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This post grew out of discussions about the proper definition of altruism in ethical discussions and if acting altruistically is rational.
Accepting the burdens of moral obligations often means “behaving in ways that are costly to the actor, but beneficial to the recipient”, which is perhaps the simplest definition of altruism.
But is acting altruistically rational and does this answer have implications concerning whether acting morally is rational? It is obviously sometimes irrational to act altruistically, as when dealing with criminals or in time of war. But that is not the question here. The question is if acting ‘rule altruistically’ (acting altruistically according to a moral rule) is rational.
The answer depends on the definitions of rational, altruism, and the particular moral rule in question. We will see that one definition of altruism leads to a conclusion that acting ‘rule altruistically’ is always irrational and another leads to the conclusion that acting ‘rule altruistically’ is not only rational, but that not doing so is irrational.
In order to focus on the definition of altruism’s large effects on the outcomes of ethical discussions, I will use a single definition of a “rational” act.
“A rational act is an act that is expected to be likely to increase personal happiness over a lifetime”.
I will also propose a single definition of a moral rule for acting altruistically. However, that moral rule is intimately connected to our choice of definition of altruism and so will be introduced later. The key to answering the question “Is acting altruistically irrational or rational?” is the definition of altruism.
Common usage of the word “altruism” includes on one extreme what I will call “pure altruism”. On the other extreme of usage is “plain altruism”, which is less common. There are intermediate variations of these two definitions, but these extremes will serve to illustrate the problem. The two definitions are:
“Pure altruism consists of giving something of value with no expectation of any compensation or benefits, either direct, or indirect (for instance from recognition of the giving and even from expectations of psychological rewards of giving)”.
“Plain altruism is a behavior which is anticipated to be costly to the actor, at least in the short term and perhaps permanently, and beneficial to the recipient”.
The difference is that, using the plain altruism definition, an act, such as acting altruistically according to “Do unto others what you would them do unto you”, would still be altruistic (as well as rational) even if a “rational actor” expected that acting according to the Golden Rule was “likely to increase personal happiness over a lifetime”.
In contrast, by the pure altruism definition, the above “rational actor” would NOT be acting ‘altruistically’ when, in accordance with the Golden Rule, they behaved in ways costly to themselves, but beneficial to the recipient. Also by the pure altruism definition, acting altruistically in general is automatically ‘irrational’ by the above definition of rational.
What is going on here? How can a minor definition change lead to such different ethical conclusions?
The source of the problem is that the pure altruism definition is the product of an evolutionarily adaptive delusion, a delusion that increased the reproductive fitness of our ancestors. That definition makes sense if people hold the idea, as many do, that there is a source of ‘obligation’ in the universe that justifies acting irrationally against our best interests.
On the other hand, the plain altruism definition is essentially the one used in the fields of both biological and cultural evolution. (In biological evolution, costs and benefits are only reproductive fitness. In cultural evolution, cultural norms can be selected for based on whatever benefits groups find attractive.)
Since it is based on an understanding of reality and not a delusion, and avoids pure altruism’s non-sensical and even potentially disastrous conclusions (disastrous if they reduce altruism in a culture), I think that that the most useful definition of altruism for ethical discussions is plain altruism: “Altruism is a behavior which is anticipated to be costly to the actor, at least in the short term and perhaps permanently, and beneficial to the recipient”.
I have argued elsewhere why the moral rule most likely to increase personal happiness over a lifetime is “Altruistic acts that increase the benefits of cooperation in groups are moral” where altruism is the “plain altruism” definition.
Acting altruistically according to this moral rule is rational. Acting contrary to it is irrational.
As an example, acting according to the Golden Rule in line with the above overriding moral rule is rational: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you so long as doing so is expected to increase the benefits of cooperation in your groups (family, friends, community, and so forth)”.
[ Edited: 16 December 2011 12:10 PM by Mark Sloan ]
I posted this a week ago, copied from a much earlier post. It seems to differentiate between what you call pure and plain altruism.
From Idries Shah, Learning How to Learn, p.133.
“One man heard of the plight of another while he was sitting among friends. He immediately felt moved, and handed out a sum of money to be given to the distressed one.
Another, who had not heard of any special case, went out when he had some money and looked for someone who was in need. He asked him about his needs, and fulfilled them.
Which of these was the really generous man? The answer is—neither.
Both were generous within conventional limits. They were doing what they had been taught to do. These forms of generosity are sufficient only at the very beginning of generosity. Beyond this is the stage for which these other forms are supposed to be the preparation. Because people rarely rise above the preliminary stages, these shallow forms of generosity are assumed to be the height of generosity.
The real generosity is when a man does something generous when nobody knows about it; or when, other people knowing something about it, he refuses to gain any credit for his generosity, from the recipient or anyone else.
Real generosity is anonymous to the extent that a man should be prepared even to be considered ungenerous rather than explain it to others. This kind of generosity, in goods, in work and in thought, is deliberately cultivated in the ranks of the Elect, and is practiced by those who wish to enter their ranks, with no exceptions at all, and there is no relaxation of this exercise.
Generosity is also marked by doing what one says one will do.”
In part, there is a question of identity involved here. We humans tend to congregate in marked groups and to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of the group, even if it isn’t composed of close genetic kin. This is because we have to capacity to (and are vulnerability to) identify with ideas, beliefs, symbolic cues, and so on. These become a part of our personal identity and as such evoke survival related behavior from our biological foundations. If our basic identification is simply with Humanity as such that leads to a different sort of altruistic behavior that if our basic identification is with Manchester United, or with a political ideology, a religion, or etc.
I don’t think a moral act can be irrational. Although an irrational act can have beneficial consequences it does not acquire the attribute unless the agent is exercising some rational discretion. Following this, I don’t think a moral act can be altruistic in the strict sense. While one can certainly make an altruistic exchange the perception of acting rightly is a personal benefit. And, made rationally, is judged to be a net gain for the agent. As you say, pure altruism is a delusion. I think it’s worse than that. It’s a deliberate lie. In every instance I’ve encountered it. The person claiming it actually stands to gain the far larger reward. Like, say, heaven.
We have had many discussions about this here. It seems perfectly rational and most probably a survival mechanism for any species, if capable, to behave altruistically to induce cooperation. This would be the prime mechanism that prevents a species from annihilating itself, and possibly other cooperating species.
It seems logical that this is a big part of why we are here, thus it is entirely rational.
I posted this a week ago, copied from a much earlier post. It seems to differentiate between what you call pure and plain altruism.
From Idries Shah, Learning How to Learn, p.133.
“One man heard of the plight of another while he was sitting among friends. He immediately felt moved, and handed out a sum of money to be given to the distressed one.
Another, who had not heard of any special case, went out when he had some money and looked for someone who was in need. He asked him about his needs, and fulfilled them.
Which of these was the really generous man? The answer is—neither.
Both were generous within conventional limits. They were doing what they had been taught to do. These forms of generosity are sufficient only at the very beginning of generosity. Beyond this is the stage for which these other forms are supposed to be the preparation. Because people rarely rise above the preliminary stages, these shallow forms of generosity are assumed to be the height of generosity.
The real generosity is when a man does something generous when nobody knows about it; or when, other people knowing something about it, he refuses to gain any credit for his generosity, from the recipient or anyone else.
Real generosity is anonymous to the extent that a man should be prepared even to be considered ungenerous rather than explain it to others. This kind of generosity, in goods, in work and in thought, is deliberately cultivated in the ranks of the Elect, and is practiced by those who wish to enter their ranks, with no exceptions at all, and there is no relaxation of this exercise.
Generosity is also marked by doing what one says one will do.” .
Hi Bert, Shah here seems close to my definition of “pure altruism”, but perhaps he might object to the addition of “no expectation of any compensation or benefits, either direct, or indirect … even from expectations of psychological rewards of giving” as being too extreme. For convenience, I’ll repeat the definition here.
“Pure altruism consists of giving something of value with no expectation of any compensation or benefits, either direct, or indirect (for instance from recognition of the giving and even from expectations of psychological rewards of giving)”.
However, I would still say that even a slightly modified definition, (dropping: “even from expectations of psychological rewards of giving”) is based on an adaptive delusion, a delusion that increased the reproductive fitness of our ancestors. In its favor, that delusion (that there is an external source of justification, a magic ought, that we must follow regardless of our needs and preferences), also now encourages a lot of cooperative behavior in cultures that has nothing to do with reproductive fitness, but makes life much better than it otherwise might be. In other words, this delusion has been useful and Shah advocates maintaining it, though, as a person probably not familiar with the science, he would probably not agree that it is a delusion.
My problem with maintaining this delusion is that its resulting “pure altruism” definition produces nonsensical ethical conclusions such as “There is no thing such as altruism” and “Acting altruistically is always irrational”, or my favorite, if you act altruistically according to “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” and believe that doing so is in your long term best interest, then you have not really acted altruistically.
So I think we will be better off, particular in terms of defining a culturally useful science based morality, if we give up the pure altruism definition, and adopt something like the plain altruism definition. Doing so makes ethical discussions so much more sensible.
burt - 16 December 2011 09:04 PM
In part, there is a question of identity involved here. We humans tend to congregate in marked groups and to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of the group, even if it isn’t composed of close genetic kin. This is because we have to capacity to (and are vulnerability to) identify with ideas, beliefs, symbolic cues, and so on. These become a part of our personal identity and as such evoke survival related behavior from our biological foundations. If our basic identification is simply with Humanity as such that leads to a different sort of altruistic behavior that if our basic identification is with Manchester United, or with a political ideology, a religion, or etc.
I agree with this and think everything I have said is not only consistent with it, but provides explanatory power as to why these things are true.
We have had many discussions about this here. It seems perfectly rational and most probably a survival mechanism for any species, if capable, to behave altruistically to induce cooperation. This would be the prime mechanism that prevents a species from annihilating itself, and possibly other cooperating species.
It seems logical that this is a big part of why we are here, thus it is entirely rational.
I agree with the above. I like the idea of defining words, such as altruism, such that choosing to act, as a rule, ‘morally’ is a rational act. (Here, acting ‘morally’ means acting consistently with the underlying principle of virtually all past and present enforced cultural norms, which are also called moral standards.)
I remain deeply puzzled by people who prefer the “pure altruism” definition of altruism even when they know it results in the conclusion that acting ‘morally’ (as defined just above) is impossible and, from that ,not rational in the way I understand rational.
[ Edited: 17 December 2011 03:24 PM by Mark Sloan ]
I don’t think a moral act can be irrational. Although an irrational act can have beneficial consequences it does not acquire the attribute unless the agent is exercising some rational discretion. Following this, I don’t think a moral act can be altruistic in the strict sense. While one can certainly make an altruistic exchange the perception of acting rightly is a personal benefit. And, made rationally, is judged to be a net gain for the agent. As you say, pure altruism is a delusion. I think it’s worse than that. It’s a deliberate lie. In every instance I’ve encountered it. The person claiming it actually stands to gain the far larger reward. Like, say, heaven.
I have to disagree on two levels with “I don’t think a moral act can be irrational”.
First by counterexample “The proverbial soldier jumping on the grenade to save his friends”. Do you claim this act is not irrational or that it is not a moral act? (I claim it is an irrational moral act.)
Second, it appears to be empirically true that virtually all past and present cultural moral standards (enforced cultural norms) advocate altruism. Using the pure altruism definition you prefer and your conclusion that acting altruistically is impossible, then virtually all past and present cultural moral standards advocate impossible behaviors. How can an impossible action be rational?
I am glad to hear we agree that the basis for defining altruism as “pure altruism” is a delusion. (Specifically that delusion is that there is an external source of justification, a magic ought, that we must follow regardless of our personal needs and preferences.)
Can you explain your objection to using the “plain altruism” definition which is not based on a delusion?
I posted this a week ago, copied from a much earlier post. It seems to differentiate between what you call pure and plain altruism.
From Idries Shah, Learning How to Learn, p.133.
“One man heard of the plight of another while he was sitting among friends. He immediately felt moved, and handed out a sum of money to be given to the distressed one.
Another, who had not heard of any special case, went out when he had some money and looked for someone who was in need. He asked him about his needs, and fulfilled them.
Which of these was the really generous man? The answer is—neither.
Both were generous within conventional limits. They were doing what they had been taught to do. These forms of generosity are sufficient only at the very beginning of generosity. Beyond this is the stage for which these other forms are supposed to be the preparation. Because people rarely rise above the preliminary stages, these shallow forms of generosity are assumed to be the height of generosity.
The real generosity is when a man does something generous when nobody knows about it; or when, other people knowing something about it, he refuses to gain any credit for his generosity, from the recipient or anyone else.
Real generosity is anonymous to the extent that a man should be prepared even to be considered ungenerous rather than explain it to others. This kind of generosity, in goods, in work and in thought, is deliberately cultivated in the ranks of the Elect, and is practiced by those who wish to enter their ranks, with no exceptions at all, and there is no relaxation of this exercise.
Generosity is also marked by doing what one says one will do.” .
Hi Bert, Shah here seems close to my definition of “pure altruism”, but perhaps he might object to the addition of “no expectation of any compensation or benefits, either direct, or indirect … even from expectations of psychological rewards of giving” as being too extreme. For convenience, I’ll repeat the definition here.
“Pure altruism consists of giving something of value with no expectation of any compensation or benefits, either direct, or indirect (for instance from recognition of the giving and even from expectations of psychological rewards of giving)”.
However, I would still say that even a slightly modified definition, (dropping: “even from expectations of psychological rewards of giving”) is based on an adaptive delusion, a delusion that increased the reproductive fitness of our ancestors. In its favor, that delusion (that there is an external source of justification, a magic ought, that we must follow regardless of our needs and preferences), also now encourages a lot of cooperative behavior in cultures that has nothing to do with reproductive fitness, but makes life much better than it otherwise might be. In other words, this delusion has been useful and Shah advocates maintaining it, though, as a person probably not familiar with the science, he would probably not agree that it is a delusion.
I would partially disagree with this. First off (this isn’t part of the disagreement), elsewhere Shah has said that if a person experiences even the psychological rewards of altruistic action, this is the only reward that will be received. His point has been that such “pure altruism” is a characteristic of (and prerequisite for) becoming a certain sort of person. There is no prior assumption of any external source of justification. An interesting question is, would it be evolutionarily best for everybody to act in this way, or is there some preferred percentage of a population? I think Plato had something similar in mind in The Republic when he described the “guardians.” There is also the question of whether a population of pure altruists could be invaded by selfish individuals. A factor involved in this would be the extent to which the altruists were able to recognize and deal with the invaders. For the past 40 years I’ve had a “Theory of the Proliferation of SOBs.” In small homogeneous populations everybody knows everybody else and if somebody is an SOB everybody knows it and takes account so there is social pressure not to be such. As population increases, however, people meet more and more others who they don’t know, who may be SOBs. At a critical point there is a phase shift and you have to become an SOB yourself in order to protect you from all those other SOBs. This doesn’t include ideas about the ability to recognize the actual moral state of others.
I myself enjoy the giving much more than I do the taking.
It’s just how I am wired.
I don’t think much about it, I just give more than I take, and then move onto the next day, and hope that karma will roll back some goodness and love toward me in the end.
And in the end, it usually does.
Tomorrow morning I am going to be out on the roadside at dawn, in the below ‘30 degree weather, cleaning up the litter and the trash on the nearby road leading toward our neighborhood. It’s 1.5 miles of well-littered country road, it just looks like hell, and I am tired of looking at it.
(And I am frankly embarrassed to have everyone’s out of town Christmas guests roll into our neighborhood, and have them think that this is how Alabama’s roadsides are supposed to look.)
I invited everybody in the local Facebook neighborhood watch group to come join me, if they so choose.
I don’t expect for many people to show up, but if they do, I will be grateful for their company, and for their spirit of giving and community.
Is my behavior rational, or irrational?
By my reasoning, it is totally rational.
The rewards outweigh the negative aspects of the endeavor.
For me anyway.
I myself enjoy the giving much more than I do the taking.
It’s just how I am wired.
I don’t think much about it, I just give more than I take, and then move onto the next day, and hope that karma will roll back some goodness and love toward me in the end.
And in the end, it usually does.
Tomorrow morning I am going to be out on the roadside at dawn, in the below ‘30 degree weather, cleaning up the litter and the trash on the nearby road leading toward our neighborhood. It’s 1.5 miles of well-littered country road, it just looks like hell, and I am tired of looking at it.
(And I am frankly embarrassed to have everyone’s out of town Christmas guests roll into our neighborhood, and have them think that this is how Alabama’s roadsides are supposed to look.)
I invited everybody in the local Facebook neighborhood watch group to come join me, if they so choose.
I don’t expect for many people to show up, but if they do, I will be grateful for their company, and for their spirit of giving and community.
Is my behavior rational, or irrational?
By my reasoning, it is totally rational.
The rewards outweigh the negative aspects of the endeavor.
For me anyway.
Let’s see, You are acting “Altruistically to increase the benefits of cooperation in your neighborhood”. It’s clearly cooperation if some of your neighbors show up, but even if you work alone, you have initiated the potential for cooperation in your neighborhood. You have done what you could.
There is no question to me that it is a moral, altruistic act. As such, I would also say it is rational. Sometimes all it takes is one person to start to make a better, more cooperative society.
I read this quote from the Dalai Lama today,
The first beneficiary of compassion is always oneself. When compassion, or warmheartedness, arises in us and our focus shifts away from our own narrow self-interest, it is as if we open an inner door. It reduces fear, boosts confidence and brings us inner strength. By reducing distrust, it opens us to others and brings us a sense of connection to others, and sense of purpose and meaning in life.
He is talking about compassion or warmheartedness, which you may not feel is your motivation as you pick up trash to help your neighborhood, but the rewards are coming from the same source. That source is the biology we evolved that produces psychological rewards for acting altruistically to increase the benefits of cooperation in groups. Understanding where these psychological rewards come from does not reduce their validity. This understanding just tells me more about who I am and what is actually likely to increase my durable well-being.
I think your time tomorrow will be well spent. It will be better spent if some of your neighbors show up, but still well spent in any event.
Accepting the burdens of moral obligations often means “behaving in ways that are costly to the actor, but beneficial to the recipient”, which is perhaps the simplest definition of altruism.
As we stumble and stride through life, we react to new situations we encounter as things take place in real time, but our reactions have been preconfigured to a great degree, whether by ourselves (assuming such a thing is even possible) or by our families, communities and personal tendencies that can slice right through things we are taught. Yes, sometimes our reactions are costly to some degree, as you say, but we rely on these lessons to teach us habits of mental operation, including the making of choices that are sometimes referred to as moral choices. When we react in situations that challenge our moral sensibilities, we very often are simply trying to maintain equilibrium of positive or at least neutral feelings that constantly accompany us throughout the day. It might be accurate to say that we carefully guard against doing, saying or even thinking various things that might have a tendency to dissolve the positive feelings we strive to maintain, and replace them with negative feelings. This process guides us in our decisionmaking and how we react to various situations. We are compelled to rely on how we feel about different things because it would not be possible to fully analyze things from the ground up all day long. We just don’t have the necessary time or energy. Our feelings are closely linked to past successes and failures in approaches and lessons we’ve learned. We rely on them to keep us informed in a fuzzy-math sort of way.
Mark Sloan - 17 December 2011 09:26 PM
I read this quote from the Dalai Lama today,
The first beneficiary of compassion is always oneself. When compassion, or warmheartedness, arises in us and our focus shifts away from our own narrow self-interest, it is as if we open an inner door. It reduces fear, boosts confidence and brings us inner strength. By reducing distrust, it opens us to others and brings us a sense of connection to others, and sense of purpose and meaning in life.
He is talking about compassion or warmheartedness, which you may not feel is your motivation as you pick up trash to help your neighborhood, but the rewards are coming from the same source. That source is the biology we evolved that produces psychological rewards for acting altruistically to increase the benefits of cooperation in groups. Understanding where these psychological rewards come from does not reduce their validity. This understanding just tells me more about who I am and what is actually likely to increase my durable well-being.
I think your time tomorrow will be well spent. It will be better spent if some of your neighbors show up, but still well spent in any event.
Yes. If we’ve previously done something such as the kind of work Sparque mentions, we know how it made us feel afterwards, and we can’t exactly escape that psychology, can we? To consider an action or decision outside of psychological effects that may accompany or follow that action or decision is to consider how a fantasy story works. It speaks outside the sphere of what it is to be an actual human.
I would partially disagree with this. First off (this isn’t part of the disagreement), elsewhere Shah has said that if a person experiences even the psychological rewards of altruistic action, this is the only reward that will be received. His point has been that such “pure altruism” is a characteristic of (and prerequisite for) becoming a certain sort of person. There is no prior assumption of any external source of justification. An interesting question is, would it be evolutionarily best for everybody to act in this way, or is there some preferred percentage of a population? I think Plato had something similar in mind in The Republic when he described the “guardians.” There is also the question of whether a population of pure altruists could be invaded by selfish individuals. A factor involved in this would be the extent to which the altruists were able to recognize and deal with the invaders. For the past 40 years I’ve had a “Theory of the Proliferation of SOBs.” In small homogeneous populations everybody knows everybody else and if somebody is an SOB everybody knows it and takes account so there is social pressure not to be such. As population increases, however, people meet more and more others who they don’t know, who may be SOBs. At a critical point there is a phase shift and you have to become an SOB yourself in order to protect you from all those other SOBs. This doesn’t include ideas about the ability to recognize the actual moral state of others.
You sound like you know more about evolutionary game theory than you let on. What you describe is typical of studies concerning both 1) the invasion of cooperative groups by outside cheaters (SOBs) and 2) the spontaneous appearance of SOBs within cooperative groups, and 3) all possible variations.
Such studies are often done on a grid, say 100x100. Each square may be occupied by a cooperator (green), a cheater (red), or no one (white). Then ‘time’ is started, and waves of cheaters and SOBs, or a set of cooperators in a subgroup who act like SOBs to everyone not in their subgroup, and all possible variations go at it. The resulting videos can be very entertaining.
“At a critical point there is a phase shift and you have to become an SOB yourself in order to protect you from all those other SOBs.”
Yes, but this does not mean you are still acting morally toward people in general. What it means is that you have unfortunately found yourself in an environment where attempting to cooperate with “people in general” is a losing strategy. A counter strategy is to cooperate only with the subgroup of people you “know” and be an SOB toward everyone else. So, from the standpoint of evolutionary morality, you could be acting morally within your subgroup while not acting morally to out-group people.
It is interesting you mention the “recognize the moral state of others”. “Flagging” to indicate membership in a group is a standard game theory strategy meant to address that problem. Examples of flagging in people include circumcision. If you are circumcised, then, at times in the past, people who are also circumcised may think you are more likely to be a reliable person to cooperate with.
Regarding dealing with SOBs, note that, by my evolutionary morality, punishing poor cooperators (SOBs) is a moral duty. How to punish SOBs as to be most likely to increase the future benefits of cooperation, and not decrease them by cycles of retribution, is a hot topic in game theory. For individuals in societies with rule of law, it appears best for individuals to limit punishment to withdrawal of cooperation and informing other people about the SOBs poor behavior. Punishment beyond that is best reserved for the community as a whole (often the law).
“We humans tend to congregate in marked groups and to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of the group, even if it isn’t composed of close genetic kin. “
Those “personal sacrifices for the benefit of the group” you mention are often to punish or to defend against SOB’s, most spectacularly as the clash of armies.
It definitely is more fulfilling to give than receive. I am glad this evolved in us, and I think it is a huge reason for why we made it this far. It most times feels good to receive as well, but I surely feel like I should always give back, in some manner at some point down the line.
“Pure altruism consists of giving something of value with no expectation of any compensation or benefits, either direct, or indirect (for instance from recognition of the giving and even from expectations of psychological rewards of giving)”.
“Plain altruism is a behavior which is anticipated to be costly to the actor, at least in the short term and perhaps permanently, and beneficial to the recipient”.
According to these definitions as written, pure altruism doesn’t necessarily benefit anyone. I’m assuming it was an oversight to leave off, “...and beneficial to the recipient” from the “pure altruism” definition. (The word “giving” sort of implies someone is benefiting.)
More problematic, in my opinion, is that (assuming my first point is correct) there’s no difference between these two definitions. Unless, of course, you define “costly to the actor” in such a way that excludes psychological rewards and punishment.
My question is whether psychological rewards and punishment are implicitly excluded from the “plain altruism” definition; whether you don’t think they exist; or whether you don’t think they play a role in determining human behavior?
You sound like you know more about evolutionary game theory than you let on. What you describe is typical of studies concerning both 1) the invasion of cooperative groups by outside cheaters (SOBs) and 2) the spontaneous appearance of SOBs within cooperative groups, and 3) all possible variations.
Such studies are often done on a grid, say 100x100. Each square may be occupied by a cooperator (green), a cheater (red), or no one (white). Then ‘time’ is started, and waves of cheaters and SOBs, or a set of cooperators in a subgroup who act like SOBs to everyone not in their subgroup, and all possible variations go at it. The resulting videos can be very entertaining.
“At a critical point there is a phase shift and you have to become an SOB yourself in order to protect you from all those other SOBs.”
Yes, but this does not mean you are still acting morally toward people in general. What it means is that you have unfortunately found yourself in an environment where attempting to cooperate with “people in general” is a losing strategy. A counter strategy is to cooperate only with the subgroup of people you “know” and be an SOB toward everyone else. So, from the standpoint of evolutionary morality, you could be acting morally within your subgroup while not acting morally to out-group people.
It is interesting you mention the “recognize the moral state of others”. “Flagging” to indicate membership in a group is a standard game theory strategy meant to address that problem. Examples of flagging in people include circumcision. If you are circumcised, then, at times in the past, people who are also circumcised may think you are more likely to be a reliable person to cooperate with.
Regarding dealing with SOBs, note that, by my evolutionary morality, punishing poor cooperators (SOBs) is a moral duty. How to punish SOBs as to be most likely to increase the future benefits of cooperation, and not decrease them by cycles of retribution, is a hot topic in game theory. For individuals in societies with rule of law, it appears best for individuals to limit punishment to withdrawal of cooperation and informing other people about the SOBs poor behavior. Punishment beyond that is best reserved for the community as a whole (often the law).
“We humans tend to congregate in marked groups and to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of the group, even if it isn’t composed of close genetic kin. “
Those “personal sacrifices for the benefit of the group” you mention are often to punish or to defend against SOB’s, most spectacularly as the clash of armies.
I’m currently developing a first year graduate course in “evolutionary dynamics” and evolutionary game theory is a big part of that. Am also working on a paper for the next Tucson conference “Toward a Science of Consciousness” with the title: Consciousness, Identity, and Morality. So these sorts of questions are very interesting for me (although my actual immediate interest is fixation probabilities on graphs).
Recognizing the moral state of others via external indications is a poor substitute for direct recognition of a person’s state. But in general, it’s all that’s possible. That’s why we have more positive feelings on the highway toward people driving the same make of car as we have, even though consciously we know this is totally bogus.
