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Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 29 September 2011 07:08 AM
That is arguable, GAD. I doubt we will be able to agree on the matter. Happy to discuss, though.
I’m a moral relativist and I am against stoning, am I wrong?
For example, you can be horribly offended that the Romans fed the Christians to the lions for the entertainment of the crowd, but still understand that if you were brought up in those times and in that culture you probably would have cheered along with everyone else in the stadium. You can be offended at something without taking the “holier than thou” stance that you have the authority and right to pass judgement.
When I consider those kinds of issues I always need to know if there was any real opposition to such things at the time, because if I were me now then I likely would have, in fact, and if you’re saying I wouldn’t have been me now then it’s kind of like just asking what “I” would do if “I” were some random person then rather than me, and that hardly seems a compelling question.
Suppose you were stolen as a baby and put in a time machine and sent back to Roman times and were raised by a Roman family according to their value system.
Well, yeah, that’s what I’m saying. Under such extremely different conditions I’d basically just be someone else entirely.
‘Again, I’m not saying it’s a bad thing, but I think we need to recognize the blend of Objective/Subjective in these endeavors.’
Exactly! Spot on, dead on etc., etc.,
Moral issues and scenarios are and should be a blend of subjective and objective prespectives.
There are a few absolutes, like murder, rape etc. And there are some scenarios that require views relative to given culture, tradition etc.,
This is what SH is trying to do, build a bridge between moral absolutism and moral relativism. They are both relevant to human life and kept and used within the proper context they are what help us develop civilized, thriving societies.
FWIW, this is what Michael Shermer talks about with his ‘provisional ethics concept’ in ‘The Science of Good and Evil’
I think Carl Sagan commented that our secular ethics should be based upon the golden rule added to…. tit for tat.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 29 September 2011 07:08 AM
That is arguable, GAD. I doubt we will be able to agree on the matter. Happy to discuss, though.
I’m a moral relativist and I am against stoning, am I wrong?
For example, you can be horribly offended that the Romans fed the Christians to the lions for the entertainment of the crowd, but still understand that if you were brought up in those times and in that culture you probably would have cheered along with everyone else in the stadium. You can be offended at something without taking the “holier than thou” stance that you have the authority and right to pass judgement.
When I consider those kinds of issues I always need to know if there was any real opposition to such things at the time, because if I were me now then I likely would have, in fact, and if you’re saying I wouldn’t have been me now then it’s kind of like just asking what “I” would do if “I” were some random person then rather than me, and that hardly seems a compelling question.
Suppose you were stolen as a baby and put in a time machine and sent back to Roman times and were raised by a Roman family according to their value system.
Well, yeah, that’s what I’m saying. Under such extremely different conditions I’d basically just be someone else entirely.
Sure, because your outlook is relative to your environment.
Relativism simply cannot be the end result of moral investigations. It has nothing to say. Someone tells me that I’m mistaken to consider some action wrong. On what basis can they possibly make that criticism? How does a moral relativist justify a challenge to the foundationalist without violating his own code? Sure you can belittle a position by saying that it’s only an opinion but isn’t that ‘only an opinion’ as well? If there is no justification for objective morality how is there justification for relativism? It seems like a speed bump.
Relativism simply cannot be the end result of moral investigations. It has nothing to say. Someone tells me that I’m mistaken to consider some action wrong. On what basis can they possibly make that criticism? How does a moral relativist justify a challenge to the foundationalist without violating his own code? Sure you can belittle a position by saying that it’s only an opinion but isn’t that ‘only an opinion’ as well? If there is no justification for objective morality how is there justification for relativism? It seems like a speed bump.
If right/wrong|good/evil do not exist in nature then they can only be invented.
Morality = the consensus of personal preferences of a group = moral relativism.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Rob) - 29 September 2011 07:08 AM
That is arguable, GAD. I doubt we will be able to agree on the matter. Happy to discuss, though.
I’m a moral relativist and I am against stoning, am I wrong?
For example, you can be horribly offended that the Romans fed the Christians to the lions for the entertainment of the crowd, but still understand that if you were brought up in those times and in that culture you probably would have cheered along with everyone else in the stadium. You can be offended at something without taking the “holier than thou” stance that you have the authority and right to pass judgement.
When I consider those kinds of issues I always need to know if there was any real opposition to such things at the time, because if I were me now then I likely would have, in fact, and if you’re saying I wouldn’t have been me now then it’s kind of like just asking what “I” would do if “I” were some random person then rather than me, and that hardly seems a compelling question.
If you were a good Roman citizen, then you would probably have seen the official disapproval of Christianity, and occasional capital punishment of Christians, as good things. Christians refused to sacrifice to the traditional deities. Such sacrifices were generally believed to be the rituals necessary to gaining the best favor possible for the empire and its people from those deities. So Christians were making problems for the empire and all the people in it vis-a-vis the traditional deities. This is my interpretation of the consensus view of the situation among those religious historians I’m familiar with, among them Pagels and Ehrman.
Aargh! A great OP directly related to what I joined this forum for, but my mind is currently in a condition too much like that of a recently-used port-a-potty to respond as I would like.
I definitely think Can Zen points the way toward part of the answer, with the emphasis on intersubjectivity and transactionalism. (This sounds compatible with John Dewey’s pragmatism, before Sam Rorty got hold of it and evidently made freedom synonymous with maximum self-development.)
Other parts of the answer take the form of the relative transience of different objective rules. Perhaps a view of the “moral landscape” as more of a seascape will help, with the sets of viable moral rules being represented as the tops of volcanic mountains. The surrounding sea rises and falls according to predictable rythms, but also in ways that are not entirely predictable. Meanwhile the mountains, like the Hawaiian islands, emerge from the ocean to become high and wide, then erode as the volcanic hot spot moves elsewhere.
For some spans of lifetimes, a single large island can provide, in moral terms, the appearance of universal objectivity. The periodic rising and falling of the sea serves to constrain those rule set “organisms” from becoming established too far from the high ground. The occasional catastrophe inundates even those that were thought to be safe. Eventually, however, the island will erode, and no high ground on it will be high enough to prevent inundation from the next catastrophe.
If another, higher, island is nearby, a temporarily low sea level may allow some random variations of rule set “organisms” to establish themselves there. Occasionally, some rule set “organisms” may spawn offspring that land on the new island (I’m assuming these “organisms” are sessile, at least in their “adult” forms). This is an analogy for how nearby local “moral fitness” peaks might be colonized, despite being generally unattainable by viable means.
I’m not sure if this parable entirely makes sense (port-a-potty residue in mind, and first thought of it today), but maybe it makes enough sense.
In practical terms, relativity is represented by the constantly shifting relationships among the constraints that affect the viability of particular moral positions (practice sets, really). Objective universality is represented by the illusionary stability of the original island over time. The individual, sessile-stage, rule sets are our own primarily unconscious moral preferences, resulting from both biology and socialization.
The volcanos forming the high ground of each island represent the unattainability of moral perfection.
So, there can be rule sets that we can regard as absolute over large spans of time, compared to a human lifetime. At the same time, these rule sets must change to keep pace with both human biological evolution and the more rapid changes in human society. Some of the changes will be foreseeable, while some will not be (as befits a complex system). The grave danger of a morality based on an illusionary absolute is that it will not be abandoned or modified when the alternative is extinction.
Tangentially, I have a gut feel that we humans are going to figure this out in a way understandable by most of us in a decade or two. Maybe a few of us already have. At the same time, there will IMO never be an end to suffering over it. As I’ve said here before, morality is and always will be on the “bleeding edge” of human evolution.
Relativism simply cannot be the end result of moral investigations. It has nothing to say. Someone tells me that I’m mistaken to consider some action wrong. On what basis can they possibly make that criticism? How does a moral relativist justify a challenge to the foundationalist without violating his own code? Sure you can belittle a position by saying that it’s only an opinion but isn’t that ‘only an opinion’ as well? If there is no justification for objective morality how is there justification for relativism? It seems like a speed bump.
No, relativism isn’t the end result of moral investigations—it’s a footnote: true, but irrelevant except when you claim something is objectively right or wrong. I can’t speak for all moral relativists, but I find the idea that you’re “mistaken to consider some action wrong” ludicrous. Frankly, I don’t understand the obsession with being objectively right on moral issues. It seems like a religious mindset to me.
I agree with GAD: morality stems from consensus. We believe stoning adulteresses is wrong; they believe it’s right. When you come right down to it, morality (or values, if you prefer) is what separates us from them more so than anything else I can think of.
Relativism simply cannot be the end result of moral investigations. It has nothing to say. Someone tells me that I’m mistaken to consider some action wrong. On what basis can they possibly make that criticism? How does a moral relativist justify a challenge to the foundationalist without violating his own code? Sure you can belittle a position by saying that it’s only an opinion but isn’t that ‘only an opinion’ as well? If there is no justification for objective morality how is there justification for relativism? It seems like a speed bump.
No, relativism isn’t the end result of moral investigations—it’s a footnote: true, but irrelevant except when you claim something is objectively right or wrong. I can’t speak for all moral relativists, but I find the idea that you’re “mistaken to consider some action wrong” ludicrous. Frankly, I don’t understand the obsession with being objectively right on moral issues. It seems like a religious mindset to me.
I agree with GAD: morality stems from consensus. We believe stoning adulteresses is wrong; they believe it’s right. When you come right down to it, morality (or values, if you prefer) is what separates us from them more so than anything else I can think of.
I think I agree. The whole issue just makes me edgy. Probably related to my religious upbringing.
I guess I’m mostly concerned with how ethics collides with geopolitics. Burkas and so forth. Does the relative nature of morals compel someone to accept something they find abhorrent? Or, are we only obligated to uphold our own cultural morals without making space for others? Or, is it pointless asking another person because I’m just going to do whatever I’m going to do anyway? I’m really lost at sea here.
Relativism simply cannot be the end result of moral investigations. It has nothing to say. Someone tells me that I’m mistaken to consider some action wrong. On what basis can they possibly make that criticism? How does a moral relativist justify a challenge to the foundationalist without violating his own code? Sure you can belittle a position by saying that it’s only an opinion but isn’t that ‘only an opinion’ as well? If there is no justification for objective morality how is there justification for relativism? It seems like a speed bump.
No, relativism isn’t the end result of moral investigations—it’s a footnote: true, but irrelevant except when you claim something is objectively right or wrong. I can’t speak for all moral relativists, but I find the idea that you’re “mistaken to consider some action wrong” ludicrous. Frankly, I don’t understand the obsession with being objectively right on moral issues. It seems like a religious mindset to me.
I agree with GAD: morality stems from consensus. We believe stoning adulteresses is wrong; they believe it’s right. When you come right down to it, morality (or values, if you prefer) is what separates us from them more so than anything else I can think of.
I think I agree. The whole issue just makes me edgy. Probably related to my religious upbringing.
I was wondering about this issue today. Not about you specifically, but about the difference between relativists and people who believe objective morality exists. I was not raised in a religious household. I can’t remember ever believing in God. My theory is this: that atheists who did at one time believe in God (recovering theists) have a harder time with relativism than atheists who never believed in God. I wonder if there’s a correlation.
Brick Bungalow - 30 September 2011 12:04 PM
I guess I’m mostly concerned with how ethics collides with geopolitics. Burkas and so forth. Does the relative nature of morals compel someone to accept something they find abhorrent? Or, are we only obligated to uphold our own cultural morals without making space for others? Or, is it pointless asking another person because I’m just going to do whatever I’m going to do anyway? I’m really lost at sea here.
We wouldn’t accept the practice of stoning adulteresses in our society. On the other hand, we do expect foreigners to accept things they probably think are abhorrent in our society—if they want to be a part of our society. I wouldn’t necessarily be opposed to forcing them to stop being so abhorrent in their own societies, but I question whether it would be worth our time and effort. So I guess I’d go along with, “we’re only obligated to uphold our own cultural morals without making space for others.”
I do think there’s a lot of truth to your last point. Suppose, for example, that it could be shown that stoning adulteresses was objectively right. I’d still be against it. And even if we could show that stoning adulteresses was objectively wrong, I doubt it would stop anyone from stoning adulteresses. Even if objective morality existed, it probably wouldn’t make much difference in terms of people’s behavior. So from a practical standpoint, the whole issue seems moot to me. Which is why I say it’s a footnote.
But that’s not to say the science of morality isn’t useful.
I think I agree that the issue of ‘objectivity’ is probably irrelevant, distracting and ultimately just a subtle way of interjecting a religious idea. How about this?
1. I cannot judge your actions nor your internal moral state nor your reactions to the actions of others in a moral sense.
2. I can and must make judgments about all of these things within myself. And I can make practical judgments about the outcomes of others and their dynamic moral relationship to myself.
3. Being accountable for my own actions and reactions means that deliberate permissiveness is a moral act like any other. So allowing harm to come to another person, regardless of culture, is itself a moral act when one could reasonably have done otherwise. This act being considered subjectively and independent of the actor.
4. So while pronouncements of guilt are meaningless direct physical intervention can be justified since the power to act in effect deprives the agent of the freedom FROM making a moral determination. Since conscious inaction is itself a moral act. We are in effect trapped by our own knowledge and power.
5. Geographic or cultural separation is only meaningful for predicting outcome and the probable reactions of other persons. It has no direct bearing on the choice to intervene because the choice to intervene is not made on the basis of relative morals but on strictly on ones own personal convictions. And the actual practical capacity to intervene when those convictions compel one to do so.
1) Everyone should adopt culture X, others that differ are wrong in those ways they differ. Objective truth is not the point.
The other group of non-relativist’s believe as I do:
2) False beliefs are bad for all of us, whether they come from culture X or Y. This belief requires self examination as well as calling for others to drop their false beliefs. One is wrong if they teach that the world was made in 7 days. We use right and wrong in the normative or reason-implying sense.
Among moral relativist’s, one group believes:
3) Objective truths exist (like the world was formed over billions of years) but it is not wrong to choose to believe it was made in 7 days if that is your culture, or if someone else believes it was made in 7 days you have no right to say that is wrong.
Another moral relativest group believes:
4) Objective truth does not exist. There is no objective way to tell what is right or wrong outside of ones own culture and one cannot say whethere another culture has elements that are right and wrong.
I think I agree that the issue of ‘objectivity’ is probably irrelevant, distracting and ultimately just a subtle way of interjecting a religious idea. How about this?
1. I cannot judge your actions nor your internal moral state nor your reactions to the actions of others in a moral sense.
2. I can and must make judgments about all of these things within myself. And I can make practical judgments about the outcomes of others and their dynamic moral relationship to myself.
3. Being accountable for my own actions and reactions means that deliberate permissiveness is a moral act like any other. So allowing harm to come to another person, regardless of culture, is itself a moral act when one could reasonably have done otherwise. This act being considered subjectively and independent of the actor.
4. So while pronouncements of guilt are meaningless direct physical intervention can be justified since the power to act in effect deprives the agent of the freedom FROM making a moral determination. Since conscious inaction is itself a moral act. We are in effect trapped by our own knowledge and power.
5. Geographic or cultural separation is only meaningful for predicting outcome and the probable reactions of other persons. It has no direct bearing on the choice to intervene because the choice to intervene is not made on the basis of relative morals but on strictly on ones own personal convictions. And the actual practical capacity to intervene when those convictions compel one to do so.
1) Everyone should adopt culture X, others that differ are wrong in those ways they differ. Objective truth is not the point.
The other group of non-relativist’s believe as I do:
2) False beliefs are bad for all of us, whether they come from culture X or Y. This belief requires self examination as well as calling for others to drop their false beliefs. One is wrong if they teach that the world was made in 7 days. We use right and wrong in the normative or reason-implying sense.
Among moral relativist’s, one group believes:
3) Objective truths exist (like the world was formed over billions of years) but it is not wrong to choose to believe it was made in 7 days if that is your culture, or if someone else believes it was made in 7 days you have no right to say that is wrong.
Another moral relativest group believes:
4) Objective truth does not exist. There is no objective way to tell what is right or wrong outside of ones own culture and one cannot say whethere another culture has elements that are right and wrong.
Another group believes:
5) There is no right and wrong.
That’s not what a moral relativist believes at all. It’s a fact that world is over a billion years old. It is not a fact that the Romans feeding the Christians to the lions for the entertainment of the crowd was wrong. It was just their culture.
Tis better to ask a Moral Relativist for a definition of Moral Relativism, Mr. M. It really looks more like 2 than the other items.
Make this item 6…
6) Believing that false beliefs are perfect, absolute and eternal is bad for everyone in both cultures X and Y. Believing that false beliefs must be constantly reexamined and revised is healthy for everyone. The truth may well be absolute, but our own conclusions about the truth should remain flexible. There will be times when we will need to believe our conclusions enough to act on them and react to something, or accomplish something. Success should earn a conclusion respect but not reverence or permanence.
