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i have a hard time following what all of you are saying - you reject the term “free will” as having some religious overtones embedded in metaphysics? at least that is what i think i am understanding - but are you says that the human brain is not capable of making a choice independently based upon information that it receives - that the brain does not really weigh the options and come to an independent conclusion - are you saying that all the brain is doing is making decisions based upon a rigid cause and effect phenomena that drives the brain to a predetermined resolution?
cause and effect occurs almost nowhere in this universe - it occurs in most but not all mathematics [impossible numbers are outside this] and in general physics but not in relativity, quantum, sub-quantum, string, or black-hole related physics, not in dark matter nor dark energy physics as far as we can tell - this pushes cause and effect into a narrow corner - when the “forward pointing arrow” of that thing we call “time” is irrelevant than cause and effect mean nothing - cause and effect don’t take into account impossible ideas - nor can it take into account possibilities - Watson can run from now til the end of time - it can never posit a possibility only a probability - the human brain is capable of considering things that are impossible: the notions of add - or - neither - both and/or; neither and/ or - these notions fly in the face of cause and effect but we use them all the time in philosophy and in physics and in fuzzy math - [which helps Watson to “think”] - none of this has anything to do with cause and effect - the mental creation of impossibilities such as paradox, contradictions, absurdities. etc,etc etc.
Simpson’s paradox for continuous data: a positive trend appears for two separate groups (blue and red), a negative trend (black, dashed) appears when the data are combined. In probability and statistics, Simpson’s paradox (Yule–Simpson effect) is a paradox in which a correlation present in different groups is reversed when the groups are combined. This result is often encountered in social-science and medical-science statistics, and is particularly confounding when frequency data are unduly given CAUSAL interpretations. As Karl Popper pointed out we can never know with any certainty as to whether causality can be asserted in almost anything having to do with human behavior - inferential statistical analysis is flawed by the phenomenon of the ability of only ever being able to prove the consequent - inferential analysis - the only way we have of present to assess human behavior can never be proven - it lies in the realm of possibilities. Causality can only exist in the world of probabilities. It has no place in the world outside of the scope of what can be understood to be possible. The human brain on the other hand is capable of positing the impossible.
Say what? Let me summarize, people are special and not subject to causality because they can make shit up. I’d say you proved the make the shit up part anyway.
Rather than fruitlessly arguing about whether or not Harris’ take on free will is correct, it might make sense instead to wonder about Harris’ and others’ goals in their arguments. People don’t write books just to make points out of context with real-world goals, fears and emotion-based views. I can think of some valuable reasons to pronounce the death of free will. How about you? If I only get cricket chirps, I’ll try to return to this question later with some of my personal opinions on the matter.
I think this is spot on. I’ve just finished reading Sam’s latest blog on “Free Will and “Free Will” - How my view differs from Daniel Dennett’s”. It seems to me that the biggest difference is a political one rather than a scientific one or broad philosophical one. I’m guessing Sam would be ok with “compatibilism” if it came via a different name, such as “rejectionism” or “wake-upism” or something.
But I would like to support Sam’s objection too. I don’t see it as coddling. “Compatibilism” as a word does seem to promote the unsustainable status quo. But even more deeply, why do we do science? Do we seek “truths” for their own sake or do we seek to add value? The first reason is a luxury in a lazy, unsustainable world. We need to change. We need to view self and free will (and religion) differently if we are to turn this ship in a new direction. I think we need the benefits of a growing evitability that also promotes our species’ sustainability and our planet’s synergistic biodiversity…
Retribution is a morally repugnant idea (to me) Making it also a scientifically and philosophically irrational concept will hopefully push it toward the margins.
Some people like retribution, some don’t. Sam’s fight over free will is a fight over rationalizations for pre existing preferences.
Of course there are causal, reductionist reasons why you selected a ham on rye instead of a hot dog for lunch. Anyone with a little scientific literacy who isn’t a Mysterion accepts that. But that in no way eradicates the preference a person has with respect to retribution, one way or another.
Retribution is a morally repugnant idea (to me) Making it also a scientifically and philosophically irrational concept will hopefully push it toward the margins.
Some people like retribution, some don’t. Sam’s fight over free will is a fight over rationalizations for pre existing preferences.
Of course there are causal, reductionist reasons why you selected a ham on rye instead of a hot dog for lunch. Anyone with a little scientific literacy who isn’t a Mysterion accepts that. But that in no way eradicates the preference a person has with respect to retribution, one way or another.
Retribution! A concept dependent on the existence of free will. But what if retribution is the antidote to empathy, when empathy might lead one to behave immorally? What if the average homo sapiens is incapable of meting out punishment without prompted by a sense, however wrong, of retribution? On a rational level, it’s easy to justify punishing people who don’t deserve to suffer. Maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures is a rational objective. But what happens when our irrational sense of empathy gets in the way of our rational goal of maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures? We fight irrational with irrational: we employ retribution. Without retribution, morality would have no teeth.
Retribution! A concept dependent on the existence of free will.
I find most of what you wrote plausible from an evolutionary perspective. In fact, the defining characteristic of a moral preferences is the punishment associated with violations of the preference.
But I disagree with the above. Retribution isn’t a concept dependent on other concepts, it is a impulse based on a preference, both existing because of evolutionary pressures long before we pontificated on rationalizations about them.
Retribution! A concept dependent on the existence of free will.
I find most of what you wrote plausible from an evolutionary perspective. In fact, the defining characteristic of a moral preferences is the punishment associated with violations of the preference.
But I disagree with the above. Retribution isn’t a concept dependent on other concepts, it is a impulse based on a preference, both existing because of evolutionary pressures long before we pontificated on rationalizations about them.
I know. But given that we can now, and therefore (it seems) must rationalize our beliefs, doesn’t retribution at least owe its continued existence to the belief in free will? It’s pretty hard to rationalize any other way.
Retribution! A concept dependent on the existence of free will.
I find most of what you wrote plausible from an evolutionary perspective. In fact, the defining characteristic of a moral preferences is the punishment associated with violations of the preference.
But I disagree with the above. Retribution isn’t a concept dependent on other concepts, it is a impulse based on a preference, both existing because of evolutionary pressures long before we pontificated on rationalizations about them.
I know. But given that we can now, and therefore (it seems) must rationalize our beliefs, doesn’t retribution at least owe its continued existence to the belief in free will? It’s pretty hard to rationalize any other way.
No. I don’t believe in freewill but I still believe in retribution.
Retribution! A concept dependent on the existence of free will.
I find most of what you wrote plausible from an evolutionary perspective. In fact, the defining characteristic of a moral preferences is the punishment associated with violations of the preference.
But I disagree with the above. Retribution isn’t a concept dependent on other concepts, it is a impulse based on a preference, both existing because of evolutionary pressures long before we pontificated on rationalizations about them.
I know. But given that we can now, and therefore (it seems) must rationalize our beliefs, doesn’t retribution at least owe its continued existence to the belief in free will? It’s pretty hard to rationalize any other way.
No. I don’t believe in freewill but I still believe in retribution.
Do you rationalize it? Or just blindly believe in it for no reason?
Retribution! A concept dependent on the existence of free will.
I find most of what you wrote plausible from an evolutionary perspective. In fact, the defining characteristic of a moral preferences is the punishment associated with violations of the preference.
But I disagree with the above. Retribution isn’t a concept dependent on other concepts, it is a impulse based on a preference, both existing because of evolutionary pressures long before we pontificated on rationalizations about them.
I know. But given that we can now, and therefore (it seems) must rationalize our beliefs, doesn’t retribution at least owe its continued existence to the belief in free will? It’s pretty hard to rationalize any other way.
No. I don’t believe in freewill but I still believe in retribution.
Do you rationalize it? Or just blindly believe in it for no reason?
Retribution! A concept dependent on the existence of free will.
I find most of what you wrote plausible from an evolutionary perspective. In fact, the defining characteristic of a moral preferences is the punishment associated with violations of the preference.
But I disagree with the above. Retribution isn’t a concept dependent on other concepts, it is a impulse based on a preference, both existing because of evolutionary pressures long before we pontificated on rationalizations about them.
I know. But given that we can now, and therefore (it seems) must rationalize our beliefs, doesn’t retribution at least owe its continued existence to the belief in free will? It’s pretty hard to rationalize any other way.
No. I don’t believe in freewill but I still believe in retribution.
Do you rationalize it? Or just blindly believe in it for no reason?
It is determined, I had no choice.
All right, but that just means you’re the exception that proves the rule.
The key word is rational. Sure some people have ‘preferences’ for causing suffering as retribution. Sure subjective theories allow for that. In the reason-implying sense I believe a factual assessment of ‘free will’ is a strong basis to make desert of retribution wrong. Yes, there are practical matters to consider, but they do not deserve to suffer.
GAD, I hope you realize how silly the above looks coming from a normally intelligent and at times somewhat brilliant person. My apologies and embarrassments if you were kidding, which I think you may have been.
GAD, I hope you realize how silly the above looks coming from a normally intelligent and at times somewhat brilliant person. My apologies and embarrassments if you were kidding, which I think you may have been.
I’ve been called a lot of things on this forum but never intelligent or somewhat brilliant, I’m going to have to think about that for a while. As for my comment like many things I post it’s much deeper then it appears but I lack the skill/energy to articulate it well and at depth. Which is something else that has got me called many things far from intelligent or brilliant.
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