Anyway, I was so busy looking upward and outward that I didn’t see the dead squirrel on the road and I ran right over it.  I had to stand to regain my balance and I looked back at the dead squirrel,  whose glassy eyes were being eaten out by tiny white worms. Yuck.  Ugly.

I started wondering about the nature of beauty.  Do I see things as beautiful because I learned to see them that way from someone else?  I remember, as a child, being genuinely awe-struck by a nature scene painted on black velvet.  In later years, I saw the painting again and laughed because it was so garish.  What changed?  Did my aesthetic sense naturally mature or was I simply more cognizant of the qualities of “good art” after years of being subtly instructed? 

Is ugliness the opposite of beauty?  Physical attributes and lust aside, seems to me ugliness is more visceral, and strongly related to ideas.  Dead squirrel + worms = death. 

Are there ugly shapes?  There are beautiful shapes….the number 8, for instance, pleases me very much. 

If I see an ugly flower, it is usually because it looks like something unpleasant.  My neighbor has one that looks like a bunch of enflamed hemorrhoids surrounding an anus.

So…what is the function of beauty, anyway?  Why did it evolve.?  Again…sex attraction aside.  What is its purpose?

Any other thoughts on beauty?

But another issue occurs to me. And I’m not sure if this is dealt with at length anywhere. And that’s the fundamental set of concessions and investments one is making when committing TO argue at all.

My practical example involves power and authority. I submit to you that power is best justified by informed consent. And that someone who exercises power over you without at least the potential of your informed consent does so unjustly. We can argue about this elsewhere but take it for granted, at least, that this is MY position. Whether you agree or not.

Now, should I engage in argument with unjust authority?

I would say not. I would say that the choice to engage in argument at all, is itself a certain concession about the relationship between two parties. It speaks to equanimity and courtesy. It implies that two voices are, in some sense, of equal merit and status. At the very least its a compliment to the others capacity to be persuaded.

Further. The unjust authority will. judging from record, not use new information for the revision of conclusions. But rather for the revision of strategy. In other words, they have no regard for your concerns with respect for your person. But only with respect their tactical advantage over you. So its fundamentally not in your interest to argue with them.

Again, all of this is really just a throwaway example for a situation where argument isn’t warranted or appropriate. Regardless of the character of that argument.

I would submit that the appropriate and ethical target of argument are those parties with whom one shares established and consensual common interests. While holding different views as to the most efficient realization of those interests. If common interests and values are not ascertainable no reasonable argument is possible. Because it has no functional context.

Would you agree?

I would like to talk about the so called holy grail of secular ethics called Universally Preferable Behavior as devised by the philosopher Stefan Molyneux from Freedomain Radio.

UPB is an ethical framework to analyze and test the validity of moral propositions.

It can be used to scientifically establish objective moral truths, just like the relativity theory can be used to established objective physical truths. I find it very relevant for this reason, but it seems to be largely unknown among the science and reason community, or at the very least it isn’t usually discussed.

UPB is based on a simple idea, but many people seem to have a hard time wrapping their mind around it (similar to when you first hear about the theory of evolution). Hopefully I can give an adequate explanation of UPB so that everybody currently unfamiliar with it has an idea of how it works.

But if you want to understand it more fully you can read the book here: Online Book

Or watch a video presentation about it here: UPB Video

What follows is my own summary of UPB, which may or may not be correct:

UPB is based on a very widely accepted axiom that all other scientific theories share, namely that any proposition claiming to be true (otherwise it would be irrelevant) has to be:
a)  testable
b)  logically consistent
c)  and supported by empirical evidence

So just like it isn’t valid in Biology to claim that, for instance, life couldn’t have started without divine intervention, it is not valid to claim in Ethics that the bible offers a perfect set of moral rules that everyone should adhere to.

Neither of these propositions is testable (since the supernatural is by definition not testable) and therefore invalid.

However, there are of course plenty of propositions that are testable but not necessarily logically consistent or supported by evidence.

So just like in science we need a theory of evolution or gravity, etc. to test claims about the real world, we need a theory of ethics (UPB) to test moral claims.

It’s important to understand that the purpose of UPB is NOT to be a tool for judgement (i.e. is John immoral / guilty for killing Bob?), but merely to test the validity of propositions (is it moral to kill?).

Again, it’s helpful to compare it to science in order to understand why: the purpose of the theory of evolution is not to understand why Bill has blue eyes. Rather, it can explain why people with blue eyes were able to pass on their genes.

Now, the main idea behind UPB is that there IS such a thing as universally preferable behavior.

This isn’t particularly controversial. For example, if you want to lose weight, then it’s certainly universally preferable to exercise and eat healthy food. It’s not a matter of opinion or a subjective preference. It’s objectively true – everywhere, at any time, for everyone (unless you are sufficiently physiologically different from other people, i.e. an alien…) – and hence universally preferable.

But please notice that it is NOT universally PREFERRED behavior.

In other words, just because something is universally preferable doesn’t mean that everyone does it or is physically forced to do it.

This is a very common criticism in the context of objective ethics – people assume that ethics must be subjective because no one HAS to follow the same moral rules. But that is simply a misunderstanding. You CAN use leeches to try and cure your flu. But it is still objectively true that it won’t do you any good.

Similarly, if you preach morality and claim that it is moral to beat your wife and children, we can prove by using UPB that your ethics are false – even though you are technically still able to beat your wife and kids.

This is a crucial point; I hope I made it clear. But feel free to let me know if it doesn’t make sense to you.

Now then, once we understand that there is universally preferable behavior (we couldn’t function as human beings if there wasn’t), we can go on by ascertaining that EVERY moral proposition claims to be universally preferable. It wouldn’t make sense otherwise.

So if parents tell their children that they shouldn’t hit and push other kids, it is clear that this proposition is supposed to apply to ALL children (and adults), and not only to them or only half of the time or only in a specific location.

Moral claims are not portrayed as subjective preferences. In a societal context, moral rules become laws that are mandatory and punishable in the face of offense.

[I just want to point out that this is how moral propositions are generally viewed. People are free to say that they do not believe in objective moral rules or the legitimacy of laws, and that’s perfectly fine. But it doesn’t change the fact that most people DO. And UPB can be used to test those propositions. Again, if you personally believe that all moral claims are subjective and none is ultimately better than the other, that’s fine – but then you have obviously no right to claim that your position is preferable over any other (since it’s subjective, too). So you can’t say that others SHOULD believe that ethics is not universally preferable without implicitly claiming that it is universally preferable to do so and thus invalidating your claim.]

Now that we understand the nature of moral propositions, we can devise a methodology to test their validity. It is quite simple: we just have to ask whether a particular proposition CAN be universally preferable behavior.

Let’s illustrate this with a simple example: “Murder is moral”

This proposition claims that to kill other people against their will is universally preferable. But can it logically and practically BE universally preferable?

If you think about it, the answer is clearly no. In order for it to be “murder”, the victim has to try and avoid being murdered (since it must be against their will) and therefore cannot follow the proposition. So in other words, in order to be moral in this scenario, you have to follow the universally preferable behavior and at the same time avoid it, which is contradictory.

Once we establish that a certain proposition cannot be universally preferable, we can deduce that it therefore cannot be moral. I will stop here, but the UPB book illustrates multiple value categories that any proposition can be assigned to (amoral, aesthetically preferable and universally preferable) and explains how to do so.

That’s pretty much it. While it may not sound spectacular at first glance, it has some pretty serious implications, especially when it comes to our state system and the law (it pretty much invalidates both). UPB leaves us with a very simple and elegant (albeit radical) explanation as to how our society should look like.

Whether you think it’s a valid approach or not, I certainly think it’s worth discussing in-depth, which I don’t see happening much in scientifically minded circles.

So with that said – what do you think?

For instance, this moment. And this one.

Can you articulate what gives it its affective, artistic, emotional or other value-positive attributes?

I’ll try and provide an example to clarify the question. My moment finds its significance within a narrative of imaginative representation stretching both forwards and backward. Previous plans have either been realized or else have failed. Informing the structure of future plans.
Similarly, pleasurable experiences are recalled with a mixture of deliberation and impulse. Sometimes evoking a tincture of the sensation itself. Sometimes creating an even stronger and more potent mental cocktail than the original event. Just through the sheer tenacity of nostalgia. Pride, shame, joy, regret, love and hate all jostle for position.

What’s important to notice here?

Again, I’ll give you my take to clarify the question:

Events seem to mainly acquire significance through narrative. There may be isolated cases of pleasure or pain that are so distilled that they occur in apparent isolation. But for the most part, the quality and qualitative significance of each experience in active memory relies on its function with a dramatic arc. And the members, the actors, are temporal conduits for one another. Homo sapiens as individuals. But only truly human together.

In possible contrast:

I’m aware of at least the idea of contemplative states that purport to break this chain. At least for a while. Meditation practices that divorce individual experience from the baggage of individual identity. To relieve the quintessential suffering of existence. I’m not qualified to comment on the success or failure of such efforts. I use it only as a reference point for contrast. As a possible alternative to the storytelling mode I describe above.

Essentially, its the fear and trembling issue. If we agree that we have the resources to end our own existence in a manner and time of our choosing what explicit reasons can or should we provide for choosing to persist in living?

What about Chimps? Lions? All other social animals?

These animals, who do not “believe” in God and have never been given, nor have the capacity to understand a moral law live in social groups and cooperate and show what could arguably be described as a sense of morality towards each other. They don’t just kill each other and constantly fight and kill each others babies willy nilly. Certainly there is a social order, there are dominate and subordinate individuals and the “punishment”, if you will, for offenses against the group or challenging that social order can be violent and include death, but more often is ostricization. No more violent and arguably more “fair” than the moral law one finds in holy texts, which is more often death for the most minute offenses.

And, if these punishments were considered moral, given by God, and are “objective” then why has the punishment for these moral offenses changed over the centuries? Why is it that slavery was once considered just fine and there were even moral laws given by God to deal with property rights of slave owners and today this is morally reprehensible?

It makes no sense. Unless…

Engineering can be as objective as science, but it is objective within the context of a different framework than that of the sciences.  Engineering allows for a looser set of goals that can freely incorporate subjective realities and arbitrary selection criteria.  Certainly there is no scientific experiment that with total objectivity could establish that the well being of conscious creatures is the most important goal in the universe.  However, once such a goal is established we as a society could set about to engineer solutions to meet the goal and objectively evaluate them.

Brick Bungalow - 15 March 2012 10:35 AM

Is—————————————————-Ought.

I have yet to hear anyone connect them. I think the best and most consistent moral position is to own ones preferences as preferences and act upon them. Without calling them anything else.
I don’t like it but I do accept it.

IS and OUGHT are easy enough to connect.

Here is the formula:

IS + Moral Theory = OUGHT (in the sense of the moral theory)

As an example of IS lets use the natural fact:

the Earth is rotating around the Sun.

 

Now lets take a really simple made up objective theory.

the Natural-Fact Theory:  We have reason to believe natural facts.

 

This theory is adequate to produce an ought.  To be clear when we apply the theory we should specify its sense in the sentence.  In this case we will call it the natural-fact sense.

In the natural-fact sense, we ought to believe the Earth rotates around the Sun.

 

Once someone specifies the sense, the is and the ought are connected by the definitions within the theory that the sense refers to.

Although it is true that we do not possess all of the facts in the universe, and one day we may find the World does not rotate around the sun, and we are all in a vat of fluid like the Matrix and images have been fed into out brain all along, for now, the Earth rotating around the Sun is a natural-fact and the Natural-Fact Theory was objectively applied in the sentence.

It is true that in other senses, one may conclude we ought to believe something else, or we should not use ought at all.  That is why it is important to specify the sense of moral theory that is being used when invoking ought.

Another argument I hear often is “maybe the criteria is objective, and you may be correct in that sense, but you subjectively choose to use the theory.”  Although that is a point worth considering, that argument does not change the fact that in the Natural-Fact sense, we ought to believe the World rotates around the Sun.

Kant’s gist is that reality cannot be experienced as a thing-in-itself (ding an sich in German, which reminds me of a Chuck Berry song). My position is more related to the notion of “error band” in communication theory, which is that we cannot absolutely be sure what we experience conveys accurate information about reality. In other words, I focus more on communicability and predicability, which is the ability to form descriptive categories by which experiences can be communicated among entities.

Some self-described Transcendental Pragmatists are attempting to make the world safe for religion in ways that I consider suspect. Since I am in agreement with a Sufi quote I came across, “He who explains God is wrong”, I will probably disagree with them. My adoption of the “Transcendental” qualifier is an admission of defeat, insofar as I’ve come to the opinion that explaining all of reality, or even the part of it that I can experience, to an extent I would consider adequate is beyond the capability of any conscious entity. Another way to put it is that any such explanation would require a transfinite number of statements in any system of predicates that derive from experience. I suspect the order of that infinity is Aleph-prime rather than Aleph-null, as well, but I don’t understand the math well enough to be sure I believe it, much less actually use it to justify a “gut” feeling.

So, briefly, none of our explanations can be expected to be absolutely true representations of reality, where reality is a ding an sich. Moreover, even if an explanation were to be an absolutely true representation of reality, we would never be able to prove it beyond the shadow of any doubt, because of the limitations of our ability to measure (i.e., experience in a formal, controlled way). This principle throws a metaphorical wrench into traditional epistemology, and also into any literal religious belief system. Our explanations are dynamic systems which need to evolve in order to accommodate new findings (i.e., experiences that are communicable among conscious beings).

This principle has particular relevance to the notion of “Law of Nature”. It is reasonable to characterize the descriptions of the statistical regularities that we observe as laws. It is reasonable to hypothesize some kind of causal necessity “behind” those descriptions. However, it is dangerous to succumb to the temptation to describe that hypothesized causal necessity as a “law” of nature as well. Whatever that “necessity” is, it is not describable in any better known terms than the description that it has been hypothesized to “cause”.

I hope I’ve stated this well enough to inspire or provoke some thoughtful comment.

I’ve heard a number of secular people describe a hard journey of realization and ownership over atheism. And once the threshold is crossed, the need to publicly state the fact of it. As a matter of principle.

Christianity, for some contrast, explicitly instructs its members to declare for the faith. And usually to proselytize as well. I would say this is most clearly inferred by the story of the denial of Peter. But it’s repeated numerous times.

Personally, I feel little pressure in this regard. I like to think I have moral principles and generally behave well. But I have little attachment to certainties over matters of fact. I’m far more interested in exploring, comparing and testing the boundaries of my mind and of the cultural assumptions that have informed it thus far. Rather than stoically defending some set of propositions. This is probably something of a luxury for most people. But it is what it is.