the article by Martin Nowak in the July 2012 issue of Scientific American.
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