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I have the notion that the further study of dementia or its dysfunctional mechanisms may help lead to a better understanding and perhaps provide the model of self-consciousness that you’re looking for.
Touch Me
by Stanley Kunitz
Summer is late, my heart.
Words plucked out of the air
some forty years ago
when I was wild with love
and torn almost in two
scatter like leaves this night
of whistling wind and rain.
It is my heart that’s late,
it is my song that’s flown.
Outdoors all afternoon
under a gunmetal sky
staking my garden down,
I kneeled to the crickets trilling
underfoot as if about
to burst from their crusty shells;
and like a child again
marveled to hear so clear
and brave a music pour
from such a small machine.
What makes the engine go?
Desire, desire, desire.
The longing for the dance
stirs in the buried life.
One season only,
and it’s done.
So let the battered old willow
thrash against the windowpanes
and the house timbers creak.
Darling, do you remember
the man you married? Touch me,
remind me who I am.
Here’s a question for you burt. If your position about the differences between ‘consciousness’ (as an a priori condition) and ‘self-oonsciousness’ (or conscious activity as a phenomenal event) has any traction, then those who believe in a “life-after-death” will definitely be on your side even though their beliefs are about the transmigration of souls. How does your version of consciousness fit in with the notion of a soul? I realize that personal identity cannot be maintained in an undifferentiated form of existence, but does your version of pure consciousness influence or otherwise affect conscious activity? If so, then how?
That’s my interest as well cz. Does a priori or cosmic consciousness lend itself to the belief in the existence of a soul, or mind body dualism? If consciousness is separate from human self-consciousness, what exactly does that mean?
Perhaps burt will explain his ‘belief’ so we can comprehend better.
No. What is required is development of something that both can agree on, namely developing a model of self-consciousness that can be tested both in first and third person. For example, a model that (a) allows a person to gain first person verifiable understanding of their own behavior, and (b) allows for third person explanations of that same behavior that fits with the first person verification. Then, the connection of that sort of model to basic biology and neurology. The question of how the consciousness part of the self-consciousness arises is, I think, premature and can be bracketed until then, perhaps booted up to the level of metaphysics, or decided on pragmatic criteria. One of the methodological advantages of assuming a priori consciousness is that it allows attention to get focused back on developing a theory of a self, however it might become conscious.
Another thing, this formulation has my percepts discombobulated. What happens if we start with basic biology and neurology instead and connect behavior to that? Then we have a first and third person basis of examination, with consciousness arising from that (assuming thought/awareness/feelings as behaviors, but not actions per se), and with self-consciousness arising from consciousness rather than the other way around. In my view, that seems to plug into the evolutionary paradigm better. Now you have little crawly thingies sloshing out of the primordial soup reacting to stimuli (attraction/avoidance) until it develops brains up through the various levels of consciousness across species. The higher the development of the brain, the higher the development of consciousness and concomitant self-consciousness. To me, the concept of “self-consciousness” is a redundancy, or “two sides of the same coin” that allow for processing of two internally and externally presented perceptual targets on the same ongoing basis.
Here’s a question for you burt. If your position about the differences between ‘consciousness’ (as an a priori condition) and ‘self-oonsciousness’ (or conscious activity as a phenomenal event) has any traction, then those who believe in a “life-after-death” will definitely be on your side even though their beliefs are about the transmigration of souls. How does your version of consciousness fit in with the notion of a soul? I realize that personal identity cannot be maintained in an undifferentiated form of existence, but does your version of pure consciousness influence or otherwise affect conscious activity? If so, then how?
Hard to answer in part. I bracket the question of souls as not relevant to my interest. (I can just hear BM responding to that.) Part of the issue has to do with the way I think of pure consciousness since the word consciousness is usually taken as implying a personal identity, which I place with self-consciousness. One line of thought I’ve had around this goes with the fate of the heretics in the Inferno. They are imprisoned within red hot iron bins. They have the capacity to see some aspects of the future, but on the last day the bins will be sealed and they will be stuck inside with themselves forever. Not a great fate, but making an analogy, we experience conscious activity throughout life and at the end, there is a personal history that is fixed in reality. In other word, it exists in spacetime. Depending on how time functions at the point of death, a person trying to hold onto that history might well have some rather unpleasant final experiences.
Second question is how consciousness might influence conscious activity. Short answer is that it makes it possible, otherwise it would just be non-conscious activity. From my point of view, an equivalent question would be something like “how does empty space influence or otherwise affect spatial activity?”
What is required is development of something that both can agree on, namely developing a model of self-consciousness that can be tested both in first and third person. For example, a model that (a) allows a person to gain first person verifiable understanding of their own behavior, and (b) allows for third person explanations of that same behavior that fits with the first person verification. Then, the connection of that sort of model to basic biology and neurology. The question of how the consciousness part of the self-consciousness arises is, I think, premature and can be bracketed until then, perhaps booted up to the level of metaphysics, or decided on pragmatic criteria. One of the methodological advantages of assuming a priori consciousness is that it allows attention to get focused back on developing a theory of a self, however it might become conscious.
Interesting. What would part (a) look like, do you think? Is this even possible in a real world, pragmatic sense? I have my doubts, but I’m interested to hear your thoughts.
I think it’s possible. For example, suppose you had a theory that said something like “here is the spectrum of discrete ego states that can arise in experience. If you pay attention to your thoughts and behaviors you will discover that you can learn to identify which of these states you are in at any given moment.” If it further was able to tie the proposed set of states into biological correlates and provide an evolutionary argument for why they were s they were I think that would be a pretty good way to go.
Speechie - 14 December 2011 03:15 PM
That’s my interest as well cz. Does a priori or cosmic consciousness lend itself to the belief in the existence of a soul, or mind body dualism? If consciousness is separate from human self-consciousness, what exactly does that mean?
I can’t speak for Burt, but I’m inclined to say just the opposite. I have no problem with the idea that consciousness as we experience it is an illusion, a hall of mirrors of sorts. Billions of pieces of data compiled to create the illusion of our internal landscape.
Where I don’t follow, though, is in seeing how you can ever break this process down to a level that doesn’t require an experience to be experienced. You can break it down into smaller and smaller pieces, of course, to the most basic fragments of sensory experience, but even those miniscule experienced are - well, experienced. Which begs the question - by who, or what? We can say it’s an illusion, but as has been noted many times before, then who or what is experiencing that illusion? And if you don’t fall back on dualism and bring in that “who” or “what”, then where do you go next? Priori consciousness actually seems like the opposite of dualism.
we experience conscious activity throughout life and at the end, there is a personal history that is fixed in reality. In other word, it exists in spacetime. Depending on how time functions at the point of death, a person trying to hold onto that history might well have some rather unpleasant final experiences.
In space-time, a record of every event that has ever occurred is preserved in light. If we had the proper perspective at different positions in the universe, together with a sufficiently powerful telescope, we could observe every event that ever occurred on the earth, even though those events took place billions of years before.
Likewise, if a priori consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality, there is a record of every experience of self-consciousness preserved in some form in that reality. Thus, just as historical events assume some aspect of eternality in space-time, so self-conscious events assume some aspect of eternality in a priori consciousness. This eternal record of both events and self-conscious experience provides the foundation for life after death. Think of the universe as a gigantic hard drive saving everything that occurs on the cosmic computer.
It’s not really necessary to think of this in terms of a duality. Space-time and a priori consciousness would be all part of a unified reality, but just represent different aspects of it.
I think it’s possible. For example, suppose you had a theory that said something like “here is the spectrum of discrete ego states that can arise in experience. If you pay attention to your thoughts and behaviors you will discover that you can learn to identify which of these states you are in at any given moment.” If it further was able to tie the proposed set of states into biological correlates and provide an evolutionary argument for why they were s they were I think that would be a pretty good way to go.
That would be interesting, if found to be true. Just curious, is this something you’ve read about, or experienced via observation? What would those states look like, if you care to share? Or if you think it’s too off topic, I understand!
It doesn’t seem like that could account for all of our varied and diverse behavior (why did I buy this bottle of wine instead of that one, why did I choose this word instead of that one, etc.) but in broader strokes it could say something about what “mode” of interaction we’re in at the moment.
Of course couldn’t account for all variety, but this is something that psychologists have been doing for years. For example, classifications like paranoia give you a pretty good idea of how somebody it’s applied to will react in some circumstances. We had a guy on here a while ago (wissler) who I mentally catagorized as seriously “over-independent.” Anybody who tried to interact with him, I think, would see how that applied. If he had been willing to consider his own reactions and look for sources, he might have found that useful as well. We’ve also had people here who could be classified as being in a state of subjectivity fitting the classification “True Believer.” What’s required is a complete theory.
No. What is required is development of something that both can agree on, namely developing a model of self-consciousness that can be tested both in first and third person. For example, a model that (a) allows a person to gain first person verifiable understanding of their own behavior, and (b) allows for third person explanations of that same behavior that fits with the first person verification. Then, the connection of that sort of model to basic biology and neurology. The question of how the consciousness part of the self-consciousness arises is, I think, premature and can be bracketed until then, perhaps booted up to the level of metaphysics, or decided on pragmatic criteria. One of the methodological advantages of assuming a priori consciousness is that it allows attention to get focused back on developing a theory of a self, however it might become conscious.
Another thing, this formulation has my percepts discombobulated. What happens if we start with basic biology and neurology instead and connect behavior to that? Then we have a first and third person basis of examination, with consciousness arising from that (assuming thought/awareness/feelings as behaviors, but not actions per se), and with self-consciousness arising from consciousness rather than the other way around. In my view, that seems to plug into the evolutionary paradigm better. Now you have little crawly thingies sloshing out of the primordial soup reacting to stimuli (attraction/avoidance) until it develops brains up through the various levels of consciousness across species. The higher the development of the brain, the higher the development of consciousness and concomitant self-consciousness. To me, the concept of “self-consciousness” is a redundancy, or “two sides of the same coin” that allow for processing of two internally and externally presented perceptual targets on the same ongoing basis.
Please pardon my ignorance, but this is all very confusing without a better idea of the terms you’re using. I suspect you’re using consciousness and self-consciousness in different ways (among different posters, I mean), but I could be wrong. So for my part, I’ll use sensory-consciousness (the earliest form of consciousness I can conceive of - simple awareness of a single fragment of sensory information) vs. self-consciousness (a sense of self).
In that sense, Answerer, couldn’t sensory-consciousness be part of the process of basic biology and neurology from which behavior arises? This is where I find Burt’s question interesting - I’m taking it to mean - “Can we ever really know why we do what we do?” Again, my intuitions say no (as at least some of these processes probably arise at a neurological level we can’t consciously examine, anymore than we can turn our brain inward and watch our neurons control our heartbeat,) but I’m curious to hear other thoughts.
Yes, I think we/they (see philosophers) are all over the place re how “we” see consciousness/self-consciousness. I rely on such clinical research information from all the pertinent sciences for which I see reports and references to, but basically from psychology and neurology. The Charlie Rose Brain Series program (Year 2, Episode 2) provides a good discussion with diagrams of conscious/unconscious activity. I think all of our conscious awareness including self-consciousness arises from direct sensory perception and the interplay between the conscious (awareness) and unconscious (unawareness) which gets fed back through to consciousness with all brain activity (internally and externally stimulated) having an effect on conscious awareness. We are in fact, finding out more about the brain, ie, the parts we can’t consciously self-examine without instruments, that combine to present the total picture. I think to a large extent we do know why we do what we do.
The question goes to burt again. I assume that he has viewed the conference presentation by Farhan Qureshi in the General Religion thread, if not I’ll repost it here. What has this got to do with qualia? Is the spontaneous experience he calls “spirituality” the same thing as qualia?
The question goes to burt again. I assume that he has viewed the conference presentation by Farhan Qureshi in the General Religion thread, if not I’ll repost it here. What has this got to do with qualia? Is the spontaneous experience he calls “spirituality” the same thing as qualia?
As I understand the term, qualia refers to basic sensory experiences: colors, tastes, smells, and so on. When it gets into more complex experiences these are composed of multiple qualitative sensations. I wonder if there is any experience associated with a complete lack of qualia….
The question goes to burt again. I assume that he has viewed the conference presentation by Farhan Qureshi in the General Religion thread, if not I’ll repost it here. What has this got to do with qualia? Is the spontaneous experience he calls “spirituality” the same thing as qualia?
As I understand the term, qualia refers to basic sensory experiences: colors, tastes, smells, and so on. When it gets into more complex experiences these are composed of multiple qualitative sensations. I wonder if there is any experience associated with a complete lack of qualia….
The question goes to burt again. I assume that he has viewed the conference presentation by Farhan Qureshi in the General Religion thread, if not I’ll repost it here. What has this got to do with qualia? Is the spontaneous experience he calls “spirituality” the same thing as qualia?
As I understand the term, qualia refers to basic sensory experiences: colors, tastes, smells, and so on. When it gets into more complex experiences these are composed of multiple qualitative sensations. I wonder if there is any experience associated with a complete lack of qualia….
From Wiki-
Qualia ( /ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/), singular “quale” (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkwaːle]), from a Latin word meaning for “what sort” or “what kind,” is a term used in philosophy to refer to subjective conscious experiences as ‘raw feels’. Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the experience of taking a recreational drug, or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes that qualia is “an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us.” Erwin Schrödinger, the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: “The sensation of colour cannot be accounted for by the physicist’s objective picture of light-waves. Could the physiologist account for it, if he had fuller knowledge than he has of the processes in the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so.”
The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from the fact that they are seen as posing a fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body problem. Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia.
From Wiki-
Qualia ( /ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/), singular “quale” (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkwaːle]), from a Latin word meaning for “what sort” or “what kind,” is a term used in philosophy to refer to subjective conscious experiences as ‘raw feels’. Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the experience of taking a recreational drug, or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes that qualia is “an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us.” Erwin Schrödinger, the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: “The sensation of colour cannot be accounted for by the physicist’s objective picture of light-waves. Could the physiologist account for it, if he had fuller knowledge than he has of the processes in the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so.”
The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from the fact that they are seen as posing a fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body problem. Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia.
That kind of philosophy doesn’t resonate with me. In that case, we can’t account for anything, while at the same time, we are on the path of accounting for everything, albeit in steady increments, perhaps with the prospect of no real or foreseeable end. The way I see it, the ability to pose the “problem” itself is qualia. “The way things seem” may be reduced to the way things are, perhaps nothing more than binding clumps of Higgs bosons, in turn, perhaps bound by other tinier particles yet. They are no less bound, therefore distinguishable at some level. Even if we weren’t here, a tree is still a tree, an ocean an ocean, the earth, earth, the moon, the moon with their physical properties in tact ... and here we are with ours. The physicist and the physiologist together account for the “experience.” The “experience” is existence, and any subjective question of “why” on the subject of physicalism after the objective “how” is accounted for, is the basis for the qualia, religion, or the meaning for life ascribed by humanism, which in my view is more closely tied to properties of physicalism (ie, existence) by following science and skipping the fantasy non-existent middle-man.
I like to stick to the color red as the simplest example of this perceptual question, although the others similarly apply. Is the perceived redness of the evening sky really a subjective conscious experience? Or is the interaction of the nature (physical properties) of the object and the perceiver (physical properties), the objective existence of what we call color, specifically, depending on the alteration of physical properties, what we physically distinguish between them, red. It seems to me this so-called mystery of qualia is akin to a catchy marketing concept, “I Can’t Believe It’s Not ...” When the true answer is, “It is what it is,” not “what it seems” to be. Red is red. What’s subjective about it? It’s different than blue. We’re not making it up.
Red may be only red to those creatures who see light in that particular spectrum, but you have a point. What real difference does it make? The concept of qualia lends itself to the theory succumbed to by many people that reality is a cognitive illusion, with no objective reality and no absolutes of nature.
That is, reality is only our perception of such based upon the qualia produced by our sensory inputs.
