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I am not the first on this forum to mention Derek Parfit’s book “On What Matters” so be sure to check out the other threads too.
After ordering the two volume set and reading the introduction, preface, and chapter on normative concepts, I feel compelled to try to introduce beginners to this book.
First, there is no need to get the two volumes at once. His book is the first volume and that is all you need. The larger second volume will probably yield some red meat for some philosophers who want to read criticisms from prominent academics. I’ll admit the voluminous volume two is occupying a hefty chunk of a bookshelf and likely will for a while.
When you get volume 1, I recommend you skip the introduction first time around. It just is too much talking about stuff in the both volumes before you even get a chance to check it out.
This is where Derek begins his book and carefully gives an admiring introduction to the genius of Kant, while pointing out some flaws. He then brings in Sidgwick which was a surprising treat. The passages he quotes from Sidgwick gives you a feeling for the calm way he wrote about matters of importance. You can tell that Derek has great admiration for Sidgwick’s dry, accurate and somehow gentle descriptions of ethical matters. You do not have to have read Kant or Sidgewick to appreciate the chapter and gain insights into the book.
From what little I have read, I really appreciate how Derek has taken Sidgwick’s writing skills to heart.
Let us know what you think as you read it. The combination of Bentham and Kant seems obvious, but I’m not smart enough to pull it off. I’d like to see how it’s done.
My interest in the book does not come from formal philosophy, although I would like to hear your ideas. I have been pondering (more off than on) about the math of morals along the thinking I expressed in the thread “A Moral Equation” in the science area of the forum. When I read the link you posted in your thread, the book sounded like it might be interesting. I am not saying it was the best route to the book, but here I am. I will be happy to share my thoughts on the first chapter.
Lower the lights please…
The following example is paraphrased from Derek Parfit’s “Normative Concepts” chapter in his new book “On What Matters”:
Someone is in the desert and halts dangerously close to an angry poisonous snake . A snake expert would tell you to stay frozen because the snake will strike at movement. The person had the belief that the right thing to do is run away. The choice was run.
Alright you can turn the light back up…
Thanks to Derek Parfit I now understand that this example is ripe with normative concepts.
Normative Reason
A normative reason is basically a verifiable fact. In the example the normative reason to freeze is that snakes strike at movement.
Non-Normative Reason
A non-normative reason is based on a non-normative belief. In the example the person used a non-normative reason (their belief) to run.
Normative and Non-Normative Beliefs
A belief that is based on normative reasons or facts is a normative belief. In this case the belief to freeze is a normative belief. Beliefs based on non-normative reasons are non-normative beliefs.
He brings in a few more concepts and applies them to this and that. It is a very interesting chapter. I am sure I will be visiting it multiple times in the near future.
To quote Mma Ramotswe from Alexander McCall Smith’s novel, “Blue Shoes and Happiness”:
Snakes were one of the tests which life sent for us, and there was no telling how we might respond until the moment arrived.
I have read Derek Parfit’s “Objective Theories” chapter now, but I keep finding my mind wants to return to the foundation he laid in normative concepts.
I think the example with the snake does a wonderful job of pointing out the fact that it is advantageous to have normative reasons.
I may have been taking some liberty using the term non-normative since I do not see him using it in the book. I was considering why not, then I remembered one of his criticisms of Kant was that he tended to talk in terms of absolutes in unfortunate ways. Maybe non-normative implies too much of an absolute to be useful in more complex scenarios.
Normative Force
Rather than labeling the belief to run as non-normative, I think Derek would refer to it as not having normative force. The weight of the normative reasons for a belief gives it its normative force.
I’m going to tell you that I have not yet read any of Alexander McCall Smith’s novels, but it just so happens that my wife enjoys his novels and had just read a chapter where a small group of people encounter a poisonous snake in a room. I think I may read the chapter for the fun of it, maybe explore the normative concepts.
You may have guessed that I am still in the normative concepts chapter. To be absolutely clear, when I titled this thread as “for beginners” I should have added “by a beginner” because I haven’t read much formal philosophy and have only read through “Objective Theories” in the book “On What Matters”. I take a book like this at my own pace which is slow. Buried in the topics in this section you will find a topic “Slow as a philosophy”, if you are interested in how “slow” can be good from my point of view.
I feel one of the most powerful tools we have as humans is the ability to learn. I also think there is value in documenting the struggle of a beginner when learning.
Writing these posts as I learn helps me think more critically about the material I am studying. I will often write something with great conviction and ready to post, only to re-read it and see that I missed a very important point, or that my point was weak, or I said something I did not think was completely true. If it were just a thought in my head, I might not go to the trouble of double checking what I thought, but I know there are others who would rightly point out a flaw.
This extra push usually results in a tossed draft or in me exploring the finer points, like I did with dropping non-normative. If I was not writing about details right after reading about it, I would likely have continued using non-normative in less than accurate ways. I suppose one could use non-normative in the complete absence of normative force, but those cases are rare and it may trap your point at zero in an unnecessary way. I understood the concept of normative force, but did not exactly understand how it fit into the language of normative concepts.
It is my hope that other beginners can benefit from reading the stuff I am writing, or it will interest them in the book, and I usually benefit from the feedback of others.
Now that I am re-reading Normative Concepts, it is reminding me that the end of it leads to the word “ought” and its relation to normative concepts.
When reading his discussion of “ought” it reminded me of a discussion I jumped into not long after I found this forum. One of the posters was taking exception to science ever being able to determine “ought”. I took exception and pointed out “When a Nurse says that you ought to take your medicine, science is what is justifying the ought”. I think I then went into a contorted argument from there that didn’t further my case very much.
Were I responding now, I would say that science gives the nurses “ought” its normative force.
I’m still working through the Normative Concepts chapter, but I think I am close to moving on. The reason I am not head first into “Objective Theories” is, after his discussion of “ought” and all the concepts I have talked about so far, the whole second section of the chapter called “Reason-Involving Goodness” is densely packed in approximately five pages at the end, and unlike his very digestible discussion of the encounter with the snake and its normative concepts, I am finding his section on “Reason-Involving Goodness” not as well packaged.
Derek Parfit begins his chapter with a definition.
good, in what we call the reason-implying sense, we mean roughly that there are certain kinds of fact about this thing’s nature, or properties, that would in certain situations give us or others strong reasons to respond to this thing in some positive way, such as wanting, choosing, using, producing, or preserving this thing.
This is a lot for me to chew on in one bite. Then there are examples involving good metaphor and palindrome from a person’s point of view and why they are not “reason-implying”.
As a beginner, I am a bit stumped why he did not build on the concept of normative force in his definition of good, rather than introducing the vaguer “reason-involving” or “reason-implying” concept. I’m thinking since reasons can have widely different amounts of normative force, his term “reason-implying” may not be as accurate as referring to the normative force in the “good”.
Why not say?
good, in a normative sense, we mean the normative force in this thing’s nature, or properties, that would in certain situations give us or others strong reasons to respond to this thing in some positive way, such as wanting, choosing, using, producing, or preserving this thing.
Why not title the section “Normative Goodness”? Pretty interesting stuff. I hope to find out why.
After I ended the last post I was trying to think of a science fiction analogy where the expedition went to bed with laser guns by their side and woke up with muskets. That is a little bit how I felt after reading his definition of “good, in what we call the reason-implying sense…” and “certain kinds of fact” …. I’m thinking, um, that “we” you just mentioned in the definition, is that supposed to include me? What the heck is “the reason-implying sense” and these “certain kinds of fact” of which you speak?
From reading on a bit I think these “certain kinds of fact” are none-other-than those providing normative force to the good. Additionally, as far as I can tell “reason-implying sense” is no different than “normative sense”, at least as he pitches it, or maybe as I catch it.
I got a chuckle how he brings in Scanlon to his discussion of second-order fact. After describing Scanlon’s view, he writes, “This view needs, I think, one small revision.” and goes on to a paragraph of explanation. I get lost when he does these things simply because I have not read Scanlon.
Within this paragraph explaining the revision, he goes on to explain how normative-reasons do not duplicate, no matter how many reasons claim them derivatively to the good. Having designed databases and normalized data schemas, this concept was pretty easy for me. The example he gave is that one might explain how the medicine is good because it is the fastest (normative reason 1), the most effective (normative reason 2), and the best (combining 1 and 2). Following Scanlon’s rules, I think, you can’t claim any of these reasons at all because they are second-order facts. With Parfits small revision, one could correctly claim effective and fast as derivative normative reasons contributing to the normative force of the good, but not best, at least in a normative “reason-implying” sense.
Hey Jeff, thanks for doing all this hard work with “On What Matters”. i was all for rushing out to buy it when it came out. Now I’m going to let you continue and hope you’ll post more before I decide to actually buy the book.
I’m glad you are finding the posts somewhat useful. I would be doing the work either way because I am drawn to the book. I hope you do not find these these posts a replacement for the book, unless you are not up for for spending the time.
When one is speaking in the normative (reason-implying) sense, possible acts are:
Derek Parfit:
rational if we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth would give us sufficient reasons to act in this way,
what we ought rationally to do if these reasons would be decisive,
less than fully rational if we have beliefs whose truth would give us clear and decisive reasons not to act this way,
and
[irrational] if these reasons would be strongly decisive.
Remember the definitions above apply normative concepts to possible acts, as in before they happen.
After an act happens we move to a second set of normative concept definitions where we actually act
Derek Parfit:
rationally if we act in some way because we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth would give us sufficient reasons to act in this way,
and
irrationally if we act in some way despite having beliefs whose truth would give us clear and strongly decisive reasons not to act in this way.
If that was a bit to chew, you are not alone. I have come back to these definitions a number of times.
Luckily, we get to talk about the encounter with the snake again.
Let’s say you are dangerously close to a poisonous snake and and you do not know snakes strike at movement and you believe the best thing to do is run.
Derek Parfit:
Given your false belief, it would be irrational for you to stand still. You ought rationally to run away. But that is not what you ought to do in the decisive-reason-implying sense. You have no reason to run away, and a decisive reason to not to run away. You ought to stand still, since that is your only way to save your life.
I have found these normative concepts and definitions very helpful in my own thinking and well worth the time spent contemplating.
When one is speaking in the normative (reason-implying) sense, possible acts are:
Derek Parfit:
rational if we have beliefs. . . .
Does Parfit give some specific definition of belief? If not, then use of that word seems dicey. For me, a belief is very different from knowing about something. It is also very different from trusting something. The term, unless it’s defined in some specific and limiting way, arrives complete with religious undertones, including significant doubt about whatever matters are at hand.
When one is speaking in the normative (reason-implying) sense, possible acts are:
Derek Parfit:
rational if we have beliefs. . . .
Does Parfit give some specific definition of belief? If not, then use of that word seems dicey. For me, a belief is very different from knowing about something. It is also very different from trusting something. The term, unless it’s defined in some specific and limiting way, arrives complete with religious undertones, including significant doubt about whatever matters are at hand.
I do not see where he gives a formal definition of belief.
After reading his chapter and checking the definitions of belief at webster and oxford, I am going to go on a limb and say he means:
1 : a state or habit of mind in which trust or confidence is placed in some person or thing
Here is part of the paragraph preceding the definitions of rational and irrational where he discusses belief in the normative (reason-implying) sense:
Derek Parfit starts paragraph:
When we must choose between several possible acts, there may be several facts that give us reasons to act in these ways. I shall call these relevant, reason-giving facts. What we ought rationally to do depends in part on our beliefs about these facts.
... (some discussion I (Jeff M) have not set up for this thread about a possible deadly reaction to a walnut ) ...
Parfit ends paragraph:
If we have certain beliefs about the relevant facts, and what we believe would, if it were true, give us reason to act in some way, I shall call these beliefs whose truth would give us this reason. In most cases, I believe, some possible act of our would be
rational if we have beliefs. . . .
edited for clarity and separating my comment from his quote.
When I first started posting to this thread, I thought I could somehow pick out a highlight or two from the first chapter and convey the notion of normative concepts, but no, after a few weeks of living with them so to speak, highlights are not enough, all of the concepts are important. For-instance he ends the chapter with the importance of the impartial point of view in relation to normative concepts.
Derek Parfit:
We have an impartial point of view when we are considering possible events that would affect or involve people who are complete strangers to us. When our actual point of view is not impartial, we can think about possible events from an impartial point of view. We can do that by imagining possible events that are relevantly similar, except that the people involved are all strangers to us.
Now that I am starting to write about normative concepts a bit more, I am warming up to use of the term reason-implying sense. You may have noticed in an earlier post on this thread I used a science fiction analogy to bemoan the term ‘reason-implying sense’. Now that I have some more experience with the term, I no-longer use that analogy. I could come up with another but I am not seeing much use for it.
Is the reason-implying sense applicable to everything?
No.
As I said in an earlier post in this thread, when one invokes the reason-implying sense we are implying we have normative reasons to make such a claim.
It would be silly to try to talk in the reason-implying sense all of the time. For instance one would not likely not bring up ones favorite color in the reason-implying sense. I suppose one could have normative reasons to pick a color over another if you are a scientist picking a light filter for an experiment. Maybe the scientist would invoke the reason-implying sense when discussing the great effects the color filter had on the experiment and why he likes it so much and it is his favorite color for that experiment. But usually when we are talking about our favorite color, we mean in a another sense that does not imply normative reasons.
This is how Derek Parfit puts it when discussing the reason-implying sense:
Derek Parfit:
Things can be good or bad in other senses. If I claimed, for example, that some tree has good roots, that moles have bad eye-sight, or the best metaphor is
Ice formed on the butler’s upper slopes,
and the best palindrome is not ‘Madam I’m Adam’ but
A MAN A PLAN A CANAL: PANAMA,
I would not intend these uses of ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘best’ to be reason-implying. Moles could not have reasons to wear spectacles, nor do we have reasons to be amused by the ice on the butler’s upper slopes. And many uses of ‘good’ mean that something meets certain standards. But the most important uses of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are, I believe, reason-implying.
In another post on another thread, I said something like ‘Normative concepts are reserved for matters of importance.’ After further study I think this roughly hold true, although I do not see that Derek put it exactly that way.
I would never say ‘Love you neighbor as yourself.’ could not be true in the reason-implying sense because it comes from the Bible. If that were the only phrase in the Bible I might argue that it is a good place to get your morals using the reason-implying sense.
Overt moral systems have a way of turning people into self-deceivers. If I don’t particularly care for my neighbor (or some other individual or group), yet the narrative operating in my geographical area commands that I love them anyway, I’ll either be transformed into a pseudo-saint (unlikely without the assistance of steady supplies of benzodiazepines) or I’ll tell myself and others that I’m a person who I’m not. This can lead to unproductive and unresolved confusion for myself and everyone around me.
I thinks it’s mistaken to refer to an aphorism as being possibly “true,” unless you’re speaking to your buddies at the pub. It fits poorly in a serious discussion.
Good point. I have the bias that my mom gave me which was that ‘Love your neighbor as your self.’ meant you should care about others as well as yourself. I would think that statement is argued hundreds of ways by people out there. My only point is that some interpretations (such as my mom’s) are arguably compatible with normative concepts.
Maybe I should take a step back and let you know that Parfit does not subscribe to a simple system of rational impartialism. You are absolutely correct that it is not practical to ignore your own personal and partial reasons when you act and that taking ‘Love your neighbor’ to the extreme would likely cause bad effects. How can we objectively approach morals when when we have these dual impartial reasons and personal/partial reasons?
In the Preface of ‘On What Matters’, Parfit goes out of his way to compliment Sedgwick for the drab accurate style he employed while comprehensively analyzing ethical matters. In ‘Chapter 6 Morality’, Parfit jumps straight into Sedgwick’s Dualism (dual impartial reasons and personal/partial reasons). I am not all of the way through the chapter, so I will give you an American Football analogy of what I see so far. Sedgwick marched down the field through describing the mechanics of this dualism, but punted when it comes to considering conflicts between them. I can’t believe this, look down the field! There is Derek Parfit with the ball!
