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I don’t think I conceded that reality is dependent on perception. I suppose it is more accurate to say I conceded that “some parts of reality” are dependent on perception, but to me, those words ultimately convey something different from what I was hoping to. I was hoping to articulate that some things that exist in reality were themselves perceptions.
“Some things that exist in reality were themselves perceptions?” What’s that supposed to mean? They started out as mere perceptions but somehow graduated to existing in reality? And now that they do exist in reality, will they persist even after no one perceives them anymore? Can things be perceived out of existence as well as into it? I don’t think that’s what you’re trying to articulate. You concede as much:
Libeqrat - 24 June 2012 09:31 PM
I agree that there is no mind-independent plane of morality or “oughts.” Looking for it is a fool’s errand.
Spin it however you like; the bottom line is, your position is that “some parts of reality” do depend on human perception. Let’s not lose sight of that or try to make it sound more plausible with misleading articulations. If ought exists in reality as you claim, and there is no mind-independent plane of ought, then the part of reality that includes ought is mind-dependent. That part of reality depends on our perception.
So we’re beyond the issue of whether ought exists independent of human perception; we both agree it doesn’t. The issue now is whether a mind-dependent part of reality—the part of reality that includes ought—exists alongside the normal, mind-independent part. Agreed?
I’ll admit, a mind-dependent part of reality isn’t something I’ve ever seriously considered. (You don’t believe Uri Geller really bent those spoons, do you?) Do you have any evidence for its existence? Of course you do: your perception that it exists is all the evidence you need. Because mind-dependent reality is itself a part of…mind-dependent reality! It exists because you perceive it rather than the other way round.
Finally, back to the question I asked before: what determines whether something belongs to the mind-dependent part of reality as opposed to the mind-independent part? Does that depend on perception, too? You can see how that leads to some unlikely conclusions. If I perceive that Santa Claus exists, and I also perceive that he belongs to mind-dependent reality, then…Presto Magico! he exists. Or, he ought to.
Lest you claim that nothing which takes physical form (like Santa) belongs to mind-dependent reality, then how about things like God or karma? Are God and karma neighbors of ought out there in mind-dependent reality? If not, why not?
I don’t think I conceded that reality is dependent on perception. I suppose it is more accurate to say I conceded that “some parts of reality” are dependent on perception, but to me, those words ultimately convey something different from what I was hoping to. I was hoping to articulate that some things that exist in reality were themselves perceptions.
“Some things that exist in reality were themselves perceptions?” What’s that supposed to mean? They started out as mere perceptions but somehow graduated to existing in reality? And now that they do exist in reality, will they persist even after no one perceives them anymore? Can things be perceived out of existence as well as into it? I don’t think that’s what you’re trying to articulate. You concede as much:
Libeqrat - 24 June 2012 09:31 PM
I agree that there is no mind-independent plane of morality or “oughts.” Looking for it is a fool’s errand.
Spin it however you like; the bottom line is, your position is that “some parts of reality” do depend on human perception. Let’s not lose sight of that or try to make it sound more plausible with misleading articulations. If ought exists in reality as you claim, and there is no mind-independent plane of ought, then the part of reality that includes ought is mind-dependent. That part of reality depends on our perception.
So we’re beyond the issue of whether ought exists independent of human perception; we both agree it doesn’t. The issue now is whether a mind-dependent part of reality—the part of reality that includes ought—exists alongside the normal, mind-independent part. Agreed?
I’ll admit, a mind-dependent part of reality isn’t something I’ve ever seriously considered. (You don’t believe Uri Geller really bent those spoons, do you?) Do you have any evidence for its existence? Of course you do: your perception that it exists is all the evidence you need. Because mind-dependent reality is itself a part of…mind-dependent reality! It exists because you perceive it rather than the other way round.
Finally, back to the question I asked before: what determines whether something belongs to the mind-dependent part of reality as opposed to the mind-independent part? Does that depend on perception, too? You can see how that leads to some unlikely conclusions. If I perceive that Santa Claus exists, and I also perceive that he belongs to mind-dependent reality, then…Presto Magico! he exists. Or, he ought to.
Lest you claim that nothing which takes physical form (like Santa) belongs to mind-dependent reality, then how about things like God or karma? Are God and karma neighbors of ought out there in mind-dependent reality? If not, why not?
I honestly thought I had answered your queries. Since my words were insufficient, or even misleading as you say, I will happily try again.
What do I mean by “some things in reality [are] themselves perceptions?” Nothing more than what you agreed to earlier: Perceptions exist in reality.
I am not proposing that Uri Geller-style telekinesis occurs (no experiment has ever offered any evidence in favor of it). I am not proposing Peter Pan’s notion that fairies actually live and breathe as as long as a sufficient number of people believe they do. I am not proposing that wishing for something can make it come true. I am not proposing anything along such lines, and that is not what I meant by positing a relationship between mind and matter.
I am proposing the following about the universe we inhabit: If matter is configured in a certain way, that matter will develop a capacity for subjective perception; consciousness; a mind. The subjectivity that exists by virtue of a particular arrangement of matter exists in reality. In short, subjectivity objectively exists.
You, for instance, are a configuration of matter with subjectivity. Your subjectivity exists even if I deny its existence. Even if everyone denies its existence. Even if all other conscious beings disappear and leave you as the only sentient configuration of matter in the universe, your subjectivity still exists in reality. It only ceases to exist when your particular configuration of matter changes in a certain way (i.e. you die). And even when you do die, your subjectivity still objectively existed at one point in time.
So, what determines whether something is part of “mind-dependent reality?” Personally, I think it would be misleading to posit the existence of mind-dependent reality vs. mind-independent reality. There is just “reality.” A planet can exist in reality if matter is configured in a certain way. So can, say, fear. Each exists in reality, but the latter is, to use a term we have been employing, “dependent on perception.” That is, before fear can exist, matter must be configured in such a way that it develops a capacity for subjective perception.
May I ask you, do the following things exist in reality?: (1) Pain; (2) Itches; (3) Orgasms; (4) Vision; (5) Emotions; (6) Words.
I am quite interested in how you would answer for each of the things listed.
So, what determines whether something is part of “mind-dependent reality?” Personally, I think it would be misleading to posit the existence of mind-dependent reality vs. mind-independent reality. There is just “reality.” A planet can exist in reality if matter is configured in a certain way. So can, say, fear. Each exists in reality, but the latter is, to use a term we have been employing, “dependent on perception.” That is, before fear can exist, matter must be configured in such a way that it develops a capacity for subjective perception.
May I ask you, do the following things exist in reality?: (1) Pain; (2) Itches; (3) Orgasms; (4) Vision; (5) Emotions; (6) Words.
I am quite interested in how you would answer for each of the things listed.
Yes, of course all those things exist in reality, as does fear. But isn’t fear itself a perception? Fear exists in reality just like all perceptions exist in reality. Fear is the perception of danger. Are lions dangerous because we fear them or do we fear them because they’re dangerous? The danger of something exists independent of our perception of it. Lions are dangerous whether we fear them or not; spiders (most of them) are not dangerous despite most people’s fear of them. So again, I think you’re blurring the distinction between the perception—which exists in reality—and the thing being perceived, which exists (or doesn’t) independent of our perception of it.
May I ask you, do the following things exist in reality?: (1) Pain; (2) Itches; (3) Orgasms; (4) Vision; (5) Emotions; (6) Words.
I am quite interested in how you would answer for each of the things listed.
Yes, of course all those things exist in reality, as does fear. But isn’t fear itself a perception? Fear exists in reality just like all perceptions exist in reality.
Exactly. This was one of my points all along. It now appears we are on the same page on that.
I’m still interested, though . . . since you agree that words exist in reality, how do you think they exist? They do not exist in the same way as the Earth, the sun or the orbit of the former around the latter, correct? Those things exist even if nobody is around to perceive them. Not quite so with words. Words come from within us. We are the ultimate arbiters of what they mean. Does this preclude objective knowledge about them? Can we not determine their objective definitions because they are dependent on human perception in a way that planets and stars are not? Are dictionary writers engaging in as forlorn an activity as you think Sam Harris is?
Fear is the perception of danger.
Well, I’m not sure that quite captures what fear is. Fear is a physical sensation that can accompany the perception of danger.
Are lions dangerous because we fear them or do we fear them because they’re dangerous? The danger of something exists independent of our perception of it. Lions are dangerous whether we fear them or not; spiders (most of them) are not dangerous despite most people’s fear of them.
I’m in complete agreement with you here. Whether actual danger exists, fear might or might not exist in the subjectivity of the entity in danger.
So again, I think you’re blurring the distinction between the perception—which exists in reality—and the thing being perceived, which exists (or doesn’t) independent of our perception of it.
Oh, not at all. Actually, I’m quite puzzled as to why you think I’m doing that.
Fear is a physical sensation, a perception, a state of mind. It can be generated by correct beliefs about reality or incorrect beliefs about reality. Or simply the lack of belief about reality (the unknown—fear brought on by unfamiliarity, and thus the possibility of imminent danger). Or it can be generated for seemingly no rational reason whatsoever.
Everything I have been saying is wedded to the notion that sensations, perceptions, states of mind, etc., just exist on their own. They exist as perceptions, as subjective states of mind, but they nonetheless objectively exist on their own. They can be studied objectively as what they are.
Moreover, we can adjudge them objectively using the science of health, as sensations/perceptions are facets of our biology. As but a simplistic example: fear generated in a human being by the approach of a bear—healthy, benign or malignant? Most likely healthy, assuming it doesn’t paralyze the human such that she cannot get herself to safety. Fear generated by a bowl of Cheerios? Probably not actively healthy. Perhaps benign, perhaps malignant. Whatever the case, these judgments are objective ones that can be made simply of the sensation of fear.
And if we recognize that “valuing” is a biological sensation as well, we can make similarly objective judgments about our values. Are they healthy, benign or malignant? Moral beliefs can likewise be analyzed this way, I think. The belief that homosexual acts are immoral, for instance: Healthy? Benign? Malignant? At the very least, I think it’s possible to answer.
Perhaps there is an impenetrable semantic roadblock to understanding “morality” this way as people tend to assume that “objective morality” must be something “out there” like a planet. Perhaps it would be better to say, “There is no ‘morality,’ there is only ‘health.’”?
I’m still interested, though . . . since you agree that words exist in reality, how do you think they exist? They do not exist in the same way as the Earth, the sun or the orbit of the former around the latter, correct? Those things exist even if nobody is around to perceive them. Not quite so with words. Words come from within us. We are the ultimate arbiters of what they mean. Does this preclude objective knowledge about them? Can we not determine their objective definitions because they are dependent on human perception in a way that planets and stars are not? Are dictionary writers engaging in as forlorn an activity as you think Sam Harris is?
Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that words both depend on perception and exist in reality, thus providing a counterexample to my claim that reality exists independent of our perception. What kind of objective knowledge is possible about words? Suppose we wanted to know the word for a colorful speaking bird. What would “Science” tell us? Science would say, “It depends on what language you’re speaking.”
We could then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit. We want you to determine what word we ought to use for a colorful speaking bird.” So we put our scientists to work on it. And the scientist from Spain says, “Science has determined that the word for a colorful speaking bird is, ‘pajarito.’ Therefore, we ought to say ‘pajarito’ whenever we mean a colorful speaking bird.”
Would you agree with the Spanish-speaking scientist?
Now suppose we demand of Science, “Science, is stoning adulteresses wrong?” and Science replies, “It depends on what values you subscribe to.” We would then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit. We want you to determine whether we ought to stone adulteresses.” So we put our scientists to work on it. And the scientist from the Libeqrat Institute who believes that right and wrong are determined by human health and notes that stoning adulteresses is bad for the adulteress’s health says, “Science has determined that stoning adulteresses is wrong. Therefore, we ought not stone them.”
Would you agree with the Libeqrat Institute scientist? Why is the Libeqrat Institute scientist’s choice of health as the basis for right and wrong less subjective than the Spanish-speaking scientist’s choice of Spanish as the basis for words?
I’m still interested, though . . . since you agree that words exist in reality, how do you think they exist? They do not exist in the same way as the Earth, the sun or the orbit of the former around the latter, correct? Those things exist even if nobody is around to perceive them. Not quite so with words. Words come from within us. We are the ultimate arbiters of what they mean. Does this preclude objective knowledge about them? Can we not determine their objective definitions because they are dependent on human perception in a way that planets and stars are not? Are dictionary writers engaging in as forlorn an activity as you think Sam Harris is?
Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that words both depend on perception and exist in reality, thus providing a counterexample to my claim that reality exists independent of our perception. What kind of objective knowledge is possible about words? Suppose we wanted to know the word for a colorful speaking bird. What would “Science” tell us? Science would say, “It depends on what language you’re speaking.”
We could then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit. We want you to determine what word we ought to use for a colorful speaking bird.” So we put our scientists to work on it. And the scientist from Spain says, “Science has determined that the word for a colorful speaking bird is, ‘pajarito.’ Therefore, we ought to say ‘pajarito’ whenever we mean a colorful speaking bird.”
Would you agree with the Spanish-speaking scientist?
Now suppose we demand of Science, “Science, is stoning adulteresses wrong?” and Science replies, “It depends on what values you subscribe to.” We would then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit. We want you to determine whether we ought to stone adulteresses.” So we put our scientists to work on it. And the scientist from the Libeqrat Institute who believes that right and wrong are determined by human health and notes that stoning adulteresses is bad for the adulteress’s health says, “Science has determined that stoning adulteresses is wrong. Therefore, we ought not stone them.”
Would you agree with the Libeqrat Institute scientist? Why is the Libeqrat Institute scientist’s choice of health as the basis for right and wrong less subjective than the Spanish-speaking scientist’s choice of Spanish as the basis for words?
Well, I think the onus of proof here is on the Ahab Institute of morality—after all we don’t stone people for chewing gum in class or breaking wind at the table, so why is sleeping with somebody. that the Imam didn’t certify as fuckable a capital offense? “Oh,” explains the Ahab Institute representative “there was this merchant we call Muhammad [‘cause nobody really remembers his real name] that around 610 A.D. had these divine revelations that he wrote down in this book we call the Koran that might appear to the casual observer to be mostly plagiarism of the bible but in point-of-fact is the single source of all unquestionable divine knowledge. Therein it is revealed that every man is entitled to four wives and if any of them fool around with any of the other 3 out of 4 guys standing around with a hard on in their pocket, all of her friends and family are required to stone her to death in the public square.”
Well, now that Ahab institute has had its say it seem a rather paltry thing that some person with hopes and dreams is never again going to kiss her kids goodnight or hold her little girl when she’s scared. It makes complete sense to me now. Of course, all this relativistic bullshit is still bullshit isn’t it? Just ask Mr. Ahab Institute representative—he’ll tell you what he thinks of your relativistic bullshit, won’t he?
Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that words both depend on perception and exist in reality, thus providing a counterexample to my claim that reality exists independent of our perception.
I thought we were on the same page on that already. Were we not?
What kind of objective knowledge is possible about words?
Suppose someone asks you, “Does the English word ‘cat’ denote a an eight-legged creature that spins webs?” Is your answer, “I’m sorry, but there is no objective answer to that question, but I can give you my subjective opinion.”?
Suppose we wanted to know the word for a colorful speaking bird. What would “Science” tell us? Science would say, “It depends on what language you’re speaking.” We could then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit.
We could say that, but we would cease to make sense. How is that “relativistic bullshit?” Suppose we wanted to know how much Antisocialdarwinist weighs. If science says, “It depends on what planet Antisocialdarwinist is on,” is that relativistic bullshit that somehow precludes objective answers to the question?
Suppose we wanted to know the word for a colorful speaking bird. What would “Science” tell us? Science would say, “It depends on what language you’re speaking.” [ ] We could then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit.We want you to determine what word we ought to use for a colorful speaking bird.” So we put our scientists to work on it. And the scientist from Spain says, “Science has determined that the word for a colorful speaking bird is, ‘pajarito.’ Therefore, we ought to say ‘pajarito’ whenever we mean a colorful speaking bird.”
Would you agree with the Spanish-speaking scientist?
No, but I would wonder what the Spanish-speaking scientist and her interrogator “we” think the word “ought” means.
Now suppose we demand of Science, “Science, is stoning adulteresses wrong?” and Science replies, “It depends on what values you subscribe to.” We would then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit. We want you to determine whether we ought to stone adulteresses.” So we put our scientists to work on it. And the scientist from the Libeqrat Institute who believes that right and wrong are determined by human health and notes that stoning adulteresses is bad for the adulteress’s health says, “Science has determined that stoning adulteresses is wrong. Therefore, we ought not stone them.”
Would you agree with the Libeqrat Institute scientist?
No, I would think that the founder of the Libeqrat Institute had died, leaving Antisocialdarwinist in charge to hire scientists despite having altogether failed to convey to Antisocialdarwinist what she had in mind.
Why is the Libeqrat Institute scientist’s choice of health as the basis for right and wrong less subjective than the Spanish-speaking scientist’s choice of Spanish as the basis for words?
First, I wasn’t suggesting that because we could gain objective knowledge about words that we could therefore determine which words were the morally correct ones to use. I was just curious, since you agreed that words existed in reality, how you believed they existed. What their nature was, and what can we know objectively about them. I was just trying to understand your understanding of “objectivity.” Refer to my question above about the definition of “cat.” Do you believe it has an objective answer? (Whatever your answer, I don’t think it has any implications for whether we should use “cat” instead of “gato” when referring to felines.)
To the extent that the question does have an objective answer (e.g., No, the English word “cat” does not mean an eight-legged creature that spins webs; the word you’re looking for is “spider.”), what I think this suggests is simply that we can gain objective knowledge about something even though it originates in, and is dependent on, the mind. If you disagree with this—with this statement alone—I eagerly await your rebuttal, as I would like to know where my mistake is.
As for your question, it seems like you’re suggesting that I merely have a subjective preference for analyzing morality through the lens of health, just as a Spanish speaker might have a subjective preference for using Spanish instead of any other language. Which would suggest to me that you think that I have arbitrarily chosen health as objective measure of morality. (Please correct me if I have misinterpreted you.)
I don’t want to continue if I have misunderstood you, but I do want to ask, do you think the word “ought” has an objective definition? If so, what is it? What does “ought” mean? The word on its own. Not whether any particular statement or claim that employs the word “ought” is right or wrong, but just what we mean by the word “ought.” Perhaps if we can come to some mutual understanding about the term, we can discuss this topic without misunderstanding each other.
I have a theory why Hume, and his modern day followers, did/do not acknowledge that one can objectivity derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ in certain senses. I call this theory the “Senses Not Obvious Theory”, or SNOT. Under this theory, rather than the world having an actual is/ought problem, certain individuals simply do not understand the SNOT problem.
I’ll bite: what specifically don’t certain people understand about your SNOT?
Thanks for asking.
Picture 10,000 years ago as humans were on the cusp of coming out of the stone age. Along the way we have learned a lot of facts.
Still, looking forward another 10,000 years, this era we were born into will probably be viewed as a time of vast ignorance, a point in time where harmony with nature took second place to greedy profits for a select group of individuals. A time when outright deception through advertising could dominate government actions through paid messaging communication networks controlled by the likes of Rupert Murdoch.
Theoretically, the Earth could sustain future human evolution for billions of years and it is fun to imagine what they will figure out or be capable of.
In many senses, the story of humanity is our slow crawl out of ignorance.
I think ultimate objective truth may only be known once all of the facts across all time and space are known.
While that may be a really high bar, I disagree with subjectivists when they assert that “ultimate objective truth does not exist”. I think such a statement is the equivalent of saying that “all of the facts across space and time do and did not exist.” I believe it is more accurate to say that we are a very long way off from discovering and confirming anything close to ultimate objective truth.
That does not mean that objective truth is not “out there shining down” (paraphrasing Derek Parfit). I believe the objective truth that is “out there” is basically all of nature as we discover it, including our DNA. We have much more to figure out.
No one can claim ultimate objective truth. All we can do now is take crude readings and accumulate facts using our past and current technology. Whether moral or scientific, good theories should present wanted, predictive, testable, monitored outcomes. Worldwide health and well being combined with steps to insure sustainable evolving life for humans and Earth’s ecosystem for billions of years are obvious high priorities.
So, back to the SNOT (Sense Not Obvious Theory) problem that many subjectivists have. Let me give you an example. I have seen you basically argue that deciding about stoning a woman for adultery or choosing one’s favorite color are preferences in the same league, missing the fact that theories related to predictive outcomes related to civil options to deal with the multifaceted issue of “adultery” are not remotely similar to theories related simply to choosing one’s favorite color. That when we are talking about the two we are talking in different senses.
just wanted to stop in and note the colossal amount of words you guys (poldano, brick, jeff, asd) have used to get basically nowhere
i feel pity for you guys, watching how happy you all are to be going round and round in your evolutionary eddies. in an ideal universe your mental activity could be monitored indefinitely to see just how long you remain stuck. i suppose at some point though the predictability would pass a certainty threshold indicating an end to the usefulness of recording such uninspired repetition…
Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that words both depend on perception and exist in reality, thus providing a counterexample to my claim that reality exists independent of our perception.
I thought we were on the same page on that already. Were we not?
We both agree that words exist in reality. I’m not convinced they depend on our perception. Maybe it would be more accurate to say they don’t depend on the observer’s perception. If I perceive the word “cat” to mean an eight-legged creature that spins webs, does that make it so? Maybe words are themselves perceptions. It’s an intriguing topic in and of itself. But it’s neither here nor there in terms of connecting “is” and “ought,” so I’m willing to concede the point for now.
Libeqrat - 06 July 2012 07:13 PM
What kind of objective knowledge is possible about words?
Suppose someone asks you, “Does the English word ‘cat’ denote a an eight-legged creature that spins webs?” Is your answer, “I’m sorry, but there is no objective answer to that question, but I can give you my subjective opinion.”?
Suppose someone asks you, “Is stoning adulteresses wrong in the United States?” Is your answer, “I’m sorry, but there is no objective answer to that question, but I can give you my subjective opinion?”
The qualifiers, “In the United States” and “English” establish a context for making objective claims. Remove the context and it’s no longer possible.
Libeqrat - 06 July 2012 07:13 PM
Suppose we wanted to know the word for a colorful speaking bird. What would “Science” tell us? Science would say, “It depends on what language you’re speaking.” We could then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit.
We could say that, but we would cease to make sense. How is that “relativistic bullshit?” Suppose we wanted to know how much Antisocialdarwinist weighs. If science says, “It depends on what planet Antisocialdarwinist is on,” is that relativistic bullshit that somehow precludes objective answers to the question?
It’s not relativistic bullshit in my opinion. It’s only relativistic bullshit if you take the position that the only words which exist in reality are English words, or that the only weight which exists in reality is weight on Earth. Or that the only morals which exist in reality are the ones based on one particular value system.
Libeqrat - 06 July 2012 07:13 PM
Suppose we wanted to know the word for a colorful speaking bird. What would “Science” tell us? Science would say, “It depends on what language you’re speaking.” [ ] We could then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit.We want you to determine what word we ought to use for a colorful speaking bird.” So we put our scientists to work on it. And the scientist from Spain says, “Science has determined that the word for a colorful speaking bird is, ‘pajarito.’ Therefore, we ought to say ‘pajarito’ whenever we mean a colorful speaking bird.”
Would you agree with the Spanish-speaking scientist?
No, but I would wonder what the Spanish-speaking scientist and her interrogator “we” think the word “ought” means.
Now suppose we demand of Science, “Science, is stoning adulteresses wrong?” and Science replies, “It depends on what values you subscribe to.” We would then say, “No, Science, that’s not good enough. We don’t want any of your relativistic bullshit. We want you to determine whether we ought to stone adulteresses.” So we put our scientists to work on it. And the scientist from the Libeqrat Institute who believes that right and wrong are determined by human health and notes that stoning adulteresses is bad for the adulteress’s health says, “Science has determined that stoning adulteresses is wrong. Therefore, we ought not stone them.”
Would you agree with the Libeqrat Institute scientist?
No, I would think that the founder of the Libeqrat Institute had died, leaving Antisocialdarwinist in charge to hire scientists despite having altogether failed to convey to Antisocialdarwinist what she had in mind.
Why is the Libeqrat Institute scientist’s choice of health as the basis for right and wrong less subjective than the Spanish-speaking scientist’s choice of Spanish as the basis for words?
First, I wasn’t suggesting that because we could gain objective knowledge about words that we could therefore determine which words were the morally correct ones to use. I was just curious, since you agreed that words existed in reality, how you believed they existed. What their nature was, and what can we know objectively about them. I was just trying to understand your understanding of “objectivity.” Refer to my question above about the definition of “cat.” Do you believe it has an objective answer? (Whatever your answer, I don’t think it has any implications for whether we should use “cat” instead of “gato” when referring to felines.)
To the extent that the question does have an objective answer (e.g., No, the English word “cat” does not mean an eight-legged creature that spins webs; the word you’re looking for is “spider.”), what I think this suggests is simply that we can gain objective knowledge about something even though it originates in, and is dependent on, the mind. If you disagree with this—with this statement alone—I eagerly await your rebuttal, as I would like to know where my mistake is.
I’m not convinced that words originate in our minds. If so, then why do we have to go to school to learn them? Why do we need dictionaries?
Or, if words are themselves perceptions, then we can obviously gain objective knowledge about them just as we can about any perceptions. I don’t know. As I say, it’s an intriguing point, but I’m willing to concede it for now because I don’t see how it gets us to where we can connect “ought” to “is.”
Libeqrat - 06 July 2012 07:13 PM
As for your question, it seems like you’re suggesting that I merely have a subjective preference for analyzing morality through the lens of health, just as a Spanish speaker might have a subjective preference for using Spanish instead of any other language. Which would suggest to me that you think that I have arbitrarily chosen health as objective measure of morality. (Please correct me if I have misinterpreted you.)
I don’t want to continue if I have misunderstood you, but I do want to ask, do you think the word “ought” has an objective definition? If so, what is it? What does “ought” mean? The word on its own. Not whether any particular statement or claim that employs the word “ought” is right or wrong, but just what we mean by the word “ought.” Perhaps if we can come to some mutual understanding about the term, we can discuss this topic without misunderstanding each other.
I don’t think you’ve arbitrarily chosen health as the objective measure of morality. I’m sure you have a rational justification for your choice. Maybe it’s not even a choice. Maybe you’re taking a page from The Moral Landscape and claiming health is the objective measure of morality, just as Harris claims that maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures is the purpose of morality. If that’s the case, then you should be able to provide material evidence and verifiable facts to support your claim—as Harris did with well-being.
If, however, you chose health as the measure of morality because it suits your personal (non-arbitrary, from your perspective) world-view, then you can’t really claim it as an “is,” can you? And if you have no “is,” then you can’t very well connect “ought” to a nonexistent “is.”
And isn’t that what the debate is about? Whether we can connect “is” to “ought?” So when you ask whether the word “ought” has an objective definition, that’s not really the right question. The question is, what does it mean to connect “ought” to “is?” Whether “ought” can be connected to an existing “is” is debatable, but we certainly can’t connect “ought”—regardless of how it’s defined—to a nonexistent “is,” can we? So first we have to establish whether we have an “is.” Are we on different pages with respect to the meaning of “is” in the context of connecting “is” and “ought?”
I say if health is the measure of morality then what that means is that we can use the scientific method to determine that health is the measure of morality. Our conclusion will be based on material evidence and verifiable facts and it will be independent of our (the observer’s) personal biases and beliefs about health and morality—just as conclusions about the boiling point of water can be reached independent of the observer’s biases and beliefs about temperature and water.
If the boiling point of water depended on our perception, then water would boil at different temperatures for different observers. We couldn’t claim the boiling point of water is 100 degrees C, we could only claim the boiling point of water depends on the observer.
And if the measure of morality depends on our perception, then we can’t claim the measure of morality is health any more than we can claim the word for a colorful speaking bird is “pajarito.” We can only claim that the measure of morality depends on the observer.
So which tack will you take? Will you claim that your perception of health as the measure of morality is sufficient to claim it as an “is” despite my claim to the contrary? Or will you take Harris’s tack and provide material evidence and verifiable facts that exist independent of your perception to show that health is the measure of morality?
The earth is rotating around the sun. That is a description of a fact. However, there is no reason that the earth OUGHT to rotate around the sun. That would be a prescription that does not follow from the description. We are all glad that the earth rotates around the sun for it provides life for our planet and we are here, but there is no reason that it ought to be that way, unless one chooses to invoke metaphysical reasoning.
The natural world cannot get from the described to the prescribed without supernatural agency. It is what it is, and there is no reason it ought to be another way. Game theory supports Humes Law. The prisoners dilemma for instance. Without interjecting something subjective into the equation, description does not get us to prescription.
We are human…..the universe is not. It is the great chasm between the two entities. We, as abstract thinking primates, cannot apply ought to the universe. The universe just is, and all we can do is describe what we observe in the universe, we cannot decide what it ought to be like.
More than that, we can’t even say we OUGHT to believe that the Earth goes round the Sun without an “IF.” That is, If we want such and such then we ought to believe the Earth goes round the Sun. I can imagine conditions where we would not want to believe this, even though it is true.
burt,
As I have mentioned before, I do appreciate your responses and you have added to my knowledge a number of times. I meant to ask you this at the time but it got lost in the shuffle. I am curious what the addition of “IF” adds or subtracts from the “Natural-Fact Theory: We have reason to believe natural facts.” It looks to me that adding “if” would just be a re-wording of the theory: If we have reason to believe Natural-Facts, then we ought to believe natural facts.” Is not stating something as a theory implying “if”?
I’m open to the possibility that humans cannot have objective knowledge or devise objective theories. But as I said before, even if I’m a brain in a jar and everything I take for reality is actually just my perception, the jar still exists independent of my perception. So how does that help the is/ought problem? If anything, it only reinforces the position that science can’t determine our “oughts.” The position you’re taking now is that science can’t determine anything about reality. There’s no “is” to connect the “ought” to.
You are a brain in a jar; the jar, by all available evidence, the jar is your skull. The question is the accuracy and completeness of the information coming into that jar, and the appropriateness of the brain’s reactions to that information.
Science cannot determine what an “ought” ought to be. I thought we resolved the issue of absolute right and wrong between us. Science may be able to determine with high likelihood whether the oughts one says one has or the oughts one evidently acts upon are actually likely to make one’s life more like what one says one wants it to be or the world a place that one says one would want to live in.
THe fine distinction is necessary, because taking science entirely out of the moral information loop leaves actual catastrophic results of some sort as the only objective basis for morality. Categorically speaking, humans in general make morally evaluable decisions and can do so using infomation provided by science, if they so choose. Scientists can make morally evaluable decisions when engaged in science, through choices in experimental or observational methods or, less directly, through choices on interpreting results or suggesting applications of theories.
just wanted to stop in and note the colossal amount of words you guys (poldano, brick, jeff, asd) have used to get basically nowhere
i feel pity for you guys, watching how happy you all are to be going round and round in your evolutionary eddies. in an ideal universe your mental activity could be monitored indefinitely to see just how long you remain stuck. i suppose at some point though the predictability would pass a certainty threshold indicating an end to the usefulness of recording such uninspired repetition…
Actually, I’ve made quite a bit of progress in developing my point of view, and trying to explain it and defend it. You might not be able to see that in my posts. Then again, you’ve shown no evidence for being able to see anything beyond your own preconceptions and misinterpretations.
[Well, I think the onus of proof here is on the Ahab Institute of morality—after all we don’t stone people for chewing gum in class or breaking wind at the table, so why is sleeping with somebody. that the Imam didn’t certify as fuckable a capital offense? “Oh,” explains the Ahab Institute representative “there was this merchant we call Muhammad [‘cause nobody really remembers his real name] that around 610 A.D. had these divine revelations that he wrote down in this book we call the Koran that might appear to the casual observer to be mostly plagiarism of the bible but in point-of-fact is the single source of all unquestionable divine knowledge. Therein it is revealed that every man is entitled to four wives and if any of them fool around with any of the other 3 out of 4 guys standing around with a hard on in their pocket, all of her friends and family are required to stone her to death in the public square.”
Well, now that Ahab institute has had its say it seem a rather paltry thing that some person with hopes and dreams is never again going to kiss her kids goodnight or hold her little girl when she’s scared. It makes complete sense to me now. Of course, all this relativistic bullshit is still bullshit isn’t it? Just ask Mr. Ahab Institute representative—he’ll tell you what he thinks of your relativistic bullshit, won’t he?
I think the way to go about this analysis is not to assume the worst of the people who originated the ostensibly outrageous rules and punishments, but to try to imagine what kind of situation would make such rules and punishments the best from among those available.
In this particular case, a herding society where most men spent most of their time away from the home community, and where most women remained in the home community, would give ample opportunity for adultery to the women and to those men who remained in the community. To prevent the loss of production that would ensue if suspicious men stayed in the community instead of tending their herds, adultery might tend to become interpreted as a crime against the community rather than a tort against the husband. As I’ve mentioned before, stoning is cruel, but mob stoning has the effect of involving everyone in the community but with no one knowing who cast the fatal stone or stones.
I’ve not mentioned the interests that women have in preventing adultery, which is likely to have been just as strong as the interests that men have. There may therefore be more reciprocity to this cruelty than is at first evident, given that it is a feature of a strongly patriarchal and male-dominated culture.
[Well, I think the onus of proof here is on the Ahab Institute of morality—after all we don’t stone people for chewing gum in class or breaking wind at the table, so why is sleeping with somebody. that the Imam didn’t certify as fuckable a capital offense? “Oh,” explains the Ahab Institute representative “there was this merchant we call Muhammad [‘cause nobody really remembers his real name] that around 610 A.D. had these divine revelations that he wrote down in this book we call the Koran that might appear to the casual observer to be mostly plagiarism of the bible but in point-of-fact is the single source of all unquestionable divine knowledge. Therein it is revealed that every man is entitled to four wives and if any of them fool around with any of the other 3 out of 4 guys standing around with a hard on in their pocket, all of her friends and family are required to stone her to death in the public square.”
Well, now that Ahab institute has had its say it seem a rather paltry thing that some person with hopes and dreams is never again going to kiss her kids goodnight or hold her little girl when she’s scared. It makes complete sense to me now. Of course, all this relativistic bullshit is still bullshit isn’t it? Just ask Mr. Ahab Institute representative—he’ll tell you what he thinks of your relativistic bullshit, won’t he?
I think the way to go about this analysis is not to assume the worst of the people who originated the ostensibly outrageous rules and punishments, but to try to imagine what kind of situation would make such rules and punishments the best from among those available.
In this particular case, a herding society where most men spent most of their time away from the home community, and where most women remained in the home community, would give ample opportunity for adultery to the women and to those men who remained in the community. To prevent the loss of production that would ensue if suspicious men stayed in the community instead of tending their herds, adultery might tend to become interpreted as a crime against the community rather than a tort against the husband. As I’ve mentioned before, stoning is cruel, but mob stoning has the effect of involving everyone in the community but with no one knowing who cast the fatal stone or stones.
I’ve not mentioned the interests that women have in preventing adultery, which is likely to have been just as strong as the interests that men have. There may therefore be more reciprocity to this cruelty than is at first evident, given that it is a feature of a strongly patriarchal and male-dominated culture.
I don’t quite see how that is the best way of dealing with the situation, even given the cultural climate this arose in it seems to me there are a number of better solutions and that these solutions only didn’t arise because of the absolutist morality these cultures get from religion. This solution is not the best among those available but just the one that best serves the interest of those who have power. One that comes to mind is to stop treating women in these communities like property.
At the same time it is understandable that these people didn’t come up with the best solution or even a very good one. They had a much less sophisticated understanding of the world and of people.
