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Check out this amoeba house built by Difflugia Coronata. Difflugia is a single eukaryotic cell - an amoeba. Difflugia has no nervous “system”, it’s what nervous systems are made of. Still, Difflugia, is an architect and a micro mason. The house is about 150 nanometers wide. We know the species Coronata by the kind of house it builds. Other Difflugia species build different houses.
The nano grains of sand are incorporated into the cytoplasm of the cell as it grazes on bacteria. These sand grains are exuded through the cell wall along with an adhesive that is manufactured by the cell to hold the grains together. These “casts” are found after the cell that created it is dead. This one appears abandoned.
When the Amoeba divides, as all amoebae must do, the “new” cell is pushed from the nest which is retained by the “original” cell. The new Difflugia Coronata then builds a new home, in this style, after an appropriate amount of feeding.
It’s worth noting that these homes exhibit anterior and posterior which seem to incorporate themes of both defense and decoration.
Consciousness, in my opinion has to be life with a thought process. In order to have a thought process there needs to be centralization so there can be an established “self” to the life. & The brain serves as the centralized command center. So when you talk about life performing functions without a brain the functions are not a conscious function. They are simply functions that are constant impulses of signaling within the life.
You all know about sea squirts. Starts out with a rudimentary brain that generates its mobility, then “eats” it and becomes a pollop.
Didn’t know that…very interesting, we live and learn.
In the sea squirt’s case, it didn’t have the opportunity to learn much more than morphing from an ambulatory brain into a sedentary stomach. It couldn’t eat at an early stage in its life cycle so it “learned” to eat itself. Good a way as any to avoid other predators, I guess.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 10 February 2012 09:37 AM
Yes, but we realise that. Worms don’t.
You don’t know that.
Look at your choice of words. What is it to “realize” if not to create or make real some “thing”, (consciousness) without evidence for it. What Dennett calls the zombic hunch. The idea that there could be such a thing that appeared “consicious” in all ways and also also reported itself to be conscious and yet is not.
There are two camps.
One insists that consciousness is real and that it’s possible to imagine such a zombie who is everything but conscious. This stance creates a need for dualism. That which appears conscious but is not, and that which appears and actually is conscious. These people would deny the possibility of a truly conscious artificial intellegence.
The other camp thinks that all we can really determine empirically is the report of the phenomenon of consciousness. We have no evidence for consciousness itself. It’s rather like alien abductions, Big Foot, Elvis, or even god. Dennett calls this hetero-phenomenolgy. A hetero-phenomenological view is really just good old 3rd person science. We understand clinically that some have vivid “real” experiences of alien abduction and we don’t deny them their experience, but neither do we all share it. We can’t accept a 1st person account.
The same 3rd person, empirical evaluation of “consciousness” has to apply rationally (by ratio), to any and all particular subjects.
I think that we are the zombies that we imagine. The consciousness is the result of cognitive processes that are materially represented in the subject. There are as many consciousnesses, or views of the world as there are material cognitive processes to represent them. There are a variety of such processes, the “view” of any of them a function of their (temporal), material configuration.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 10 February 2012 09:37 AM
Yes, but we realise that. Worms don’t.
You don’t know that.
Look at your choice of words. What is it to “realize” if not to create or make real some “thing”, (consciousness) without evidence for it. What Dennett calls the zombic hunch. The idea that there could be such a thing that appeared “consicious” in all ways and also also reported itself to be conscious and yet is not.
There are two camps.
One insists that consciousness is real and that it’s possible to imagine such a zombie who is everything but conscious. This stance creates a need for dualism. That which appears conscious but is not, and that which appears and actually is conscious. These people would deny the possibility of a truly conscious artificial intellegence.
The other camp thinks that all we can really determine empirically is the report of the phenomenon of consciousness. We have no evidence for consciousness itself. It’s rather like alien abductions, Big Foot, Elvis, or even god. Dennett calls this hetero-phenomenolgy. A hetero-phenomenological view is really just good old 3rd person science. We understand clinically that some have vivid “real” experiences of alien abduction and we don’t deny them their experience, but neither do we all share it. We can’t accept a 1st person account.
The same 3rd person, empirical evaluation of “consciousness” has to apply rationally (by ratio), to any and all particular subjects.
I think that we are the zombies that we imagine. The consciousness is the result of cognitive processes that are materially represented in the subject. There are as many consciousnesses, or views of the world as there are material cognitive processes to represent them. There are a variety of such processes, the “view” of any of them a function of their (temporal), material configuration.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 10 February 2012 09:37 AM
Yes, but we realise that. Worms don’t.
You don’t know that.
Look at your choice of words. What is it to “realize” if not to create or make real some “thing”, (consciousness) without evidence for it. What Dennett calls the zombic hunch. The idea that there could be such a thing that appeared “consicious” in all ways and also also reported itself to be conscious and yet is not.
There are two camps.
One insists that consciousness is real and that it’s possible to imagine such a zombie who is everything but conscious. This stance creates a need for dualism. That which appears conscious but is not, and that which appears and actually is conscious. These people would deny the possibility of a truly conscious artificial intellegence.
The other camp thinks that all we can really determine empirically is the report of the phenomenon of consciousness. We have no evidence for consciousness itself. It’s rather like alien abductions, Big Foot, Elvis, or even god. Dennett calls this hetero-phenomenolgy. A hetero-phenomenological view is really just good old 3rd person science. We understand clinically that some have vivid “real” experiences of alien abduction and we don’t deny them their experience, but neither do we all share it. We can’t accept a 1st person account.
The same 3rd person, empirical evaluation of “consciousness” has to apply rationally (by ratio), to any and all particular subjects.
I think that we are the zombies that we imagine. The consciousness is the result of cognitive processes that are materially represented in the subject. There are as many consciousnesses, or views of the world as there are material cognitive processes to represent them. There are a variety of such processes, the “view” of any of them a function of their (temporal), material configuration.
Euc, that’s interesting. I don’t have time to comment right now (at work) but I will do so soon because it is an area that really interests me and the points you made need addressing.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 12 February 2012 03:40 PM
eucaryote - 12 February 2012 11:47 AM
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 10 February 2012 09:37 AM
Yes, but we realise that. Worms don’t.
You don’t know that.
Look at your choice of words. What is it to “realize” if not to create or make real some “thing”, (consciousness) without evidence for it. What Dennett calls the zombic hunch. The idea that there could be such a thing that appeared “consicious” in all ways and also also reported itself to be conscious and yet is not.
There are two camps.
One insists that consciousness is real and that it’s possible to imagine such a zombie who is everything but conscious. This stance creates a need for dualism. That which appears conscious but is not, and that which appears and actually is conscious. These people would deny the possibility of a truly conscious artificial intellegence.
The other camp thinks that all we can really determine empirically is the report of the phenomenon of consciousness. We have no evidence for consciousness itself. It’s rather like alien abductions, Big Foot, Elvis, or even god. Dennett calls this hetero-phenomenolgy. A hetero-phenomenological view is really just good old 3rd person science. We understand clinically that some have vivid “real” experiences of alien abduction and we don’t deny them their experience, but neither do we all share it. We can’t accept a 1st person account.
The same 3rd person, empirical evaluation of “consciousness” has to apply rationally (by ratio), to any and all particular subjects.
I think that we are the zombies that we imagine. The consciousness is the result of cognitive processes that are materially represented in the subject. There are as many consciousnesses, or views of the world as there are material cognitive processes to represent them. There are a variety of such processes, the “view” of any of them a function of their (temporal), material configuration.
Euc, that’s interesting. I don’t have time to comment right now (at work) but I will do so soon because it is an area that really interests me and the points you made need addressing.
Take your time. I’ve been interested in this for a while. I appreciate the correspondence.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 10 February 2012 09:37 AM
Yes, but we realise that. Worms don’t.
You don’t know that.
Euc, I think I do. I mean, I think I know enough about what is required for consciousness of our sort to know a worm doesn’t have it.
Look at your choice of words. What is it to “realize” if not to create or make real some “thing”, (consciousness) without evidence for it. What Dennett calls the zombic hunch. The idea that there could be such a thing that appeared “consicious” in all ways and also also reported itself to be conscious and yet is not.
‘Realize’ was an unfortunate choice or words. ‘Understand’ or ‘comprehend’ or ‘be aware of’ would have been better.
There are two camps.
One insists that consciousness is real and that it’s possible to imagine such a zombie who is everything but conscious. This stance creates a need for dualism. That which appears conscious but is not, and that which appears and actually is conscious. These people would deny the possibility of a truly conscious artificial intellegence.
I do not deny the possibility of a truly conscious artificial intellegence. I believe it is entirely possible. We are machines; biological machines but machines nonetheless that, in principle, if properly understood, could be ‘copied’ and ‘built’. But if our understanding reached that level we could ‘build better to last longer’. As well as brains that were conscious we would build much better bodies than evolution has come up with. Take the male uro-genital tract for example - a complete dog’s breakfast prone to seizing up as we age.
The other camp thinks that all we can really determine empirically is the report of the phenomenon of consciousness. We have no evidence for consciousness itself. It’s rather like alien abductions, Big Foot, Elvis, or even god. Dennett calls this hetero-phenomenolgy. A hetero-phenomenological view is really just good old 3rd person science. We understand clinically that some have vivid “real” experiences of alien abduction and we don’t deny them their experience, but neither do we all share it. We can’t accept a 1st person account.
The same 3rd person, empirical evaluation of “consciousness” has to apply rationally (by ratio), to any and all particular subjects.
I think that we are the zombies that we imagine. The consciousness is the result of cognitive processes that are materially represented in the subject. There are as many consciousnesses, or views of the world as there are material cognitive processes to represent them. There are a variety of such processes, the “view” of any of them a function of their (temporal), material configuration.
If I understand you correctly, then I basiclly agree with you. Consciousness is the result of processes that occur in physical brains whether they be biological organs or artificail structures that do the same or a similar job as biological brains.
It seems that what is really at issue in this thread is not consciousness per se (it most certainly exists or we wouldn’t be having this communication) but levels of consciousness. In relatively simple organisms such as mosquitos or worms, or in simple artificial information processing structures that control present day robots, there is not enough complexity to produce self awareness. IMO, self-awareness begins to happen only at the level of neuronal complexity seen in mammals (and perhaps some cephalopods and maybe a few birds). As the story in Hofstadter and Dennet that I linked to above makes clear, it is all too easy to impute self-awareness where it probably does not exist.
Sure, a worm responds to stimulii, so do plants, but I doubt very much whether there is any self-awareness in either, or any awareness that they are responding to stimulii. Such awareness would require a neuronal structure or circuitry of a complexity a worm does not possess. Plants and worms almost certainly have no ‘self’ - at least, not ones they are aware of. A fetus probably doesn’t have one either.
I think that, given enough knowledge, it would be possible to build a machine that approached or even attained self-awareness. Afterall, it happened in nature all by itself, by sheer chance and the mindless crane of evolution through natural selection. However, we are a long way from having the required knowledge and abilty. Yet I believe , if we survive, we will eventually be able to achieve consciousness and even self-awareness in the things we build. I do not think there is any ghost in machines biological. Just as there will be no ghost in the machines we invent. Awareness requires no woo. Not as far as I can see, anyway.
I am aware that many people are uncomfortable with this. I can only say that I doubt life was meant to be comfortable. Or meant to be anything at all.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 14 February 2012 03:39 AM
eucaryote - 12 February 2012 11:47 AM
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 10 February 2012 09:37 AM
Yes, but we realise that. Worms don’t.
You don’t know that.
Euc, I think I do. I mean, I think I know enough about what is required for consciousness of our sort to know a worm doesn’t have it.
Look at your choice of words. What is it to “realize” if not to create or make real some “thing”, (consciousness) without evidence for it. What Dennett calls the zombic hunch. The idea that there could be such a thing that appeared “consicious” in all ways and also also reported itself to be conscious and yet is not.
‘Realize’ was an unfortunate choice or words. ‘Understand’ or ‘comprehend’ or ‘be aware of’ would have been better.
Those are all the same words. None of them have any meaning in this context. There is no empirical evidence, no empirical “phenomenon”, no 3rd party observation or 3rd party experience. No objective description about which we might develop an phenomenology, an objective study of the phenomenon. i.e. an “understanding”.
All we have are 1st person reports of a phenomenon that we can’t identify empirically and our own 3rd party experience of those reports. Obviously that there is no 1st person report of phenomena that can be taken literally, as it were.
When we ask the question, “Are other creatures conscious?”, we are presuming empirical facts not in evidence, and then projecting that presumption onto others in the form of a question. This idea of an explanation chasing a unfalsifiable presumption is just not rational.
That presumption opens the door to dualism, pantheism, solipcism and the like, aka, la la land.
In as much as no one knows what they mean by the term, “consciousness”, I am naturally led question that presumption since everything hinges on it. After all, if it turns out that there is no such thing then asking if worms have it is a pretty silly question.
My own thinking is the idea really is a canard, a false turn. The more I watch myself and my behavior the more it seems that all most all of me arises from my ‘non-consicous’ creature, all of the parts of which are themselves “conscious” so as to function in their respective roles. The creature itself seems imbued with a kind of proprioception regarding it’s role in space and time. Even as I type these thoughts, they seem to spring from my fingers as my brain while any consciousness at best proof reads.
Think about the genuine phenomenon of blind sight where one’s brain can be damaged in such a way to allow the victim to locate and navigate around objects in space that they actually can’t “see” or describe.
After all, if it turns out that there is no such thing, then asking if worms have it is a pretty silly question.
Could asking a worm if it is conscious be anything like asking a two-year-old child if it is conscious? If an answer was possible, might it be, “I am consciousness.” (not someone who is conscious). Is this state what Zen masters call ‘absorption in the oceanic reflection.’?
A year or two later, the two-year-old will begin to accumulate memories, resulting in a sense of being a separate self - a figment (mental construct) that claims to be conscious.
Zen master Mazu comments:
“Human delusions of time immemorial, deciet, pride, deviousness, and conceit, have conglomerated into one body. This is why scripture says that this body is just made of elements, and its appearance and disappearance is just that of elements, which have no identity. When successive thoughts do not await one another, and each thought dies peacefully away, this is called absorption in the oceanic reflection.”
(Mazu quoted from the book, ‘ZEN ESSENCE - The Science of Freedom’ - translated and edited by Thomas Cleary)
There is no empirical evidence, no empirical “phenomenon”, no 3rd party observation or 3rd party experience. No objective description about which we might develop an phenomenology, an objective study of the phenomenon. i.e. an “understanding”.
All we have are 1st person reports of a phenomenon that we can’t identify empirically and our own 3rd party experience of those reports. Obviously that there is no 1st person report of phenomena that can be taken literally, as it were.
Euc - While this is relevant to our understanding or definition of consciousness, I think it is irrelevant to the question of whether consciousness exists or not.
When we ask the question, “Are other creatures conscious?”, we are presuming empirical facts not in evidence, and then projecting that presumption onto others in the form of a question. This idea of an explanation chasing a unfalsifiable presumption is just not rational.
Agreed the topic is not particularly amenable to the scientific method, but then neither is dark energy. But that doesn’t mean we have to discard all our models (in either case).
That presumption opens the door to dualism, pantheism, solipcism and the like, aka, la la land.
Yeah, but doesn’t have to (in either case).
In as much as no one knows what they mean by the term, “consciousness”, I am naturally led question that presumption since everything hinges on it. After all, if it turns out that there is no such thing then asking if worms have it is a pretty silly question.
Yeah, which means we are still at the stage of proposing models rather than reporting too many facts (in either case). I’m assuming here that a corroboration of very many common 1st-person feelings is a kind of fact about the human experience. The bigger question here is if such feelings can be detected in the behaviours of other species, such as insects.
My own thinking is the idea really is a canard, a false turn. The more I watch myself and my behavior the more it seems that all most all of me arises from my ‘non-consicous’ creature, all of the parts of which are themselves “conscious” so as to function in their respective roles. The creature itself seems imbued with a kind of proprioception regarding it’s role in space and time. Even as I type these thoughts, they seem to spring from my fingers as my brain while any consciousness at best proof reads.
Think about the genuine phenomenon of blind sight where one’s brain can be damaged in such a way to allow the victim to locate and navigate around objects in space that they actually can’t “see” or describe.
Okay, so here is a proposed model of a system of interacting living parts that don’t really need to have self-aware agency at the systemic level. It would explain everything except the feeling of systemic self-aware agency itself. My question would be, why did we evolve this feeling if it plays no adaptive role? Just another evolutionary by-product perhaps (like music, the Arts, religion, etc.)? I’ll post the rest of my reply over at the “How the Mind Works” thread…
Strange I only just got the email notifying me of socialfabric’s reply. About 11 days late. SF posted it on leap day.
SocialFabric - 10 March 2012 08:00 PM
eucaryote - 14 February 2012 09:51 AM
There is no empirical evidence, no empirical “phenomenon”, no 3rd party observation or 3rd party experience. No objective description about which we might develop an phenomenology, an objective study of the phenomenon. i.e. an “understanding”.
All we have are 1st person reports of a phenomenon that we can’t identify empirically and our own 3rd party experience of those reports. Obviously that there is no 1st person report of phenomena that can be taken literally, as it were.
Euc - While this is relevant to our understanding or definition of consciousness, I think it is irrelevant to the question of whether consciousness exists or not.
How so? How can you define an existential phenomenon that can’t be empirically confirmed? All that can be empirically confirmed are 1st person reports of such a phenomena, not the phenomenon itself.
When we ask the question, “Are other creatures conscious?”, we are presuming empirical facts not in evidence, and then projecting that presumption onto others in the form of a question. This idea of an explanation chasing a unfalsifiable presumption is just not rational.
SocialFabric - 10 March 2012 08:00 PM
Agreed the topic is not particularly amenable to the scientific method, but then neither is dark energy. But that doesn’t mean we have to discard all our models (in either case).
There is no “model” outside of empiricism.’ You don’t propose theories for that which is not in evidence. All you have to discard are your theories that “make no sense”.
“Dark energy” is something that we don’t understand yet can be accounted for empircally. It is only by the scientific method that we know “dark energy” to “exist”. We don’t presume it to exist without falsifiable empirical 3rd person evidence.
That presumption opens the door to dualism, pantheism, solipcism and the like, aka, la la land.
SocialFabric - 10 March 2012 08:00 PM
Yeah, but doesn’t have to (in either case).
SocialFabric - 10 March 2012 08:00 PM
In as much as no one knows what they mean by the term, “consciousness”, I am naturally led question that presumption since everything hinges on it. After all, if it turns out that there is no such thing then asking if worms have it is a pretty silly question.
SocialFabric - 10 March 2012 08:00 PM
Yeah, which means we are still at the stage of proposing models rather than reporting too many facts (in either case). I’m assuming here that a corroboration of very many common 1st-person feelings is a kind of fact about the human experience. The bigger question here is if such feelings can be detected in the behaviours of other species, such as insects.
No. “a corroboration of very many common 1st-person feelings” is just that and nothing more. All we really know empirically are the 1st person reports of such phenomena. Those who report such phenomena are usually absolutely convinced of the reality of the phenomenon in an existential sense. But the same is true of those “experience” alien abductions yet those of us who do not share the experience think of it as an illusion of the abductee, and rightly so!
There is no reason to think that that human organisms are possessed of an existential “consciousness” that cannot be reduced to the physical organisms and it’s functions. Other than the widespread reports of “consciousness”, there seems to be little evident in the behavior of human organisms that would lead us to identify empirically the evidence of such a thing.
My own thinking is the idea really is a canard, a false turn. The more I watch myself and my behavior the more it seems that all most all of me arises from my ‘non-consicous’ creature, all of the parts of which are themselves “conscious” so as to function in their respective roles. The creature itself seems imbued with a kind of proprioception regarding it’s role in space and time. Even as I type these thoughts, they seem to spring from my fingers as my brain while any consciousness at best proof reads.
Think about the genuine phenomenon of blind sight where one’s brain can be damaged in such a way to allow the victim to locate and navigate around objects in space that they actually can’t “see” or describe.
SocialFabric - 10 March 2012 08:00 PM
Okay, so here is a proposed model of a system of interacting living parts that don’t really need to have self-aware agency at the systemic level. It would explain everything except the itself. My question would be, why did we evolve this feeling if it plays no adaptive role? Just another evolutionary by-product perhaps (like music, the Arts, religion, etc.)? I’ll post the rest of my reply over at the “How the Mind Works” thread…
Well, try to appreciate that there is a difference between having the “feeling of systemic self-aware agency” and actually having such a thing in an existential sense. It’s nice to know you feel that way, many do. The fact that you feel that way doesn’t make it true. All that’s true is that you feel that way. There doesn’t have to be a reason to realize that this must be case.
How so? How can you define an existential phenomenon that can’t be empirically confirmed? All that can be empirically confirmed are 1st person reports of such a phenomena, not the phenomenon itself.
ok - but is the issue your criterion for recognition of an empirical phenomenon? For instance, if self is not a thing, but what I suspect is a socially agreed norm, would that mean it is not an empirical phenomenon?
There is no “model” outside of empiricism. You don’t propose theories for that which is not in evidence. All you have to discard are your theories that “make no sense”.
“Dark energy” is something that we don’t understand yet can be accounted for empircally. It is only by the scientific method that we know “dark energy” to “exist”. We don’t presume it to exist without falsifiable empirical 3rd person evidence.
The delusion of self has made sense to humans for 50,000 years. If as I suggest self is merely a social norm, then can’t we have a theory of self grounded in the social instincts and the capacity of the prefrontal lobes to give us a sense of past/future? Self would be an explainable fabrication rather than a delusion to be denied. BTW this would perhaps suggest ants and bees ARE most likely self-aware, since they are capable of social activity and are space/time aware! BTW, aren’t the “social sciences” a kind of 1st person study of “us” that nevertheless teach us something about ourselves?
On the issue of dark energy, we have empirical evidence that suggests there must be some stuff that fills the missing 70% of the universe and explains cosmic expansion. So we have coralled or bounded the phenomenon - but we know nothing of the stuff itself. This seems to me to be very similar to where we are at with understanding consciousness. We know human “conscious” decisions impact the future environment in ways other animals cannot, but we haven’t agreed as yet how we do this.
There is no reason to think that that human organisms are possessed of an existential “consciousness” that cannot be reduced to the physical organisms and it’s functions. Other than the widespread reports of “consciousness”, there seems to be little evident in the behavior of human organisms that would lead us to identify empirically the evidence of such a thing.
We both agree here that everything is reducible to systems and processes, including the social systems of ants and humans. The question is how we are framing ‘self’. It is not a thing. I suggest it is a social process, whereas you suggest it is an ignorable delusion. I’d agree it’s a convenient delusion - but all the same, rightly or wrongly, it ‘get things done’ and so is not to be ignored.
SocialFabric - 10 March 2012 08:00 PM
My question would be, why did we evolve this feeling if it plays no adaptive role?
All that’s true is that you feel that way. There doesn’t have to be a reason to realize that this must be case.
I guess my question is that the feeling of self seems to be both an extension of genetic blind selfishness and the chief means by which we as humans survive and procreate. We believe in ourselves and this seems to give us our peculiar adaptive edge as a species. We pride ourselves on approaching the survival problem more rationally than all other animals, which seems to give us our edge, especially against larger and stronger beasts. So yes self is a feeling, but it has objectively measurable impacts on our world that up until now have been adaptive. To put this the opposite way, where members of our species lack self esteem, they quickly reduce their procreative success and chances for survival.
So there is something to address and explain here. The feeling alone does seem to play an adaptive role. A practical example might be the removal of the gold standard - the value of money, the basis of nearly all human social exchange, now based on “social confidence” alone. Similarly religion, in binding societies together and making their soldiers better fighters in battles, has also given it an adaptive role in the past. This does not make religion right or “make sense” in and of itself. But if you were in the out-group, it was worth knowing your enemy if you valued your survival. Religion has its woo woo claims and we have our self claims. This gets me back to my basic thesis: Self is a claim that works best while its claims are limited to that which the local environment and society can sustainably support! I’d be very happy to know if you’d support this idea…
[ Edited: 11 March 2012 09:16 PM by SocialFabric ]
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