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Aside: I think it’s an error to identify color with wavelength of light, it’s an interaction phenomenon and, interestingly, there is no single wavelength that corresponds to the color purple. Purple is the color that closes the color wheel, uniting the infra red and ultra violet limits of our color sensorium.
Interesting that you bring up the color purple burt, because I’ve been thinking about how light wavelengths correspond to color vision and the interesting fact that we don’t have a phenomenally evident colour for the infra-red wavelenghts (or the ultra-violet). I watched a show about bees being attracted to flowers because of the ultra-violet patterning on the petals and the narrator pointed out that we have no color that corresponds to this wavelength of light because we cannot see (detect) it, so we show the pattern here in black superimposed on the petals.
I never thought about purple closing the door on the spectrum because I always thought that violet was just another word for purple. But there are other colors like ‘magenta’ and ‘burgundy’ that are closer to the red than they are to the violet side of the door. Now I’m beginning to wonder if there actually are some colors that we are completely unaware of because they might be produced by the infra-red or the ultra-violet wavelengths. If there are colors that flow directly from the bottom end of the rainbow (red) to the top end (violet) in fact “closing the door” how is it possible that there might be a new and undetected/undiscoverable color that could possibly fit into that apparently closed gap. Yet bees can sense the ultra-violet and so can other creatures. Certainly we have gadgets that can pick up those wavelengths . . . what kind of qualia would infra-red produce?
I’ve wondered this often myself. Some birds have a four dimensional color space, apparently pigeons see into the ultra-violet, something the allows them to locate the sun on cloudy days. And I’ve also heard that a very small percentage of women have a fourth set of color receptors. The daughter of one of my cousins caused a stir in the family back when she was in junior high art class because she said she saw auras around things. She’s now 23 and a few months ago she said yes when I asked her if she still saw auras, but she doesn’t talk about it. I’d like to see her checked out in terms of what colors she can see. I got sort of a feel for what it might be like to see further into the spectrum by looking at a picture set up to show a scene as a red/green color blind person would see it, contrasted with the scene as a normal person sees it. When I go to bed at night I like to pay attention to my visual sensation (have found it’s much better then counting sheep) and usually get a very dull purplish color underneath any other sensations that might be there. I feel a bit claustrophobic. Have also wanted to take time to study something about other sensory modes to see if they have the same sort of structure (with sound, I know there are certain frequencies, called formant frequencies, that the ear is especially tuned to. As might be expected, these are the basic frequencies in the voice, it’s why we can pick vocal sounds out of noise easily - and very young infants can learn language so quickly).
I’ve been pretty busy at work lately and haven’t had time to follow this thread for a few days but tonight read through the posts since I last posted on the thread. I then re-read Dennet. His Consciousness Explained chapter 12 entitled Qualia Disqualified makes interesting reading. Have you read this , Burt or Can Zen or anyone else? I found section 5 of this chapter particularly persuasive. In that section he deals with the ‘Black and white Mary’ thought experiment. Mary is a color scientist who has lived since the day she was born in a black and white environment and can investigate the visual world only through a black and white TV monitor. She had learned everything there is to know about light and colour and optics and eyes and the vision centres in the brain… The neurophysiology of color vision is completely known to her. In short she has all the physical information. What will Mary experience when she leaves the black and white world and sees the coloured world outside or if she is given a color TV monitor? Will she learn anything new? Most people will emphaticall answer “yes”. Dennet thinks not. His argument is intriguing and I tend to agree with him. After giving several arguments against the idea of qualia he deals with the epiphenomenal notion of qualia which seems to be the standard philosophical argument. I shall quote him at some length here:
If qualia are epiphenomenal in the standard philosophical sense, their occurrence can’t explain the way things happen (in the material world) since, by definition, things would happen exactly the same without them. There could not be an empirical reason, then, for believing in epiphenomena. Could there be another sort of reason for asserting their existence? What sort of reason? An a priori reason, presumably. But what? [Burt?] No one has ever offered one - good, bad, or indifferent that I have seen. If someone wants to object that I am being a “verificationist” about these epiphenomena, I reply: Isn’t everyone a verifi¬cationist about this sort of assertion? Consider, for instance, the hypothesis that there are fourteen epiphenomenal gremlins in each cylinder of an internal combustion engine. These gremlins have no mass, no energy, no physical properties; they do not make the engine run smoother or rougher, faster or slower. There is and could be no empirical evidence of their presence, and no empirical way in principle of distinguishing this hypothesis from its rivals: there are twelve or thirteen or fifteen ... gremlins. By what principle does one defend one’s wholesale dismissal of such nonsense? A verificationsist principle, or just plain common sense?
In short he is, to put it mildly, not enamoured of the notion of qualia.
If you have read this chapter I wonder how you see his arguments against the notion of qualia. Are there any new counter arguments for qualia?
I am not really that widely read on the topic (which is why I went back to Dennet) but at first blush qualia have always seemed unlikely to this old materialist. I think we just think there are qualia because we do not yet know enough about the brain and how it works to give a full description of exactly what is happening when we experience ‘red’ or ‘E flat’ or ‘bitter’... In time that understanding will become available and ideas of qualia will go away.
If not, even though it would go against the materialist grain, we may have to settle for something like Burt’s a priori argument for consciousness which would, admittedly, embrace qualia. Time will tell. And there’s lots of that so I’m not going to give way just yet.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 06 December 2011 04:50 AM
I’ve been pretty busy at work lately and haven’t had time to follow this thread for a few days but tonight read through the posts since I last posted on the thread. I then re-read Dennet. His Consciousness Explained chapter 12 entitled Qualia Disqualified makes interesting reading. Have you read this , Burt or Can Zen or anyone else? I found section 5 of this chapter particularly persuasive. In that section he deals with the ‘Black and white Mary’ thought experiment. Mary is a color scientist who has lived since the day she was born in a black and white environment and can investigate the visual world only through a black and white TV monitor. She had learned everything there is to know about light and colour and optics and eyes and the vision centres in the brain… The neurophysiology of color vision is completely known to her. In short she has all the physical information. What will Mary experience when she leaves the black and white world and sees the coloured world outside or if she is given a color TV monitor? Will she learn anything new? Most people will emphaticall answer “yes”. Dennet thinks not. His argument is intriguing and I tend to agree with him. After giving several arguments against the idea of qualia he deals with the epiphenomenal notion of qualia which seems to be the standard philosophical argument. I shall quote him at some length here:
If qualia are epiphenomenal in the standard philosophical sense, their occurrence can’t explain the way things happen (in the material world) since, by definition, things would happen exactly the same without them. There could not be an empirical reason, then, for believing in epiphenomena. Could there be another sort of reason for asserting their existence? What sort of reason? An a priori reason, presumably. But what? [Burt?] No one has ever offered one - good, bad, or indifferent that I have seen. If someone wants to object that I am being a “verificationist” about these epiphenomena, I reply: Isn’t everyone a verifi¬cationist about this sort of assertion? Consider, for instance, the hypothesis that there are fourteen epiphenomenal gremlins in each cylinder of an internal combustion engine. These gremlins have no mass, no energy, no physical properties; they do not make the engine run smoother or rougher, faster or slower. There is and could be no empirical evidence of their presence, and no empirical way in principle of distinguishing this hypothesis from its rivals: there are twelve or thirteen or fifteen ... gremlins. By what principle does one defend one’s wholesale dismissal of such nonsense? A verificationsist principle, or just plain common sense?
In short he is, to put it mildly, not enamoured of the notion of qualia.
If you have read this chapter I wonder how you see his arguments against the notion of qualia. Are there any new counter arguments for qualia?
I am not really that widely read on the topic (which is why I went back to Dennet) but at first blush qualia have always seemed unlikely to this old materialist. I think we just think there are qualia because we do not yet know enough about the brain and how it works to give a full description of exactly what is happening when we experience ‘red’ or ‘E flat’ or ‘bitter’... In time that understanding will become available and ideas of qualia will go away.
If not, even though it would go against the materialist grain, we may have to settle for something like Burt’s a priori argument for consciousness which would, admittedly, embrace qualia. Time will tell. And there’s lots of that so I’m not going to give way just yet.
Don’t have time now to go into refutations of Dennett, but will send a PM. I published a review of his book in Journal of Consciousness Studies back in 2001.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 06 December 2011 04:50 AM
If you have read this chapter I wonder how you see his arguments against the notion of qualia. Are there any new counter arguments for qualia?
Thanks for the information Rob - excellent source.
I read Consciousness Explained 15 years ago and I recall not being totally convinced by Dennett’s argument at the time (I could not for certain dismiss the concept of qualia then and I haven’t really found a way to do that to my satisfaction today, although I remain skeptical). Now my only problem with Dennett’s version is that it’s very much like the “zombie argument” - that is, it’s a thought experiment (at which Dennett excels), but while the Black & White Mary and the Engine Gremlins are used to disqualify qualia the Zombie Argument is used to defend qualia. It seems that if you have a conclusion that you want to substantiate, then you find (or invent) an argument that will do exactly what you want. (Isn’t Russell’s “Teapot Argument” a thought experiment used for a similar purpose? Although the Russell argument is really used to show that you can’t prove that something doesn’t exist and this has indeed been conclusive as far as arguments go even though is doesn’t make any ontological claims negative or positive . . . iow, it’s a thought experiment about thought processes.)
When you begin to use thought experiments to refute or to support claims about the actual existence of something, the trick becomes a bit more difficult to manage. Of course the B&W Mary argument is a thought experiment about thought processes (if that’s what qualia would be?) and it never goes on to make ontological conclusions . . . it just says that with or without qualia everything that is necessary for having the experience is already there. The Gremlin thought experiment is about the epiphenomenal existence of certain things that may or may not exist and this could be applied to a host of subjective notions about things that there is no empirical evidence available to substantiate their existence . . . qualia happen to fit that category.
Now, strictly speaking, I think there are phenomenal properties that naturally come with our experience of events whether they are external to our senses or internal (like hunger or sleepiness). I don’t think qualia are epiphenomenal, but rather that they are the totality of the intrinsic properties of our having an experience (a neural-sensorial event). If you can think of conscious experiences as being naturally occurring events, like rocks falling off a mountain are natural events, then naturally these events have properties associated with their occurence. Qualia are just the properties of these events (conscious activities). However because we are living biological beings with emotive capacities, the properties of our experiences will be unlike any of the properties we associate with mundane physical events. Our properties are based in a completely fluid environment with biochemical reactions and electrochemical influences, of course these qualia (properties) would be unique, and perhaps mysterious, when looked at from a purely materialistic perspective. And this is why I require the physical/psychological impact of spacetime itself to make our cognitive world fully explainable.
I found an interesting paper [below] that reflects my views on the issue. I can now say that my position has a name, and so far, this Reflexive Model makes the most sense to me. It’s a good read. The link should allow you to reference back to a number of papers on consciousness/qualia [if none of you have referenced this site before].
Also, last night Charlie Rose presented his ongoing Brain Series: Year 2, Program 2 which coincidentally was on the topic of current research on Conscious/Nonconscious processes. [Unfortunately, the program is not posted yet, it may take a day or two.] While it only serves to highlight very specific areas on the research and findings, much of the information, I think, is transferrable to our topic under discussion. More importantly, I think it demonstrates the particular paths of research that will help to get to answers to the questions we are posing.
I also think that the combination of my two references above supports, or at least help to explain, why I think the zombie protocol doesn’t seem particularly useful in this case, nor is getting too philosophical when the scientific research should be driving our direction and formulations. Too often, it’s the dogged adherence to a particular school of thought, especially in philosophy, because of the initial personal academic investments that keep us from even framing the question in its most logical and scientific supportable manner.
Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the �mantle of science,� it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. This paper introduces such a model and how it construes the nature of conscious experience. Within this model the physical world as perceived (the phenomenal world) is viewed as part of conscious experience not apart from it. While in everyday life we treat this phenomenal world as if it is the “physical world”, it is really just one biologically useful representation of what the world is like that may differ in many respects from the world described by physics. How the world as perceived relates to the world as described by physics can be investigated by normal science (e.g. through the study of sensory physiology, psychophysics and so on). This model of consciousness appears to be consistent with both third-person evidence of how the brain works and with first-person evidence of what it is like to have a given experience. According to the reflexive model, conscious experiences are really how they seem.
CONCLUSION
Reductive physicalism rejects first-person evidence, arguing that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, however they might seem. Having reduced conscious states to brain states, they commonly try to externalise their “qualia”, claiming these to be observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although reductive physicalism drapes itself in the �mantle of science,� it routinely ignores the findings of science. For example, it ignores the evidence for the highly specialised nature of human sense organs (sensory physiology), the constructive nature of perception, the complex relationship of experienced qualia to the energies described by physics (psychophysics), the ability of the brain to generate experiences in the absence of the physical energies that those experiences would normally represent (neuropsychology) and the many ways in which human perception differs from that of other animals (comparative psychology). In short, reductive physicalism ignores both the first-person phenomenological evidence regarding the nature of consciousness and the third-person evidence about how it relates to world described by physics. It is ironic that a philosophy of mind intended to naturalise consciousness gives such an unnatural account of it.
However, it is possible to develop a reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world that is consistent with both third-person evidence of how the brain works and with first-person evidence of what it is like to have a given experience. Within this model the physical world as perceived (the phenomenal world) is viewed as part of conscious experience not apart from it. While in everyday life we treat this phenomenal world as if it is the “physical world”, it is really just one biologically useful representation of what the world is like that may differ in many respects from the world described by physics. How the world as perceived relates to the world as described by physics can be investigated by normal science (e.g, through the study of sensory physiology, psychophysics and so on). While this is an entirely “natural” account of consciousness, it is nonreductive. That is, conscious experiences are really how they seem.
I found an interesting paper [below] that reflects my views on the issue. I can now say that my position has a name, and so far, this Reflexive Model makes the most sense to me. It’s a good read. The link should allow you to reference back to a number of papers on consciousness/qualia [if none of you have referenced this site before].
I like the approach of the “Reflexive Model” and particularly how it shows us that pure physicalism is a broken-down picture of cognition. I have never had any use for the expression ‘brain states’ because in the examination of a living event (conscious activity) the break down of the total/whole process into discrete self-contained episodes just seems to miss the mark completely. And I like how it includes the thing we are conscious of in the attempt to describe how our consciousness operates. And that’s a position I have taken all along, good find Answerer.
I found an interesting paper [below] that reflects my views on the issue. I can now say that my position has a name, and so far, this Reflexive Model makes the most sense to me. It’s a good read. The link should allow you to reference back to a number of papers on consciousness/qualia [if none of you have referenced this site before].
I like the approach of the “Reflexive Model” and particularly how it shows us that pure physicalism is a broken-down picture of cognition. I have never had any use for the expression ‘brain states’ because in the examination of a living event (conscious activity) the break down of the total/whole process into discrete self-contained episodes just seems to miss the mark completely. And I like how it includes the thing we are conscious of in the attempt to describe how our consciousness operates. And that’s a position I have taken all along, good find Answerer.
I’ll recommend again the article “On Having No Head.” The writer describes an experience in which “he” wasn’t there, all that was present in awareness was a sensation of a vast empty space above a pair of shoulders, which contained all sensory presentations - And, those presentations were conscious. This is one of the anecdotes that I think supports my view since in coming out of that condition a self-conscious “I” reappeared, separate from the sensory input, with consciousness now being experienced as an aspect of the “I.” But you could probably interpret it as support as well.
I found an interesting paper [below] that reflects my views on the issue. I can now say that my position has a name, and so far, this Reflexive Model makes the most sense to me. It’s a good read. The link should allow you to reference back to a number of papers on consciousness/qualia [if none of you have referenced this site before].
I like the approach of the “Reflexive Model” and particularly how it shows us that pure physicalism is a broken-down picture of cognition. I have never had any use for the expression ‘brain states’ because in the examination of a living event (conscious activity) the break down of the total/whole process into discrete self-contained episodes just seems to miss the mark completely. And I like how it includes the thing we are conscious of in the attempt to describe how our consciousness operates. And that’s a position I have taken all along, good find Answerer.
I was hoping you’d like it, zen. Here’s the Rose broadcast.
I found an interesting paper [below] that reflects my views on the issue. I can now say that my position has a name, and so far, this Reflexive Model makes the most sense to me. It’s a good read. The link should allow you to reference back to a number of papers on consciousness/qualia [if none of you have referenced this site before].
I like the approach of the “Reflexive Model” and particularly how it shows us that pure physicalism is a broken-down picture of cognition. I have never had any use for the expression ‘brain states’ because in the examination of a living event (conscious activity) the break down of the total/whole process into discrete self-contained episodes just seems to miss the mark completely. And I like how it includes the thing we are conscious of in the attempt to describe how our consciousness operates. And that’s a position I have taken all along, good find Answerer.
I’ll recommend again the article “On Having No Head.” The writer describes an experience in which “he” wasn’t there, all that was present in awareness was a sensation of a vast empty space above a pair of shoulders, which contained all sensory presentations - And, those presentations were conscious. This is one of the anecdotes that I think supports my view since in coming out of that condition a self-conscious “I” reappeared, separate from the sensory input, with consciousness now being experienced as an aspect of the “I.” But you could probably interpret it as support as well.
Is it an article, or book? If I have to buy it, I can’t read it.
I’ll recommend again the article “On Having No Head.” The writer describes an experience in which “he” wasn’t there, all that was present in awareness was a sensation of a vast empty space above a pair of shoulders, which contained all sensory presentations - And, those presentations were conscious. This is one of the anecdotes that I think supports my view since in coming out of that condition a self-conscious “I” reappeared, separate from the sensory input, with consciousness now being experienced as an aspect of the “I.” But you could probably interpret it as support as well.
I must say though, Bruce, parts of the Rose program give a good synopsis of the conscious and unconscious working together, so that “present in awareness” and “separate from sensory input” seems to be a bit more complex than what is suggested here.
mr. burt:
The writer describes an experience in which “he” wasn’t there, all that was present in awareness was a sensation of a vast empty space above a pair of shoulders, which contained all sensory presentations - And, those presentations were conscious.
That sounds like a description of experience from the first floor cognitive perspective. Hippo has assumed the Highest Level of Organization and identity is experienced from the nervous system as a whole.
The vast empty space (or nyeep pool- most nyeeps are beyond Hippo’s perception) is the second floor where Cinema perception carries on for a phantomly conscious Mr. Now. But that isn’t “all sensory presentations”. Hippo sees the “vast empty space” via his Sub-Cinema perception. It’s like in the sixties when the family sat together and watched Batman. The children (Hippo) had fun watching but it was clear that the adults (Mr. Nows) were seeing more (being conscious of more) even though everyone was watching the same screen.
Perhaps this is a reflexive model.
Mr. Hippo is aware (perceives) that there is someone upstairs watching things he cannot see.
Mr. Now is aware (perceives) that his perceptual platform is being carried around by a semi-hairless bipedal primate.
This is one of the anecdotes that I think supports my view since in coming out of that condition a self-conscious “I” reappeared, separate from the sensory input, with consciousness now being experienced as an aspect of the “I.”
This leaps all the way to the third floor where Mr. Flashlight perceives both the primate and the Cinema viewer. Self awareness comes in different forms but is always one perspective seeing another perspective seeing.
Watching Charlie Rose was fun. I often wanted to leap throught the screen and grab and shake these folks. They are describing my triune scheme in detail but strangely avoid the number three.
Dr. Bow Tie is a frustrated triunist. I hear him trying to cram three levels into a two level scheme. He mentions “sub-conscious perception” and a broader “conscious perception”. Then he describes “conscious perception” as a flashlight-like focus that isn’t broad at all. He has offset these layers into a confusing mess. The perception of the basic brain (Hippo) is Sub-Cinema Perception and the “broader conscious perception” he describes is the familiar Cinema View but it belongs to the sub-conscious mind (or second floor). When we “focus on” what is at the center of our view, that is Mr. Now’s second floor perspective at it’s most singular- at the surface of the pool. Focusing our Cinema View in this way allows us to put three or four “visual items” in a visual buffer and examine them together. This is all sub-conscious activity. If we push harder, we can consciously narrate about the items in Mr. Now’s “focus”. That put’s us on the Libet Bridge or (third floor) where the Post Cinema View perceives the after-effect of sub-conscious sight.
The Pink Lady showed a video with a fine example of Sub-Cinema Perception. Did anyone have to see it move to recognize the image? Imagine if the vacility the video highlights was switched off but left your Cinema View intact but strangely uninformative.
She mentions being unable to follow two conversations at once. That is, only one narration at a time. Small Chunk Limited phrases can be heard in multiples.
At 36-37 mins, Mr. Blue Tie refers to the Chunk Limit and the threshold of narration. Then they go on to describe with precision the contemplative cycle of narration and nyeep pool, the illusion that Mr. Flashlight is working things out, and how distract Mr. Flashlight with a different narration leaves the nyeep pool to get on with the business. Dr. Spotted Tie describes it spot on.
They all refered to Freud’s pioneering description of the conscious and sub-conscious minds. Freud was a triunist. Finally at 38 mins, Dr. Bow Tie acknowledges Freud’s three-way scheme and then nails the difference between the second and third floors.
I’m confident these folks will get there eventually but it is a bit painful to watch.
[ Edited: 07 December 2011 02:09 AM by Nhoj Morley ]
I found an interesting paper [below] that reflects my views on the issue. I can now say that my position has a name, and so far, this Reflexive Model makes the most sense to me. It’s a good read. The link should allow you to reference back to a number of papers on consciousness/qualia [if none of you have referenced this site before].
I like the approach of the “Reflexive Model” and particularly how it shows us that pure physicalism is a broken-down picture of cognition. I have never had any use for the expression ‘brain states’ because in the examination of a living event (conscious activity) the break down of the total/whole process into discrete self-contained episodes just seems to miss the mark completely. And I like how it includes the thing we are conscious of in the attempt to describe how our consciousness operates. And that’s a position I have taken all along, good find Answerer.
I’ll recommend again the article “On Having No Head.” The writer describes an experience in which “he” wasn’t there, all that was present in awareness was a sensation of a vast empty space above a pair of shoulders, which contained all sensory presentations - And, those presentations were conscious. This is one of the anecdotes that I think supports my view since in coming out of that condition a self-conscious “I” reappeared, separate from the sensory input, with consciousness now being experienced as an aspect of the “I.” But you could probably interpret it as support as well.
Is it an article, or book? If I have to buy it, I can’t read it.
Thanks, burt. I think it was a nice and different take on the meditative experience of Oneness or pure Experience. I think it can be taken as support for the Reflexive Model.
As I have said, and as I think the model postulates, is that the process of the experience of the color red, say, or the description of redness (what “red” is) in terms of a visual feature or initial perception (experience) only, is the operation of the object (specific light waves) and the receptor (visual apparati including neurons as activators or “current” leading to specialised areas of the brain) in tandem. Red is an “experience” we call color (raw feel). Anything else associated with it (enhanced feel) is due to other perceptual factors/processes, internal and external.
The concept of the “I” or self-consciousness being different from consciousness is a problem I have. “I” is an “experience” involving all our perceptual components, conscious and unconscious, operating in tandem. The concept of “I” or self IS the experience, inasmuch as red is an experience. This is how I arrive at the conclusion that consciousness and self-consciousness are the same. If I had to put it another way, it’s [us] perceiving [us] perceive[us] and the environment, or our perception of us perceiving red. This is pretty much the standard psychology view of self-perception, I think, (ie, we are not what others perceive us as, but what we perceive others perceive us as).
I don’t know if that makes sense or can hold up because I haven’t thoroughly thought through any flaws. I wonder, does our discussion so far support the efficacy of the zombie model as it applies to qualia except in a rudimentary way, in your opinion? The zombie just seems to eliminate the stimuli from the middle self-perceptual component. While we can control or subdue the conscious component, thus the unconscious feed as it interacts, to a certain degree, I don’t think it’s a factor that can be totally eliminated, except through physical abnormalities.
Thanks, burt. I think it was a nice and different take on the meditative experience of Oneness or pure Experience. I think it can be taken as support for the Reflexive Model.
As I have said, and as I think the model postulates, is that the process of the experience of the color red, say, or the description of redness (what “red” is) in terms of a visual feature or initial perception (experience) only, is the operation of the object (specific light waves) and the receptor (visual apparati including neurons as activators or “current” leading to specialised areas of the brain) in tandem. Red is an “experience” we call color (raw feel). Anything else associated with it (enhanced feel) is due to other perceptual factors/processes, internal and external.
The concept of the “I” or self-consciousness being different from consciousness is a problem I have. “I” is an “experience” involving all our perceptual components, conscious and unconscious, operating in tandem. The concept of “I” or self IS the experience, inasmuch as red is an experience. This is how I arrive at the conclusion that consciousness and self-consciousness are the same. If I had to put it another way, it’s [us] perceiving [us] perceive[us] and the environment, or our perception of us perceiving red. This is pretty much the standard psychology view of self-perception, I think, (ie, we are not what others perceive us as, but what we perceive others perceive us as).
I don’t know if that makes sense or can hold up because I haven’t thoroughly thought through any flaws. I wonder, does our discussion so far support the efficacy of the zombie model as it applies to qualia except in a rudimentary way, in your opinion? The zombie just seems to eliminate the stimuli from the middle self-perceptual component. While we can control or subdue the conscious component, thus the unconscious feed as it interacts, to a certain degree, I don’t think it’s a factor that can be totally eliminated, except through physical abnormalities.
The only area of disagreement we might have here is the consciousness/self-consciousness distinction. If you go to identify the two you’re still stuck with the question of where the consciousness comes from and as far as I can tell the only three positions are: it’s identical with the physical and biological processes involved; it’s an epiphenomenon of those processes; or, it exists a priori but cannot “appreciate” itself except via self-consciousness. The epiphenomenon position has some problems, and I think the identity view begs the question.
The only area of disagreement we might have here is the consciousness/self-consciousness distinction. If you go to identify the two you’re still stuck with the question of where the consciousness comes from and as far as I can tell the only three positions are: it’s identical with the physical and biological processes involved; it’s an epiphenomenon of those processes; or, it exists a priori but cannot “appreciate” itself except via self-consciousness. The epiphenomenon position has some problems, and I think the identity view begs the question.
Right, though it seems first we’re still stuck with the question of what is consciousness.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 06 December 2011 04:50 AM
I’ve been pretty busy at work lately and haven’t had time to follow this thread for a few days but tonight read through the posts since I last posted on the thread. I then re-read Dennet. His Consciousness Explained chapter 12 entitled Qualia Disqualified makes interesting reading. Have you read this , Burt or Can Zen or anyone else? I found section 5 of this chapter particularly persuasive. In that section he deals with the ‘Black and white Mary’ thought experiment. Mary is a color scientist who has lived since the day she was born in a black and white environment and can investigate the visual world only through a black and white TV monitor. She had learned everything there is to know about light and colour and optics and eyes and the vision centres in the brain… The neurophysiology of color vision is completely known to her. In short she has all the physical information. What will Mary experience when she leaves the black and white world and sees the coloured world outside or if she is given a color TV monitor? Will she learn anything new? Most people will emphaticall answer “yes”. Dennet thinks not. His argument is intriguing and I tend to agree with him. After giving several arguments against the idea of qualia he deals with the epiphenomenal notion of qualia which seems to be the standard philosophical argument. I shall quote him at some length here:
If qualia are epiphenomenal in the standard philosophical sense, their occurrence can’t explain the way things happen (in the material world) since, by definition, things would happen exactly the same without them. There could not be an empirical reason, then, for believing in epiphenomena. Could there be another sort of reason for asserting their existence? What sort of reason? An a priori reason, presumably. But what? [Burt?] No one has ever offered one - good, bad, or indifferent that I have seen. If someone wants to object that I am being a “verificationist” about these epiphenomena, I reply: Isn’t everyone a verifi¬cationist about this sort of assertion? Consider, for instance, the hypothesis that there are fourteen epiphenomenal gremlins in each cylinder of an internal combustion engine. These gremlins have no mass, no energy, no physical properties; they do not make the engine run smoother or rougher, faster or slower. There is and could be no empirical evidence of their presence, and no empirical way in principle of distinguishing this hypothesis from its rivals: there are twelve or thirteen or fifteen ... gremlins. By what principle does one defend one’s wholesale dismissal of such nonsense? A verificationsist principle, or just plain common sense?
In short he is, to put it mildly, not enamoured of the notion of qualia.
If you have read this chapter I wonder how you see his arguments against the notion of qualia. Are there any new counter arguments for qualia?
I am not really that widely read on the topic (which is why I went back to Dennet) but at first blush qualia have always seemed unlikely to this old materialist. I think we just think there are qualia because we do not yet know enough about the brain and how it works to give a full description of exactly what is happening when we experience ‘red’ or ‘E flat’ or ‘bitter’... In time that understanding will become available and ideas of qualia will go away.
If not, even though it would go against the materialist grain, we may have to settle for something like Burt’s a priori argument for consciousness which would, admittedly, embrace qualia. Time will tell. And there’s lots of that so I’m not going to give way just yet.
Don’t have time now to go into refutations of Dennett, but will send a PM. I published a review of his book in Journal of Consciousness Studies back in 2001.
Nice but of writing, Burt.
I will comment on the contents soon. First I’m reviewing some other articles so that I can do some comparisons - Sam Harris’ recent peice for example: http://www.samharris.or/blog/item/the-mystery-of-consciousness/ I’ll also go back and look at Damasio and then some more recent stuff. Fascinating topic surrounded by a lot of conceptual fog. Your article helped to illuminate the landscape and clarify the terrain for me. I’ll get back to you on it soon.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 07 December 2011 08:03 PM
burt - 06 December 2011 07:57 AM
Don’t have time now to go into refutations of Dennett, but will send a PM. I published a review of his book in Journal of Consciousness Studies back in 2001.
Nice but of writing, Burt.
I will comment on the contents soon. First I’m reviewing some other articles so that I can do some comparisons - Sam Harris’ recent peice for example: http://www.samharris.or/blog/item/the-mystery-of-consciousness/ I’ll also go back and look at Damasio and then some more recent stuff. Fascinating topic surrounded by a lot of conceptual fog. Your article helped to illuminate the landscape and clarify the terrain for me. I’ll get back to you on it soon.
Cheers
Rob
Well, that leaves the rest of us at a deficit. If burt’s article helps to clarify it, I sure would like to see it because the fog of most of the academic discussion I’ve been looking at in other articles is pretty thick on me.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 07 December 2011 08:03 PM
burt - 06 December 2011 07:57 AM
Don’t have time now to go into refutations of Dennett, but will send a PM. I published a review of his book in Journal of Consciousness Studies back in 2001.
Nice but of writing, Burt.
I will comment on the contents soon. First I’m reviewing some other articles so that I can do some comparisons - Sam Harris’ recent peice for example: http://www.samharris.or/blog/item/the-mystery-of-consciousness/ I’ll also go back and look at Damasio and then some more recent stuff. Fascinating topic surrounded by a lot of conceptual fog. Your article helped to illuminate the landscape and clarify the terrain for me. I’ll get back to you on it soon.
Cheers
Rob
Well, that leaves the rest of us at a deficit. If burt’s article helps to clarify it, I sure would like to see it because the fog of most of the academic discussion I’ve been looking at in other articles is pretty thick on me.
I wanted to post it as an attachment here, but it’s over the 75K limit. No problem for me about sharing.
I wanted to post it as an attachment here, but it’s over the 75K limit. No problem for me about sharing.
But it’s going for almost $30 on the open market! You’ve outdone Sam Harris’ essay value 10:1. Wait, it’s more like 12:1, right? Goddamit, where’s my calculator?
So burt, was your criticism based on Dennett’s concept of heterophenomenolgy which seems reasonable as far as I can understand it? I also can’t ascertain exactly that Dennett is anti-qualia and anti-zombie, though it seems he is to a great degree. Is the reflexive model I referenced similar to Dennett as they both account for a 1st person and 3rd person investigative approach? Anyhow, the arguments seem to be pretty heated up around the time you critiqued.
Burt, your paper was a good read and I think you described very well what many perceive to be the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. I agree with your first point. That is, I agree that Dennett’s thesis was not substantiated. At least, I agree if you mean it was not substantiated insofar as he did not prove that his multiple drafts model was true. David Deutsch in his latest book ‘The Beginning of Infinity’ (I think you have it) couldn’t resist reminding us on p154 that some other philosophers have said ‘Consciousness Explained’ should have been called ‘Consciousness Denied’. That is too harsh and stems from a position by others that is even less substantiated than Dennett’s. No one I have read who has purported to explain consciousness has actually succeeded. The lack of success thus far is because we do not yet know enough about the brain and how it does what it does – how it makes consciousness, self-awareness, how it produces “I”. But progress by the “computational functionalist camp” has been made and that will continue for as long as people pursue an understanding of consciousness scientifically. Even if there were something a priori about consciousness there would be no way to prove it except scientifically. That is the ‘hard problem’ for the other camp.
And that is why I think your second point, that “consciousness must be assumed to have an a priori ontological existence” is, although interesting, very premature. Criticism by the likes of Searle and Chalmers I find nonsensical. I say that for the same reasons as Dennett (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3.htm) and Hofstadter.(Have you read Hofstadter’s ‘I Am A Strange Loop’?) I think Hofstadter sums up the problem for those in the other camp when he writes:
Either we believe that our consciousness is something other than an outcome of physical law, or we believe it is an outcome of physical law [like all else we know of].
It really boils down to the question of whether we are prepared to accept dualism/supernaturalism which is what, as far as I can see at this stage of our knowledge, a priori consciousness amounts to. Of course, in order to counter the charge of supernaturalism, one could argue, as you do, Burt, that there is this other a priori consciousness out there that arises as a corollary of the laws of nature. The problem with this is that there is no evidence for a priori-ness in respect of consciousness and no testable theory from which such evidence might be forthcoming. Until there is such a testable theory, I think we must go with the evidence at hand. And so far, what evidence we have has come from science and not philosophy. And certainly not from mysticism or, worse yet, from religion. And what evidence there is points to consciousness being an outcome of the workings of complex biological information processing machines called brains.
As Hofstadter goes on to say: If…one believes that consciousness is an outcome of physical law, then no room remains for anything extra “on top’. I agree with him: ‘selves’ are outcomes of and exist in “a substrate consisting of inanimate matter”. I think Hofstadter’s explanation of consciousness is a qualitative description of how ‘selves’ emerge from inanimate matter by way of “loopiness” – patterns of abstract symbols which feed back to create a self-referential “I”.
Hofstadter does not, indeed cannot, explain in detail how, at the level of neurons and systems of neurons this happens – we don’t know enough about the brain yet – but it must be something like the way he describes in order for us to know “what it is like” to be ourselves.
I cannot see how consciousness could happen in any other way without invoking some sort of a priori “essence” that is supposed to exist like the ether was said to exist – undetectable, but necessary to explain what was observed until science came up with a better explanation. As I have said, I think a priori-ness will disappear like the ether after the Michelson-Morley experiment once we come up with the right experiment(s). A priori-ness will evaporate like the ether and élan vital.
Like Dennett and Hofstadter, Damasio explanation in his book, ‘The Feeling Of What Happens’ emerges from the so called computational functionalism camp. He puts forth a plausible multi-level model not too much unlike our Nhoj’s. To my mind it is all about information and parallel processing. I agree with Deutsch, Dennett and Hofstadter: the answer to the question of whether we “could obtain the same delight from bits and bytes that we do from biological nerve impulses” is an emphatic YES.
Given an adequate level of the knowledge and the subsequent technology, I think that “I” could be loaded into a suitably complex computer (necessarily as least as complex as my brain) and calling me a zombie is really due to an aesthetic distaste and an antique view that there is something intrinsically special about our bodies of which our brains are part.
I do not believe in zombies because if a zombie had self- representation it would not be a zombie because self-representation is what consciousness is and consciousness is what produces “I”. And “you”. First person and third person.
Like Deutsch, I envisage that “I” and “WE” can be immortal if we come up with the right explanations.
I must say that I was disappointed in Sam Harris on this issue. He states that “…an analysis of purely physical processes will never yield a picture of consciousness”. He then hedges his bets by saying “However, this is not to say that some other thesis about consciousness must be true. Consciousness may very well be the lawful product of unconscious information processing.”
He then says he does not know what that last sentence means and that he does not think anyone else does either. I think he is being precious here. If he cannot imagine consciousness being the lawful product of unconscious information processing I can only agree with Dennett that he is lacking in imagination.
Finally, I am neither a professional philosopher nor a professional scientist. Yet I think I understand the arguments. If I do so understand, it is because the issues have been made understandable by Burt and the other writers I have mentioned above.
If somebody’s figured most or all of this stuff out, he’s not going to post it open-source and allow everyone to steal his hard-won accomplishments. Nor is he likely to find it even remotely easy to get published in a philosophy journal, as to a first approximation they don’t listen to anybody who lacks philosophical credentials (as Sam Harris has found out, much to his disappointment). Nor can he post his stuff on his personal blog if he doesn’t want to be written off as some run-of-the-mill crank with yet another crank website that purports to explain everything.
The sad reality is that to most people writing about these matters, and especially philosophical academics, this is nothing more than a subject of passing interest (as well as a lifetime cash cow, in the case of “professional” philosophers). If they were serious about getting to the bottom of this problem, they would welcome new ideas by outsiders. This however appears to be the exact antithesis of what the “field” of philosophy of mind is like.
